Title
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Bigo
Case
G.R. No. 10202
Decision Date
Mar 29, 1916
Municipality of Cardona challenged Binangonan's jurisdiction over disputed barrios, alleging unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 66. Court upheld Binangonan's authority, ruling the order valid under legislative presumption and executive authority.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 10202)

Factual Background

The municipality of Cardona filed an action seeking to prohibit perpetually the municipality of Binangonan from exercising municipal authority over the named barrios. The complaint alleged that Binangonan was then exercising governmental authority over the barrios “to the exclusion of the municipality of Cardona.”

Cardona attributed this asserted exclusionary authority to Executive Order No. 66, which purported to define and fix the boundary line between Binangonan and Cardona in the Province of Rizal. The quoted executive order stated, in substance, that the boundary line on the mainland and on the island of Talim was to be determined in specified geographic terms, with the effect of embracing several barrios or sitios—expressly including Tatala, Balatik, Mambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo, Sam pad, and Bonot—within the limits of Binangonan. Conversely, it confirmed as embraced within Cardona’s jurisdiction a portion of Talim at specified points, while placing the remainder of Talim and certain off-lying islands under Binangonan’s jurisdiction.

Cardona further alleged that the executive order and the act under which it was issued were “unconstitutional.” It asserted that Act No. 1748 conferred legislative authority upon the Governor-General, and that by promulgating the executive order the Governor-General usurped legislative functions.

Finally, Cardona claimed the executive order was void because it allegedly did not (1) contain a statement that the change in the division line between the municipalities was required by the public good, and (2) show, within the order itself, that there was a present urgency requiring its promulgation.

Procedural Posture: Demurrer and the Court’s Limited Inquiry

The municipality of Binangonan demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court framed the matter as being “before us is that presented by the demurrer,” thereby limiting the inquiry to whether the objections raised by Cardona, as pleaded, sufficed to sustain a cause of action or to defeat the executive order and the authority claimed under it.

The Parties’ Contentions

Cardona’s position rested on three principal objections to the executive order. First, it contended that the enabling statute, Act No. 1748, was unconstitutional because it allegedly conferred legislative authority on the Governor-General, and thus the Governor-General allegedly acted beyond constitutional bounds.

Second, Cardona argued the executive order was void for failing to state that the boundary change was required by the public good.

Third, Cardona alleged the executive order was void because it allegedly did not reflect in the order itself any present urgency justifying its issuance.

In response, Binangonan maintained through demurrer that the complaint did not allege facts that legally constituted a sufficient basis for the requested prohibition.

Ruling of the Court

The court sustained the demurrer. It held that Cardona’s objections were not well founded. The court ruled that, unless Cardona amended the complaint within five days from service of a copy of the order by eliminating the objections identified by the court, the action would be dismissed on the merits.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

On the constitutional challenge, the court stated that no reason had been given why Act No. 1748 was unconstitutional. It noted further that no argument or citations of authority were presented on that issue. The court then invoked the presumption that every act of the legislature is constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown. Since Cardona failed to make a showing of unconstitutionality, the court overruled the objection to the Governor-General’s order on that ground.

As to the remaining objections, the court characterized them as “frivolous.” It reasoned that even assuming the Governor-General “ought not” to make such an order unless the public good required it, the fact need not be stated in the order. The court similarly treated the “urgency” requirement in the same manner, stating that the order likewise need not show within itself that there was present urgency.

The court further reasoned that because the Governor-General had “full authority” to promulgate such an order, the court would assume—if it were to act on the matter—that there was public necessity and that the matter was of such urgency as properly evoked action by the Chief Executive. Accordingly, the court found no legal defect in the executive order b

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