Title
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr.
Case
G.R. No. 87636
Decision Date
Nov 19, 1990
Senate challenged President's veto of budget provisions restricting fund augmentation; Supreme Court upheld veto, affirming executive authority over distinct, germane provisions.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 87636)

Key Dates

• 16 Dec 1988: House Bill No. 19186 (GAA 1989) passed by Congress.
• 29 Dec 1988: President signs and partially vetoes Special Provisions and Section 55 (General Provision).
• 2 Feb 1989: Senate Resolution No. 381 directs Finance Committee to challenge veto.
• 11 Apr 1989: Petition for prohibition/mandamus filed in Supreme Court.
• 7 Sep 1989: Petition given due course; parties ordered to file memoranda.
• 19 Jan 1990: Supplemental petition added challenge to veto of Section 16 in GAA 1990.
• 14 Aug 1990: Case submitted for decision; oral arguments held 11 Sep 1990.
• 19 Nov 1990: En banc decision rendered under the 1987 Constitution.

Applicable Law

• 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 27(2): Presidential power to veto “any particular item or items” in appropriation bills.
• Article VI, Section 25(2): Provisions in GAA must relate specifically to particular appropriations.
• Article VI, Section 25(5): Congress may authorize by law augmentation of items from savings.
• PD No. 1177, Secs. 44–45 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977, as amended by RA 6670): Presidential authority to augment or use savings to cover deficits.
• GAA 1989, Sec. 12 and GAA 1990, Sec. 16(1): Statutory grant of augmentation power.

Factual Background

Congress reduced or eliminated certain items from the President’s proposed budgets for FY 1989 and FY 1990. After enactment, the President line‐vetoed Section 55 (GAA 1989) and Section 16 (GAA 1990) on the ground that they nullified the executive’s constitutionally/statutorily authorized power to augment items from savings. The Senate filed suit to declare those vetoes unconstitutional.

Presidential Vetoed Provisions

Section 55 (FY 89) and the proviso in Section 16 (FY 90) prohibit restoration or increase by augmentation of any item recommended by the President if disapproved or reduced by Congress. The President’s veto messages cited violation of Article VI, Section 25(5) and inconsistency with existing budget laws (PD 1177).

Issues Presented

Whether the President’s line‐veto of Sections 55 and 16—drafted as “provisions” or conditions in appropriation bills—exceeded her constitutional authority and whether those vetoes are void.

Petitioners’ Arguments

  1. The President’s item‐veto power covers only monetary items, not provisions or conditions.
  2. To veto provisions would constitute legislation, violating separation of powers.
  3. Congress, having authorized augmentation by law, may impose conditions on that power.

Respondents’ Arguments

  1. The dispute is a nonjusticiable political question; remedy was congressional override.
  2. The vetoed clauses were extraneous “riders” and appropriately struck out.
  3. Statutory authority (PD 1177) and constitutional text empower the President to veto distinct/severable parts of an appropriation bill, including provisions.

Justiciability and Jurisdiction

The Court found an actual controversy: a coordinate‐powers dispute requiring judicial resolution under Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. The political question doctrine did not bar review of a claimed excess of executive authority.

Scope of the President’s Item‐Veto Power

Article VI, Section 27(2) permits veto of “any particular item or items” in an appropriation bill. Though the 1935 Constitution expressly mentioned provisions, the 1987 framers intentionally omitted that qualifier, but did not intend to narrow longstanding practice: distinct and severable parts may be vetoed if they pertain to specific appropriations.

Appropriateness of the Vetoed Provisions

Under Article VI, Section 25(2), provisions must relate specifically to particular line items. Sections 55 and 16 apply generally to all disapproved or reduced items and cannot be tied to any single appropriation on the bill’s face. They function as extraneous legislative enunciations rather than budgetary provisions, rendering them “inappropriate” and properly subject to item‐veto treatment.

Appropriateness of the Vetoed Conditions

While Congress may attach bona fide conditions to specific appropriations, those conditions must exhibit a logical connection to itemized expenditures. Sections 55/16 do not: they regulate augmentations involving non‐enumerated savings and cannot be linked to a single schedule item, thus qualifying as general law measures rather than true budget conditions.

Constitutional Authority to Augment from Savings

Article VI, Section 25(5) allows augmentation by law; PD 1177 (Sec. 44) and GAA 1989 (Sec. 12)/GAA 1990 (Sec. 16) granted that authority. Judicial precedent (Demetria v. Alba) upheld the power’s validity and scope—limited to intra‐department transfers from savings. Sections 55/16 conflict with these grants by prohibiting augmentation of items red



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