Title
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr.
Case
G.R. No. 87636
Decision Date
Nov 19, 1990
Senate challenged President's veto of budget provisions restricting fund augmentation; Supreme Court upheld veto, affirming executive authority over distinct, germane provisions.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 87636)

Key Dates and Procedural History

House Bill No. 19186 (General Appropriations Bill for FY 1989) passed 16 December 1988 and was signed into law (RA 6688) on 29 December 1988 with seven Special Provisions and Section 55 vetoed. Senate Resolution No. 381 (2 February 1989) declared the Senate’s view that the veto of Section 55 was unconstitutional. Petition filed 11 April 1989; Solicitor General filed Comment 25 August 1989. Supplemental petition (challenging Section 16 of FY 1990 act) was admitted. Consolidated memoranda filed June–August 1990; case submitted August 1990 and oral arguments heard 11 September 1990. Decision rendered for the majority upholding the presidential veto and dismissing the petition.

Applicable Law and Textual Provisions Considered

Primary constitutional provisions: 1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 27 (presidential veto power — general and item veto) and Article VI Section 25(2) and 25(5) (limits on provisions in general appropriations bill; possibility of authorization by law to augment appropriations from savings). Statutory instruments and enactments engaged: Presidential Decree No. 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977), as amended (notably Sections 44 and 45), Republic Act No. 6670 (amendment), and the General Appropriations Acts (Sections 12 and the vetoed Sections 55 [FY 1989] and 16 [FY 1990]).

Central Legal Questions Presented

  1. Whether the President exceeded the constitutional item-veto power by vetoing Section 55 (FY 1989) and Section 16 (FY 1990), which petitioners characterize as “provisions” rather than “items.”
  2. Whether Sections 55 and 16 are valid budgetary conditions (i.e., provisions properly embraced in an appropriations act) or whether they are inappropriate general-law measures that, if inserted in an appropriations act, must be treated as items subject to the presidential item veto.
  3. Whether, and to what extent, Congress could restrict the executive’s statutory authority to augment appropriations from savings by enacting such restrictions within an appropriations act.

Background Facts Relevant to the Dispute

Congress reduced or eliminated certain items from the President’s budgetary recommendations in the general appropriations bills for FY 1989 and FY 1990. The President signed the bills into law but vetoed Section 55 (a general provision in RA 6688) and later vetoed a related proviso (Section 16) in the FY 1990 Act. The veto rationale asserted that the challenged provisions violated Article VI, Section 25(5) by nullifying the authority of the President—and other enumerated officials—to augment appropriations from savings, authority that had been implemented in statutory law (PD 1177, Secs. 44–45, and GAAs’ Use of Savings sections).

Text and Purpose of the Vetoed Provisions

Section 55 (FY 1989) prohibited restoration or increase by augmentation of any appropriation item recommended by the President that Congress had disapproved or reduced; it also treated the absence of a corresponding appropriation as a congressional disapproval. The FY 1990 counterpart (Section 16) combined the “Use of Savings” authorization with a proviso containing substantially the same restriction, i.e., forbidding augmenting items that the President had recommended but which Congress had disapproved or reduced.

Petitioners’ Principal Arguments

  • The President’s item-veto power is limited to items (specific monetary appropriations) and does not extend to “provisions”; vetoing a provision is beyond executive authority.
  • If the President objects to a provision in an appropriations bill, the remedy is a veto of the entire bill, not a line veto of the provision.
  • Allowing the President to veto conditions or restrictions would amount to legislative action by the executive in violation of separation of powers.
  • Article VI Section 25(5) contemplates authorization “by law” to augment from savings; Congress may therefore define and limit that authority by statute and in the appropriations act.

Respondents’ (Solicitor General’s) Counterarguments

  • The controversy presents a justiciable dispute; alternatively, the issue could be political (but respondents advanced legal defenses).
  • The President may veto distinct and severable parts of an appropriation bill; items and certain severable parts fall within the item-veto power.
  • Section 55 is a “rider” or extraneous to appropriations and thus subject to veto; statutory authority to augment exists (PD 1177, Secs. 44–45, and the GAAs’ Use of Savings), which the President may lawfully protect by veto.

Justiciability and Jurisdictional Determination

The Court found an actual justiciable controversy between the legislative and executive branches. It rejected political-question dismissal, reiterating the judiciary’s duty to resolve constitutional limits of government branches. Petitioners’ status as senators and as taxpayers provided sufficient standing for judicial determination.

Majority’s Interpretation of the Item-Veto Power

The majority construed Article VI Section 27(2) (1987 Constitution) as retaining the prior constitutional principle that the executive may veto “distinct and severable parts” of appropriation legislation. Although the 1935 Constitution expressly mentioned veto of provisions when related to items, the 1987 text uses “item or items” without mentioning “provision,” but the Court held that this omission did not narrow the scope to exclude veto of distinct and severable parts that function as appropriation items. The Court emphasized a non-strict construction of the veto power in favor of its constitutionality, citing prior authority that courts should indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto.

Majority’s Characterization of Sections 55 and 16 as Inappropriate Provisions (Treated as Items)

The majority concluded that Sections 55 (FY 1989) and 16 (FY 1990) were not true budgetary provisions in the sense required by Article VI Section 25(2) (i.e., that a provision must relate specifically to some particular appropriation and be limited in operation to that appropriation). The Court reasoned that the challenged provisions: (1) applied generally to all items disapproved or reduced (not to a particular appropriation); (2) required reference to the President’s original budget to identify affected items (they were not self-contained on the face of the enrolled bill); and (3) were expressions of general legislative policy concerning augmentation rather than connected budgetary conditions. On these bases, the Court treated the vetoed “provisions” as inappropriate measures that must be treated as items for purposes of the President’s item veto.

Majority’s View on Conditions/Restrictions and Applicability of Bolinao

The majority recognized that genuine budgetary conditions and provisos attached to particular appropriations (which have a nexus to specific items on the face of the appropriations schedule) are not subject to separate executive veto without vetoing the related appropriation item (as in Bolinao). However, the Court found Bolinao inapplicable here because the challenged sections lacked the required nexus to a specific appropriation and instead amounted to general legislative measures improperly shoehorned into an appropriations act.

Majority’s Analysis of the Power of Augmentation and Validity of the Veto

The Court acknowledged that Article VI Section 25(5) contemplates that augmentation authority must be authorized “by law” and observed that statutory authorization existed (PD 1177 Secs. 44–45; RA 6670; Section 12 of the 1989 GAA). The majority held that Sections 55 and 16, by prohibiting restoration or increase by augmentation of items reduced or disapproved by Congress, impaired the constitutional and statutory authority to augment from savings. Because the augmentation authority is more properly a matter of general law (a non-appropriation item) that should be defined by separate legislation rather than annually restricted or rescinded via provisions inserted into an appropriations act, the presidential veto of Sections 55 and 16 was upheld as valid. The Court emphasized that if Congress wished to nullify existing statutory authorization, it should have done so explicitly by separate enactment, and that Congress also had the constitutional remedy of overriding the veto but did not attempt to do so.

Holding and Relief

The Supreme Court majority upheld the constitutionality of the Presidential vetoes of Section 55 (FY 1989) and Section 16 (FY 1990) and dismissed the petition. No costs were imposed.

Dissent — Justice Cruz (Summary)

Justice Cruz dissented, contesting the majority’s validation of the veto. Key points: Section 25(5) is not self-executing; statutory authorization (PD 1177 Sec. 44) was the source of augmentation authority, and Congress may revoke delegated authority; Section 44 belonged in the General Appropriations Act rather than in the Budget Reform Decree and was, in her view, a rider to PD 1177. She argued that Congress can recall delegated authority by legislation and that Section 55 was a legitimate expression of legislative intent to w

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