Gonzales vs. Hechanova

Factual Background

On September 22, 1963 the Executive Secretary authorized the importation of sixty-seven thousand tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources and created a rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents to implement the proposed importation. Petitioner, a substantial rice landowner of two hundred seventy-five hectares and president of a planters association, filed an original petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, alleging that the importation was undertaken without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and contravened the prohibitions and policy embodied in Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452.

Procedural History

The petition sought immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondents from implementing the Executive Secretary’s authorization, and permanent relief after hearing. Respondents filed an answer and the parties presented memoranda; oral argument was waived. The Court heard the incident and then set the matter for hearing on the merits, treating jurisdictional and preliminary matters together with the substantive issues.

The Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner contended that Republic Act No. 3452 forbids importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency and that the government must purchase from local tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners; he asserted lack of other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Respondents maintained that the importation lay outside those statutes because it was authorized by the President for military stockpiling under his powers as Commander-in-Chief pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 1, and that the Government as such was not encompassed by the statutory prohibition against importation by a “government agency.” Respondents further relied on alleged contracts executed with the Governments of Viet Nam and Burma and on irrevocable letters of credit.

Standing and Sufficiency of Interest

The Court held that petitioner possessed sufficient interest to invoke judicial relief. It reasoned that Republic Act No. 3452 declared a governmental policy of procuring rice directly from local producers, thereby affording planters a concrete expectancy of opportunity to sell to the Government, and that petitioner, as a producer and taxpayer, had sufficient personality to seek to restrain the alleged unlawful disposition of public funds.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Court rejected the contention that petitioner had not exhausted administrative remedies. It reiterated recognized exceptions to the exhaustion rule where the question is purely legal, where the contested act is patently illegal or beyond jurisdiction, where the respondent acts as an alter ego of the President, or where urgency requires judicial intervention. The Court found the case to fall within these exceptions and proceeded to decide the merits.

Applicability of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 to Government Importation

The Court concluded that both Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 applied to the proposed importation and encompassed importations by the Government. The Court read Republic Act No. 2207 as generally prohibiting importation of rice and corn except where the President, under prescribed conditions, authorized importation through a government agency. It read Republic Act No. 3452 as explicitly forbidding importation by the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency and as reserving importation to private parties. The Court rejected the distinction urged by respondents that the Government itself was outside the term “government agency,” observing that government departments, instrumentalities and officers are government agencies or agents and that the statutory scheme, penal sanctions against public officials, and the preference mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 138 all evidenced legislative intent to bind government importations.

National Defense Argument and Commonwealth Act No. 1

The Court held that reliance on Commonwealth Act No. 1 did not authorize the importation in question. It found that the provisions invoked from Section 2 of that Act were policy declarations and not self-executing grants of power to override existing statutes. The Court noted that the Act itself contemplated that means for mobilization and security measures would be provided by Congress and that Section 5’s resource provisions operated “during a national mobilization,” a condition not present. The Court further observed that stockpiling for national reserve purposes fell within the statutory framework established by Republic Act No. 3452, which expressly empowered the Rice and Corn Administration to accumulate buffer stocks under specified conditions.

Executive Agreements and Contracts With Viet Nam and Burma

The Court found the alleged government-to-government contracts with Viet Nam and Burma insufficiently established as executive agreements and, in any event, held that an executive agreement could not lawfully contravene clear statutory prohibitions. The Court rejected respondents’ reliance on an American jurisprudential rule favoring the later instrument in conflicts between treaties and statutes, noting that respondents did not treat the instruments as treaties and that the President may not, by executive agreement, nullify statutes enacted by Congress. The Court invoked the Constitution’s provision conferring judicial power to review the validity of treaties, laws and executive orders and concluded that purported executive agreements inconsistent with statute would be subject to judicial invalidation.

Ruling on the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Disposition

The Court declared that the Executive Secretary had no power to authorize the importation in question and that he exceeded his jurisdiction; it held that the proposed importation was not sanctioned by law and contravened the cited statutes. The Court nonetheless denied petitioner’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction for lack of the requisite majority of the Court to grant injunctive relief. The judgment therefore sustained the legal conclusion of illegality