Title
Gonzales vs. De Carungcong
Case
G.R. No. L-3272-73
Decision Date
Nov 29, 1951
Dispute over validity of three wills: 1942, 1945, and 1948 revocation. Court upheld 1945 will, revoked 1942, and nullified 1948 due to testatrix's incapacity.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-16394)

Factual Background

The testatrix died at about seventy-eight years of age, leaving five children: Alejandro Gonzales, Jr., Manuel Gonzales, Leopoldo Gonzales, Manolita Gonzales de Carungcong, and Juan Gonzales. The estate was estimated at P150,000. Two instruments were presented for probate: an alleged will dated November 16, 1942 (Exhibit BManuel Gonzales) offered by Manuel Gonzales, and an alleged will dated May 5, 1945 (Exhibit 1Manolita G. Carungcong) offered by Manolita G. de Carungcong. Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. opposed both wills, alleging revocation by an instrument dated November 18, 1948 (Exhibit 2Alejandro and Juan Gonzales), which, if valid, would render the estate intestate. Other children, except Leopoldo Gonzales, filed oppositions in varying respects.

Trial Court Proceedings

After a joint hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered judgment with three dispositive conclusions: first, that Exhibit BManuel Gonzales, though validly executed on November 16, 1942, was revoked by Exhibit 1Manolita G. Carungcong pursuant to section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure; second, that Exhibit 2Alejandro and Juan Gonzales was null and void for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix and for failure to comply with section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and third, that Exhibit 1Manolita G. Carungcong was executed in accordance with law and was admitted to probate as the true and last will and testament. Manuel Gonzales and Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. appealed; Juan Gonzales’s appeal was dismissed for failure to pay his proportionate printing costs.

The May 5, 1945 Instrument and the Attestation Issue

The will dated May 5, 1945 (Exhibit 1Manolita G. Carungcong) was in seven pages and contained a penultimate clause stating the number of pages and describing signature and witness formalities, followed by a concluding paragraph signed by the testatrix and three witnesses. Appellants contended that the instrument lacked a valid attestation clause because the concluding paragraph was the act of the testatrix and not of the witnesses and because the clause did not sufficiently state the number of sheets or pages. The trial court found the attestation sufficient and admitted the will to probate.

Precedent and Treatment of Attestation Clauses

The Supreme Court examined recent authority, notably Valentina Cuevas v. Pilar Achacoso, G. R. No. L-3497 (May, 1951), and Aldaba v. Roque, 43 Phil. 378, which upheld attestation clauses that appeared, at first glance, to be declarations by the testator but were signed by the instrumental witnesses immediately beneath the testator’s signature. The Court held that such an attestation clause substantially complied with legal requirements because the signatures of the instrumental witnesses immediately under the testatrix’s signature demonstrated their participation in and attestation to the due execution of the will. The Court rejected a hypertechnical requirement that the attestation be contained in a single clause or drafted in a particular form when the authenticity of the will was not impeached.

Effect of the Validity of the 1945 Will on the 1942 Instrument

Because the Court concluded that Exhibit 1Manolita G. Carungcong was a valid will executed on May 5, 1945, it necessarily followed that the earlier will dated November 16, 1942 (Exhibit BManuel Gonzales) was revoked by the subsequent valid will. The trial court’s refusal to admit Exhibit B to probate was therefore sustained.

The Alleged Revocation Instrument of November 18, 1948

Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. maintained that Exhibit 2Alejandro and Juan Gonzales, dated November 18, 1948, revoked Exhibit 1. The instrument purports to declare all prior testaments void and contains a statement that the preparer, Jose Padilla, was requested to sign for the testatrix on November 17, 1948, in Pasay City. The trial court declared this instrument null and void on the ground that it was executed without the testamentary capacity and knowledge of the testatrix.

Evidence Concerning Testamentary Capacity

The Supreme Court reviewed the medical and lay testimony and found no reason to overturn the trial court’s finding that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity on November 18, 1948. The attending physician, Dr. Jose C. Leveriza, testified uncontradictedly that the testatrix had suffered hypertension for more than ten years, had aphasia on November 14, 1948, was admitted to the hospital on November 15, 1948 with probable cerebral thrombosis, and remained comatose, sleeping constantly, incapable of speech or understanding, and hemiplegic through November 18, 1948 until her death on November 27, 1948. The Court afforded greater weight to the observations of the attending physician who had continuous contact with the patient than to the declarations of attesting witnesses who had not examined her medically and whose statements indicated uncertainty about her condition.

Credibility, Delay, and Circumstances of Execution

The Court noted suspicious circumstances concerning the timing and preparation of the alleged revocation. Testimony showed that Jose Padilla had been requested as early as May, 1948, and reminded on several occasions before November 1, 1948, to prepare the revocation, but he delayed until November 17–18; his excuses for delay were considered inadequate. The Court emphasized that the instrument in question was couched in general terms

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