Case Summary (G.R. No. L-28196)
Petitions and Procedural Posture
Congress adopted three Resolutions on March 16, 1967: R.B.H. No. 1 (increase House membership cap from 120 to 180 and apportion 160 seats), R.B.H. No. 2 (call a constitutional convention with delegates to be elected in 1971), and R.B.H. No. 3 (permit senators and representatives to be delegates to the convention without forfeiting seats). Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913 (approved June 17, 1967) to submit the amendments proposed in R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 to the people at the general election scheduled for November 14, 1967, and to prescribe publication, posting and ballot requirements. Gonzales filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction on October 21, 1967; PHILCONSA filed a petition for certiorari on October 31, 1967. The matters were submitted to the Court for decision.
Applicable Law and Constitutional Provisions
The Court considered the then‑applicable Constitution (the fundamental law under which Article XV, Article VI and other provisions were interpreted). Central constitutional provisions invoked include Section 1, Article XV (method of proposing amendments and requirement of ratification by majority at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people), Section 5 and Section 16 of Article VI (composition and apportionment of the House and eligibility of legislators), and impeachment and treaty review provisions cited to demonstrate judicial review of constitutionality.
Threshold Issue — Jurisdiction and Justiciability
The Court held that the issues raised are justiciable. Although past decisions (notably Mabanag v. Lopez Vito) had labeled certain amendment‑process questions as political and nonjusticiable, subsequent precedents rejected categorical political‑question immunity where constitutional limits or allocations of power are at stake. The Court concluded that whether congressional resolutions proposed as constituent‑assembly acts exceed constitutional limits is subject to judicial review; members of Congress, when acting as a constituent assembly, derive authority from the Constitution and therefore do not have final, uncontrollable power to act without judicial scrutiny.
Issues Presented on the Merits
Petitioners advanced four principal contentions: (1) the members of Congress who approved the proposed amendments were, by reason of failure to effect a required reapportionment, only de facto congressmen and thus lacked authority; (2) Congress may either propose amendments or call a convention but may not validly do both; (3) ratification must occur at a special election (not at a general election selecting national and local officials); and (4) the conditions prescribed by R.A. 4913 did not give the people a reasonable opportunity to understand and deliberate on the proposed amendments (due‑process/adequacy of submission).
Legality of Congress and the Effect of Failure to Reapportion
The Court rejected the contention that failure to enact a valid reapportionment within three years after the 1960 enumeration rendered Congress or its members illegal or de jure void. Congress had enacted an apportionment statute (R.A. No. 3040) which was later declared unconstitutional, but the Constitution itself provided a fallback: until apportionment is made, the House shall retain the same number of members as fixed by law for the National Assembly and those members shall be elected from the present assembly districts. On that basis the Court found the 1961 organized Congress to be a de jure body and its members de jure officers. The Court also explained and applied the de facto officer doctrine: even if persons were merely de facto officeholders, their acts within the competence of the office are valid as to the public and their title cannot be collaterally assailed; challenges to title belong properly to direct proceedings (quo warranto). The Court therefore held that the validity of the contested resolutions and R.A. 4913 cannot be invalidated on the collateral ground that members were de facto only.
Whether Congress May Both Propose Amendments and Call a Convention
Addressing the argument that Congress may exercise one alternative only, the Court analyzed the disjunctive “or” in Article XV and found no constitutional prohibition against Congress acting on different alternatives (i.e., proposing some amendments while calling a convention to consider others). The Court noted that the three resolutions, though adopted on the same date, were distinct in subject and were voted upon separately. It also observed that the Constitution’s text and history did not support a strict restriction preventing Congress from pursuing both alternatives at different times or for different subject matters. The Court characterized objections on the wisdom or prudence of doing both as political questions outside judicial review.
Whether Submission for Ratification Must Be in a Special Election
The Court examined Section 1, Article XV and concluded the Constitution uses the term “an election” without qualification; it does not mandate a special election. While the Court acknowledged that submitting amendments at a special plebiscite devoted solely to the amendment may be preferable for public deliberation, the Constitution does not forbid submission at a general election. Several members of the Court felt the term “election” could be read to mean a plebiscite; others thought the use of “election” was intentional and allowed concurrence with the election of public officials. The majority view (as expressed by the opinion of the Chief Justice) held that Congress may lawfully submit proposed amendments to popular ratification at a general election.
Adequacy of Republic Act No. 4913’s Procedures for Submission (Sufficiency of Notice)
The Act required publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election; posting of the proposed amendments in municipal, city and provincial offices and in each polling place not later than October 14, 1967 (to remain until after the election); at least five copies of the amendments in each polling place; availability in principal native languages when practicable; availability of free copies in English, Spanish and principal native languages; and printing the full Resolutions on the back of the ballot with a simple yes/no questionnaire on the face. The majority (those who upheld R.A. 4913) found these measures constitutionally sufficient to “submit” the amendments to the people and to satisfy due‑process requirements of giving reasonable opportunity to be informed; they characterized criticisms as addressing wisdom or sufficiency but not constitutionality. The majority also relied on historical precedent showing similar dissemination methods used for prior constitutional amendments.
Dissenting / Separate Opinions and Countervailing Reasoning (Sanchez opinion)
A significant minority (Justice Sanchez, joined by several brethren) dissented on the adequacy of submission and would have declared R.A. 4913 unconstitutional. The separate opinion emphasized the transcendental nature of the proposed amendments (increase in House size; allowing legislators to be delegates without forfeiture) and
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-28196)
Facts of the Case
- On March 16, 1967 the Senate and the House of Representatives adopted three separate Resolutions of Both Houses (R.B.H. Nos. 1, 2 and 3):
- R.B.H. No. 1 proposed amending Section 5, Article VI to increase the maximum membership of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 and to apportion seats among provinces “as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants,” guaranteeing at least one member per province.
- R.B.H. No. 2 called for a constitutional convention composed of two elective delegates from each representative district to be elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971.
- R.B.H. No. 3 proposed amending Section 16, Article VI to authorize Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.
- Congress passed a bill implementing the submission of the R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 amendments to the people; this bill became Republic Act No. 4913 upon presidential approval on June 17, 1967, providing that the proposed amendments be submitted for approval at the general elections on November 14, 1967.
- Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales filed an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction on October 21, 1967 (G.R. No. L-28196) seeking to restrain: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing R.A. No. 4913 or holding the plebiscite on the proposed amendments; (b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots pursuant to R.A. No. 4913; and (c) the Auditor General from passing any disbursement from the appropriation made in R.A. No. 4913. He also prayed that R.A. No. 4913 be declared unconstitutional and void.
- PHILCONSA filed a separate petition (G.R. No. L-28224) for review by certiorari of a Commission on Elections resolution dismissing PHILCONSA’s petition that urged the Comelec to refrain from implementing R.A. No. 4913; the two cases were considered together and deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967.
Parties, Standing, and Amici
- Ramon A. Gonzales: admitted Filipino citizen, taxpayer, and voter; alleged to institute a class suit on behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated (petitioners deny or express no knowledge of the class allegation).
- Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA): admitted corporation organized under Philippine law; civic, non-profit, non-partisan; objective to uphold the rule of law and defend the Constitution.
- Respondents: Commission on Elections, Director of Printing, and Auditor General.
- Solicitor General appeared for respondents; Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for PHILCONSA (Dr. Salvador Araneta) were permitted to argue as amici curiae.
- Senator Arturo M. Tolentino appeared to oppose PHILCONSA’s petition before the Court and advanced objections including lack of jurisdiction and policy concerns.
Procedural History
- Petitions filed: L-28196 (Gonzales) on October 21, 1967; L-28224 (PHILCONSA) filed October 31, 1967; both were submitted for decision November 8, 1967.
- Solicitor General filed answers; memoranda and reply memoranda were filed as part of submission.
- The Court considered both petitions together for decision.
Reliefs Sought
- Prohibition and preliminary injunction restraining Comelec, Director of Printing, and Auditor General from implementing R.A. No. 4913 and related actions.
- Declaratory relief: that R.A. No. 4913 and the congressional Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 be declared unconstitutional and void.
- PHILCONSA sought review of the Comelec resolution dismissing its petition.
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Invoked
- Section 1, Article XV, Constitution of the Philippines: procedural requirements for amendment proposals and ratification (“three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately” to propose amendments; validity when “approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification”).
- Section 5, Article VI, Constitution of the Philippines: composition and apportionment of the House of Representatives; requirement that Congress by law make an apportionment within three years after every enumeration, and until such apportionment the House to have the same number fixed by law for the National Assembly.
- Provisions of Republic Act No. 4913, especially Section 2 (publication, posting, availability of copies, printing on ballots) and Section 4 (ballot form; printing of full resolutions on back of ballots) and appropriation provisions.
Issues Presented
- Whether the Court has jurisdiction (i.e., whether the questions presented are justiciable or political).
- Whether R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 (proposed amendments) and R.A. No. 4913 (statute submitting those amendments for ratification in the November 14, 1967 general elections) are constitutional.
- Sub-issues:
- Whether the Congress and the Members who approved the proposed amendments were de jure or only de facto due to alleged failure to make reapportionment within three years after the 1960 census.
- Whether Congress may both propose amendments and call a convention (i.e., whether it may adopt both alternatives).
- Whether proposed amendments may be submitted for ratification at a general election (concurrent with elections for public officers) or must be submitted in a special election/plebiscite.
- Whether the notification and dissemination measures prescribed by R.A. No. 4913 (publication in Official Gazette, posting, availability of copies in polling places, printing full resolutions on back of ballots, etc.) adequately “submit” the amendments to the people pursuant to Article XV.
Jurisdiction and Justiciability
- The Court reaffirmed the principle that judicial power includes review of whether other departments act within constitutional limits:
- Cited Angara v. Electoral Commission: judicial department determines allocation of power between departments.
- Recognized Mabanag v. Lopez Vito as precedent where Court declined to decide a political question; however, subsequent cases (Suanes, Avelino, Tanada, Macias) have weakened Mabanag’s force and supported judicial review in related matters.
- Held that whether a Congressional resolution acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution is justiciable and subject to judicial review; this position was unanimous among the members on the point.
- The Court emphasized that the power to propose amendments is an exercise of constituent assembly authority derived from the Constitution and thus not immune from judicial scrutiny merely because it is “political.”
Merits — Legality of Congress and Status of Members (Apportionment Issue)
- Petitioners argued Congress and its Members were de facto because Congress failed to make the reapportionment within three years after the 1960 enumeration (as required by Section 5, Art. VI).
- The Court found:
- Congress did pass an apportionment law (R.A. No. 3040, approved June 17, 1961) but that Act was later declared unconstitutional in Macias v. Commission on Elections for not apportioning by number of inhabitants.
- The constitutional provision requiring apportionment within three years is mandatory in form but its failure to be observed does not dissolve Congress or convert Members into de facto officers.
- The Constitution itself provides for continuity: “Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly,” implying continued de jure status under the pre-existing districts.
- The Director of Census’ report in 1960 was submitted on Nov. 30, 1960; the three-year period thus expired in 1963, after the 1961 Presidential elections; the Congress organized Dec. 30, 1961, was a de jure body and Members de jure officers.
- Even if Members were de facto, the de facto doctrine protects official acts in the public interest and precludes collateral attack on title; redress for title would be by quo warranto.
- Case law (Tayko v. Capistrano and others) supports that the acts of de facto officers may not be invalidated collateral to quarrel with title; the continuity of Congress and completion of acts (here, proposing amendments and enactment of R.A. No. 4913) render the de facto argument untenable in this suit.
Merits — Alternatives Available to Congress (Propose Amendments and Call Convention)
- Argument presented that Congress may either propose amendments or call a convention but may not do both simultaneously, based on the disjunctive “or” in Article XV.
- The Court noted:
- The term “or” can be construed as “and” depending on spirit and context; no other circumstances were shown to require a restrictive reading here.
- The three resolutions were distinct in subject matter: R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose specific amendments to be submitted in 1967, while R.B.H. No. 2 calls a convention to propose