Title
Go vs. Leyte II Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 176909
Decision Date
Feb 18, 2008
Jeffrey Go contested LEYECO II's disconnection notice for alleged electricity pilferage. The Supreme Court ruled in his favor, finding the inspection valid but insufficient to prove in flagrante delicto, reinstating the injunction due to compliance with bond requirements.
electric cooperative
service disconnection
alleged tampering

Case Summary (G.R. No. 176909)

Factual Background

Petitioner owned the premises located at Block 16, Lot 14, Imelda Village, Tacloban City. At about 10:20 a.m. on February 13, 2006, respondent’s inspection team proceeded to his residence to inspect his electric meter. They requested that the occupant witness the inspection, but the occupant informed them that the owner was out of town. As witnesses, respondent’s inspection was observed by Barangay Chairman Jesus Alex Alusa of Barangay 36A, Imelda Village, and by SPO3 Glen Trinidad.

During the inspection, respondent discovered that petitioner’s electric meter had a broken seal and that it had been tampered with through the installation of a shunting wire at the back of the meter insulating terminal block. Based on these findings, petitioner received on March 7, 2006 a Notice of Apprehension and Disconnection informing him of the inspection results and his liability for violation of the service contract and R.A. No. 7832. Petitioner was assessed P101,597.99 for pilferage differential billing and surcharges, and he was given ten days to settle the amount or face disconnection of his electric service.

Trial Court Proceedings

Petitioner immediately filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with a prayer for a preliminary injunction and the issuance of a temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. He contended that the inspection was irregular and illegal, and that respondent had no legal basis to disconnect his electric service.

On March 16, 2006, the Executive Judge, Salvador Apurillo, issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order enjoining respondent from disconnecting petitioner’s electric service. The case was raffled to Branch 6 and docketed as Special Civil Case No. 2006-03-24. On March 20, 2006, the court extended the temporary restraining order to 20 days. After petitioner filed a bond in an amount equivalent to the differential billing, the trial court issued an order dated April 4, 2006 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent. Respondent moved for reconsideration, but the trial court denied the motion.

Court of Appeals Proceedings and Reversal

Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s orders in a November 30, 2006 Decision. The appellate court found that respondent, through its inspection team, had not established evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority on the part of respondent, and it held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting the injunction.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in a February 27, 2007 Resolution.

Issues Raised in the Supreme Court

Petitioner raised the following issues for resolution: (one) whether the inspection of his electric meter complied with R.A. No. 7832; (two) whether petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto; and (three) whether the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued against respondent LEYECO II.

The Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner argued that respondent failed to comply with R.A. No. 7832 in conducting the inspection of his electric meter. He also maintained that he was not caught in flagrante delicto of illegal use of electricity. Finally, he asserted that the issuance of a writ of injunction was proper because he had filed the required bond with the trial court.

Respondent countered that the presence of a barangay chairman and a police officer during the inspection satisfied the statutory requirements. It also maintained that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto. Respondent further argued that under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832, a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order against a private electric utility or rural electric cooperative may issue only if there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection was made with evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority.

Compliance with R.A. No. 7832: Inspection Witnessing Requirement

The Supreme Court held that the inspection was conducted in accordance with Section 4 of R.A. No. 7832. The Court emphasized that Section 4(a) provides that the presence of certain circumstances constitutes prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person benefitted, and such evidence may serve as the basis for immediate disconnection after due notice. Among the enumerated circumstances are a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the meter and the presence of current reversing transformer, jumper, shorting and/or shunting wire, and/or loop connection or similar devices on the premises or in the meter itself.

The Court further stressed the requirement that, to constitute prima facie evidence, the discovery of those circumstances must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).

Petitioner argued that the inspection could not constitute prima facie evidence because only a barangay chairman witnessed it, and he claimed that the statute contemplated competent authority limited to police or the NBI. The Court rejected this narrow view. It held that, under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832, an officer of the law is defined as one charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property by direct provision of law or by election or appointment by competent authority. The implementing rules specifically recognize barangay chairman as an officer of the law. Accordingly, the Court found that the presence of Barangay Chairman Jesus Alex Alusa satisfied the law’s witnessing requirement. In addition, the record showed that SPO3 Glen Trinidad likewise witnessed the inspection. Respondent submitted a photograph of the findings and the police officer signed the Notice of Apprehension and Disconnection. The Court thus concluded that the inspection complied with Section 4.

Flagrante Delicto: Lack of Personal Presence of the Consumer

On the issue of flagrante delicto, the Supreme Court explained that the term means “in the very act of committing the crime.” The Court held that being caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies positive identification by eyewitnesses, and that it constitutes direct evidence of culpability without relying on inference or presumption.

Respondent relied on Section 6 of R.A. No. 7832, which allows a private electric utility or rural electric cooperative to immediately disconnect electric service after serving written notice, without need of court or administrative order, when the owner of the house or establishment concerned or someone acting in his behalf is caught in flagrante delicto doing any act enumerated in Section 4(a).

The Court found it impossible that petitioner was caught in the act. Petitioner was not present during the inspection, and no representative of petitioner was at hand. It held that the presence of a broken seal and a shunting wire in petitioner’s meter could establish prima facie evidence under Section 4, but those circumstances could not, by themselves, support a finding that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto under Section 6. For this reason, the Court ruled that respondent’s reliance on Section 6 was misplaced, since there was no basis for immediate disconnection of petitioner’s electric service.

Propriety of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction Against the Cooperative

The central procedural point in the case concerned the issuance of injunctive relief against respondent, notwithstanding the general restriction in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832.

The Supreme Court recognized that Section 9 provides a general rule: no writ of injunction or restraining order may issue against a private electric utility or rural electric cooperative exercising the right and authority to disconnect electric service unless there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection was made with evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority. However, the Court emphasized that Section 9 also contains a second paragraph that supplies another instance in which an injunction or restraining order may be effective upon compliance with the bond requirement.

The Court reiterated the text of Section 9 and treated it alongside Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832, which similarly state that unless there is prima facie evidence of evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority, no writ shall issue, but that if a court issues a writ in the absence of such showing, its effectiveness depends on the consumer’s filing of a bond in cash or cashier’s check equivalent to the differential billing, penalties, and other charges; further, the cooperative may dissolve it by filing a counterbond of similar form and amount.

The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in treating bad faith or grave abuse as the sole basis for issuance. It ruled that, as the law stands, there are two exceptions to the restriction: first, where there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection was made with evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority; and second, where even absent such showing, the electric consumer deposits the required bond in the amount equivalent to the differential billing through a cash or cashier’s check.

Applying the statutory and implementing-rule framework, the Supreme Court noted that petitioner filed a bond in the form of a cashier’s check for P101,597.99, the equivalent of the differential billing charged by respondent. The Court held that this complied with Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832 and Rule VIII of the implementing rules. It further observed that the bond requirement protects the interests of the cooperative because it places the financial risk upon the consumer pending final resolution. The Court also pointed out that respondent was not left without remedy, because respondent could file a counterbond to dissolve the injunction.

To reinforce its construction, the Court ci

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