G.R. No. 131012 - Gloria vs. Court of Appeals

Case Summary (G.R. No. 131012)

Factual Background

The respondents were public school teachers who failed to report for work on various dates during the September–October 1990 teachers' mass actions. The Department of Education, Culture, and Sports charged them administratively with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service laws, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence without leave, and placed them under preventive suspension. Investigations concluded within the ninety-day preventive suspension period for each respondent, and disciplining authorities found respondent Margallo guilty and dismissed him effective October 29, 1990, while respondents Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang were ordered suspended for six months effective December 4, 1990.

Administrative and Appellate Proceedings

Respondents appealed to the Merit Systems and Protection Board and thereafter to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The MSPB reduced Margallo's penalty to six months' suspension. The CSC affirmed the MSPB decision as to Margallo but reduced the penalties imposed on Abad, Bandigas and Somebang to reprimand, finding only violations of reasonable office rules and ordering their reinstatement. The Department of Education appealed to the Court of Appeals by way of the Supreme Court's referral. The Court of Appeals, in its September 3, 1996 decision, affirmed the CSC's holdings as to Abad, Bandigas and Somebang and modified its finding as to Margallo to a reprimand for violation of office rules. On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals ruled on July 15, 1997 that the respondents were entitled to salaries, allowances and other benefits during the period of their suspension/dismissal "beyond the ninety (90) day preventive suspension." The Court of Appeals denied the Department of Education's motion for reconsideration on October 6, 1997.

The Petition and the Core Legal Issue

Petitioner Secretary Gloria sought review of the Court of Appeals' award of salaries during the suspension periods beyond the initial ninety days. The principal legal question was whether civil service employees who were placed under preventive suspension and subsequently reinstated or given only reprimands are entitled to payment of salaries for the period of preventive suspension and for the period of suspension executed pending appeal when they are later exonerated.

Positions of the Parties

Petitioner argued that the administrative investigations were concluded within the ninety-day preventive suspension period, that any continued absence from duty resulted from appeal, and that under Sec. 47(4) of the Civil Service Law a respondent was only to be considered under preventive suspension during appeal and therefore not entitled to back salaries. Petitioner further relied on the current statutory scheme and the Ombudsman Act provision that preventive suspension is "without pay." Respondents maintained that they had been exonerated of participation in the illegal strikes and that, having been reinstated and punished only by reprimand for lesser violations, they were entitled to back salaries for the period of their suspension.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals, with modification. The Court held that private respondents were entitled to the payment of salaries, allowances and other benefits for the period of their suspension or dismissal beyond the ninety-day preventive suspension, but limited the award to the period from the time of the Department of Education's dismissal/suspension order until actual reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years.

Legal Basis and Reasoning — Preventive Suspension Pending Investigation

The Court distinguished two kinds of preventive suspension under the Civil Service Law: preventive suspension pending investigation (Sec. 51) and preventive suspension pending appeal in the event a penalty of suspension or dismissal has been imposed and the respondent later prevails (Sec. 47(4)). It held that preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but a preventive measure. The Court concluded that employees preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to back pay even if subsequently exonerated. The Court traced the statutory history: under R.A. No. 2260 the law expressly provided for restoration with full pay upon exoneration, but that provision was deleted in P.D. No. 807 and was reproduced in Sec. 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987 without the payment provision. The Court observed that the Ombudsman Act expressly prescribes preventive suspension "without pay." The Court applied the rule of statutory construction that deletion of statutory words ordinarily indicates a changed legislative intent and found that the legislative history and present statutory scheme supported denial of pay for the period of preventive suspension pending investigation.

Legal Basis and Reasoning — Preventive Suspension Pending Appeal and Entitlement to Back Pay

The Court further held that preventive suspension in execution of an administrative decision imposing suspension or dismissal and effectively enforced during appeal is punitive in effect. When the appellant ultimately prevails, that period becomes unjustifiably punitive and thus calls for restitution. The Court relied on Sec. 47(4) which treats the respondent as under preventive suspension during the pendency of appeal in the event he wins, and analogized to execution pending appeal under Rule 39, where reversal entitles the aggrieved party to restitution. The Court therefore awarded back salaries for the suspension period that was effectively part of the executed penalty pending appeal, subject to the establi

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 131012)

Parties and Posture

Hon. Ricardo T. Gloria filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging a decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals ordering payment of salaries during suspension to the private respondents.
Amparo A. Abad, Virgilia M. Bandigas, Elizabeth A. Somebang, and Nicanor Margallo were public school teachers who sought review of administrative penalties and awards of back salaries.
The case was referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and the appellate court rendered decisions and subsequent resolutions that were assailed in this petition.
The Supreme Court issued a decision affirming the Court of Appeals with a modification as to the computation and limitation of back salaries awarded to private respondents.

Key Facts

A series of teachers' strikes occurred in September and October 1990 and the strikes were declared illegal in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr..
Private respondents did not report for work on various dates in September and October 1990 and were charged administratively with multiple offenses including grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence without leave.
The disciplining authority placed respondents under preventive suspension and concluded the investigation within the ninety-day preventive suspension period, finding respondents guilty as charged.
Nicanor Margallo was ordered dismissed effective October 29, 1990 while Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six months effective December 4, 1990.
The Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB) reduced Margallo's penalty to six-month suspension, and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) later reduced the penalties of Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang to reprimand and ordered their reinstatement.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the CSC as to Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang and modified the penalty for Margallo to reprimand, and subsequently ordered the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) to pay respondents their salaries, allowances, and other benefits during the period of suspension/dismissal beyond the ninety-day preventive suspension.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' order for payment and the motion was denied, prompting the present petition.

Statutory Framework

The present Civil Service law is embodied in Executive Order No. 292 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A) and relevant provisions include SEC. 47, SEC. 51, and SEC. 52.
SEC. 47(4) provides that an appeal shall not stop execution and that a respondent shall be considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins.
SEC. 51 authorizes preventive suspension pending investigation when charges involve dishonesty, grave misconduct, neglect of duty, or when removal may be warranted.
SEC. 52 provides for automatic reinstatement if an investigation is not finally decided within ninety days, with exclusion of delays due to respondent's fault or petition.
The former Civil Service Act (R.A. No. 2260) Sec. 35 had expressly provided for payment of full pay if the respondent was exonerated, but that provision was omitted in P.D. No. 807 and was not reproduced in the present Civil Service Law.
R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act) Sec. 24 expressly provided for preventive suspension "without pay" in the Ombudsman's jurisdiction and informed the statutory interpretation in this case.
Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 states that preventive suspension is not a punishment and that the period of preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension.

Issues Presented

Whether an employee who is preventively suspended pending administrative investigation and who is later exonerated is entitled to the payment of salaries for the period of preventive suspension.
Whether an employee who is immediately executory suspended or dismissed and who is later exonerated on appeal is entitled to full back salaries for the period of suspension pending appeal.
Whether private respondents who were found not to have participated in the illegal strikes but were reprimanded for violation of reasonable office rules were entitled to back salaries for the period of their suspension/dismissal.

Contentions

Petitioner c