No. RTJ-95-1303 - Gladdy S. Bernabe vs. Hon. Judge Salvador A. Memoracion

Case Summary (No. RTJ-95-1303)

Facts Leading to the Administrative Complaint

The record showed that an information captioned as “Homicide with Double Frustrated Homicide” was filed with the RTC of Basilan against the three accused. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1771-227 and raffled to Branch 2 presided over by respondent Judge Memoracion.

After trial, respondent Judge rendered judgment finding all three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and double frustrated homicide “as charged in the information,” and invoking Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code as the basis of the offense charged. The decretal portion, as quoted in the administrative record, imposed upon each accused an indeterminate penalty “twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days as maximum” to reclusion temporal in its medium period. The judgment also ordered the accused to jointly and severally pay the heirs of PO1 Efren Cruz P50,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Modification of the Sentence and Subsequent Motions

Following the accused’s second motion for reconsideration, respondent Judge modified the judgment by reducing the imprisonment to six (6) years for each accused. The respondent admitted that he modified the decision before it became final, asserting that such modification was allowed under Section 7, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Respondent further defended the modification as legally warranted because he found the accused’s reasons in their motion for modification “legal, reasonable and justifiable” and within the evidence adduced. He emphasized that the prosecution did not file an opposition to the motion and did not present objections during the hearing; he also maintained that he denied the prosecution’s later motion for reconsideration because its opposition raised no legal issues justifying the setting aside of his order.

Court’s Initial Direction and the Judge’s Explanation

On 15 March 1995, the Court directed respondent to show cause why disciplinary sanction should not be imposed for gross ignorance of law and grave abuse of authority for: (1) imposing a single indeterminate penalty with a minimum of 12 years, 5 months, and 11 days as against a maximum of 14 years, 10 months, and 20 days for three accused; and (2) later reducing the penalty to six (6) years for each.

The Court also required explanation concerning discrepancies in respondent’s date of birth appearing in his service record, GSIS membership form, and his record in the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as the reason he filed a letter dated 27 August 1991 requesting a change of his date of birth from 14 August 1927 to 20 March 1924.

In his reply dated 30 March 1995, respondent reiterated that because the judgment was not yet final, he could modify it under Section 7, Rule 120. He argued that any error, if present, was an error of judgment not subject to administrative sanction. He also claimed that the prosecution could have appealed but did not, allegedly indicating satisfaction with the modified sentence.

Respondent then insisted that he committed an honest mistake in appreciating the aggravating circumstances used in the original decision—evident premeditation, superior force, nocturnity, revenge, and grave abuse of power—because these were allegedly not even alleged in the information. He also sought leniency for the accused, describing them as first offenders and members of the Marine Corps. He portrayed the situation in Basilan as especially hazardous, with kidnappings for ransom and other serious crimes continuing despite the presence of armed forces. As to the date of birth discrepancy, respondent said that after considering the circumstances, he believed the date shown in the baptismal certificate he submitted was incorrect and that he would continue to perform his duties using 14 August 1927 as shown in his service record.

Referral to the Office of the Court Administrator and Findings

On 26 July 1995, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation.

The Office of the Court Administrator, through Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepano, found that respondent Judge committed errors and acted without careful and prudent examination and study of the facts and the applicable law when he reduced the sentence to six (6) years. It held that the ignorance displayed could not be excused by misplaced compassion, and it emphasized that while judges should not be disciplined for occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, they must still be conversant with basic legal principles. Relying on jurisprudence cited in the report, it recommended a reprimand and a fine of P5,000.00 with stern warning.

The Court’s Decision: Gross Ignorance of Law and Incorrect Sentencing

The Court agreed that respondent showed gross ignorance of the law when he reduced the penalty to only six (6) years. The Court further found more such ignorance when it examined the legal structure of the information and the penalties actually imposable.

Although the information was captioned as Homicide with Double Frustrated Homicide, the Court held that it was “actually for three separate crimes,” namely: (a) homicide for the death of SPO1 Efren Cruz; (b) frustrated homicide for gunshot wounds suffered by SPO3 Antonio Martin; and (c) frustrated homicide for gunshot wounds suffered by PO3 Amergani Mariano. The Court observed that the information alleged that the accused, armed with M-16 rifles, conspired and attacked the victims, inflicting a fatal wound on SPO1 Efren Cruz and causing gunshot wounds on the other named victims, with the victims’ survival attributed to medical assistance.

The Court stressed that nowhere in the allegations did the prosecution suggest a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and nothing indicated that the accused had moved to quash on the ground of duplicity under paragraph (e), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The Court therefore ruled that the accused could be convicted of three separate crimes, and that the objection on multiplicity had effectively been waived.

Consequently, the Court held that respondent’s imposition of “a single indeterminate penalty” was “patently wrong.” Even assuming ex gratia that a complex crime had been charged and proved, the Court said that the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law would still have been erroneous.

Under the Court’s analysis, homicide under Article 249 carries a penalty of reclusion temporal, and the maximum period would be from 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 20 years. It applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law so that the minimum of the indeterminate penalty would not exceed prision mayor, whose range was stated as 6 years, 1 day to 12 years. The Court concluded that what respondent imposed as the minimum—12 years, 5 months, and 11 days—was not only beyond prision mayor but was also not the medium period of prision mayor, which the Court stated as 8 years, 1 day to 10 years.

The Court further reasoned that even if respondent did not consider Article 48 and believed only Article 249 was violated, the sentence imposed remained wrong. The Court noted that respondent had found aggravating circumstances—evident premeditation, use of high-powered firearms, revenge, nocturnity, and grave abuse of power—and had found no mitigating circumstance. Under paragraphs 3 and 6 of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper imposable penalty was reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law under that assumption, the minimum should fall within prision mayor, and the maximum should fall within reclusion temporal in its maximum period.

The Court held that respondent’s reduction to six (6) years demonstrated gross ignorance because six years fell within the range of prision correccional, which is two degrees lower than the penalty prescribed by law for homicide. It rejected the justification that the reduction reflected leniency or that the accused sought a reduction based on the alleged lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, holding that, even assuming praeter intentionem could have been appreciated, it would have been offset by the aggravating circumstances under paragraph 4 of Article 64.

The Court also pointed to respondent’s experience, noting that his service record showed he had been in the judiciary for twenty-nine years. It reiterated that judges must be studious and conversant with basic legal principles because it would not serve the judicial system if judges were woefully lacking in legal knowledge generally presumed of practitioners.

Penalty Imposed and Related Concern on Date of Birth

After determining that the fine recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator was too light, the Court imposed a more severe monetary penalty. It found a fine of P40,000.00 reasonable and ordered respondent to be fined and warned that repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

As to the date of birth discrepancies, the Court observed an “obvious attempt” by respondent to insist on 20 March 1924 earlier than what appeared in his records, purportedly so he could have been compulsorily retired on 20 March 1994. The Court noted that respondent withdrew his request for the change and preferred that the date in the records be allowed to stand. Still, the Court stated that a doubt had been cast on the correct date and required respondent to submit indubitable proof.

The Court’s dispositive portion thus: it fined respondent Judge SALVADOR A. MEMORACION P40,000.00 for gross ignorance of law and issued the stern warning already mentioned.

Separate Opinion: Treatment of the Facts and Additional Concern on Partiality

In a separate opinion, Bellosillo, J., while concurring with the main findings except as to the

Case Syllabus (No. RTJ-95-1303)

The administrative case arose from a letter dated 20 June 1994 filed by Atty. Gladdy S. Bernabe, then of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), seeking the Court’s determination of the propriety of Judge Salvador A. Memoracion’s act of modifying a sentence in Criminal Case No. 1771-227.
The Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint and ultimately found gross ignorance of law and imposed a fine of PHP 40,000.00 with a stern warning against repetition of similar acts.
The case was resolved En Banc, with separate opinions addressing the scope and propriety of the penalty.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Atty. Gladdy S. Bernabe acted as Complainant and invoked the Court’s disciplinary authority over a lower court judge.
Hon. Judge Salvador A. Memoracion acted as Respondent and presided over the RTC, Basilan, in Criminal Case No. 1771-227.
The Court issued a SHOW CAUSE order on 15 March 1995 covering alleged (one) incorrect imposition of an indeterminate penalty and (two) subsequent reduction of the penalty to six (6) years, as well as alleged discrepancies in respondent’s date of birth.
Respondent filed a Reply and Manifestation dated 30 March 1995, and the case was later referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended reprimand and a monetary penalty, and the Court adopted a more severe sanction.
Several Justices concurred, while Justice Bellosillo and Justice Hermosisima, Jr. issued separate opinions on the penalty and the grounds supporting a heavier sanction.

Key Factual Allegations

The prosecution filed an information for Homicide with Double Frustrated Homicide with the Regional Trial Court of Basilan against three Marine soldiers: Pfc. Vicente Machon, Pfc. Jerramy Degollado, and Pfc. Renato Castulo.
The criminal case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1771-227 and was raffled to Branch 2, presided by respondent Judge Memoracion.
After trial, respondent rendered a decision imposing an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days and a maximum of fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months, and twenty (20) days to reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Respondent also ordered the accused to jointly and severally pay the heirs of the late PO1 Efren Cruz the sum of PHP 50,000.00 as moral damages and PHP 500.00 as costs, with no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On the accuseds second motion for reconsideration, respondent modified the judgment by reducing the imprisonment penalty to six (6) years.
The prosecution sought reconsideration of the modified sentence, but respondent denied it and granted probation, reasoning that the prosecution did not raise legal issues sufficient to overturn the modification.
Respondent defended the modification on the premise that the judgment was not yet final and that he could act under Section 7, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Respondent further argued that he committed an honest mistake in appreciating aggravating circumstances, and he asserted that the aggravating circumstances were not even alleged in the information.
Respondent also invoked alleged hazardous conditions in Basilan and claimed that compassion and first-offender status justified the reduction.
A separate factual matter concerned discrepancies in respondent’s date of birth across his service record, GSIS membership form, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, including a request to change it from 14 August 1927 to 20 March 1924.

Statutory and Procedural Framework

The Court evaluated the correctness of the penalty as required by the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The Court discussed the legal effect of the information’s framing, emphasizing that it captioned Homicide with Double Frustrated Homicide, while its allegations supported multiple distinct offenses.
The Court relied on the rule that where the information was not shown to be a proper complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused may be convicted of separate crimes.
The Court referenced Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court on duplicity, noting that the accused had not moved to quash on that ground.
The Court applied the statutory instructions on indeterminate sentencing, including Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which governs how minimum and maximum are to be fixed.
The Court anchored penalty computation on the maximum period for the more serious offense and how the minimum must fit within the range prescribed by law, with reference to cited portions of the Revised Penal Code, including Article 64 and Article 27.
In evaluating the judge’s claimed procedural authority to modify a sentence before finality, the Court recognized respondent’s reliance on Section 7, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Court treated the date-of-birth issue as relevant to judicial accountability and required indubitable proof of the correct date.

Issues Framed

The Court asked whether respondent committed gross ignorance of law and/or grave abuse of authority when he imposed an indeterminate penalty that, in the Court’s view, was patently wrong.
The Court asked whether respondent’s later reduction of the penalty to a straight six (6) year imprisonment was likewise legally impermissible given the offenses charged and the penalty structure under law.
The Court asked whether respondent’s reliance on the absence of opposition and the stage of finality excused the legal errors in sentence modification.
The Court asked whether respondent’s explanation for the reduction, including alleged compassion and the claim of honest error of judgment, mitigated or negated administrative liability.
The Court asked whether respondent’s date-of-birth discrepancy and his earlier request to change it demonstrated conduct requiring clarification and proof.

Parties’ Arguments

Respondent contended that because the judgment had not become final, he could modify it under Section 7, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Respondent maintained that the modification followed a thorough review and reevaluation of the facts and the accuseds motions, and he stressed that the prosecution did not oppose the motion nor raise objection during the hearing.