Title
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 97336
Decision Date
Feb 19, 1993
A foreign student deceitfully promised marriage to a Filipina, leading to moral injury; damages awarded under Article 21 for fraudulent breach of promise.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 97336)

Key Dates

Material events took place in 1986–1987 (meeting on August 3, 1986; alleged proposal and other events in 1987). Trial court judgment dated 16 October 1989. Court of Appeals decision dated 18 February 1991. Petition for review on certiorari filed 26 March 1991. Decision of the Supreme Court denying the petition was rendered on 19 February 1993.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

Primary substantive provision applied: Article 21 of the Civil Code (formerly Article 23 in the Code Commission draft) — liability for willfully causing loss or injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Related provision: Article 2176 (quasi-delict) discussed for contrast. Procedural framework: Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari (limitations on reexamination of factual findings). Applicable constitution for analysis: 1987 Constitution (decision date 1993, i.e., post-1990).

Facts as Pleaded by Private Respondent

Private respondent alleged that petitioner courted and proposed marriage, that she accepted on the condition they marry, and that they agreed to marry after the semester (October 1987). She alleged petitioner visited her parents to secure approval, that he forced her to live with him in his apartment beginning 20 August 1987, that she was a virgin before living with him, that petitioner maltreated and threatened her, and later repudiated the marriage agreement, revealing he was already married to someone in Bacolod. She sought damages of not less than P45,000, reimbursement of P600 actual expenses, attorney’s fees and costs.

Petitioner's Denials and Counterclaim

Petitioner denied proposing marriage or seeking parental consent, denied forcing her to live with him, and denied maltreatment, alleging instead that he told her to stop coming because she had stolen his money and passport. He admitted only personal circumstances. In a counterclaim he sought P5,000 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000 as moral damages for being allegedly dragged into court and suffering anxiety and injury to reputation.

Pre-trial Stipulations and Evidence

The pre-trial order contained stipulated facts: parties’ residences, petitioner’s status as a second-year medical student at Lyceum-Northwestern, private respondent’s employment since July 1986 and high school education, and that they met by introduction on 3 August 1986. At trial the RTC received the private respondent’s testimony, photographic exhibits showing petitioner with her and family, testimony about petitioner’s trips to her hometown and preparations made by her parents for the wedding, and allegations of a live-in relationship resulting in pregnancy and attempted abortion (as recited in the appellate summary).

Trial Court Findings and Judgment

Applying Article 21, the RTC credited the private respondent’s testimony and concluded: (a) the parties were lovers; (b) private respondent was of good moral character and a virgin prior to the relationship; (c) petitioner, by promise to marry through machination, deceit and false pretenses, induced her to surrender her virtue and live with him; (d) petitioner’s promise led to wedding preparations by the family; (e) petitioner failed to fulfill the promise; and (f) petitioner’s acts offended morals, good customs and traditions. The RTC awarded P20,000 moral damages, P3,000 attorney’s fees, P2,000 litigation expenses, and costs; all other claims denied.

Court of Appeals’ Analysis and Ruling

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in toto. It emphasized (1) the youth and inexperience of private respondent (21) compared to petitioner (29), (2) the absence of indicia that she was of loose morals, (3) photographic and testimonial evidence of petitioner’s overtures and visits to her hometown and family, and (4) petitioner’s admission of a prior live-in relationship in Bacolod. The CA concluded petitioner’s protestations of love and promise to marry were fraudulent and deceptive, induced the surrender of her virtue, and persuaded her parents to assent to living-in arrangements. The CA held these acts contrary to morals, good customs and public policy and thus actionable under Article 21, justifying the award of damages.

Issue on Review and Standard of Review

The sole legal issue in the petition to the Supreme Court was whether Article 21 of the Civil Code applied to permit recovery for the breach of a promise to marry under the facts. The Court reiterated the Rule 45 principle that factual findings of trial and appellate courts are generally conclusive and will not be disturbed absent one of established exceptions (e.g., findings grounded on speculation, manifestly mistaken inference, grave abuse of discretion, misapprehension of facts, conflicting findings, findings beyond issues, conclusions without citation of specific evidence, undisputed facts, or findings premised on supposed absence of evidence contradicted by the record). Petitioner did not successfully invoke any exception; thus the courts’ factual findings were entitled to respect.

Legal Framework: Article 21 and Its Purpose

The Court explained that while breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable and Congress had consciously eliminated a statutory remedy for breach of promise, Article 21 was drafted by the Code Commission to address moral wrongs not otherwise covered by statute. The legislative history and Code Commission report illustrated the intention that Article 21 cover cases where a person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to morals, good customs or public policy — including cases of moral seduction where deceit induces sexual intercourse leading to injury to honor and reputation. The Court contrasted Article 2176 (quasi-delict), which addresses negligence, with Article 21, which captures willful moral wrongs and fills a remedial gap between penal law and negligence-based civil liability.

Application of Article 21 to Promises to Marry and Seduction Doctrine

The Court held Article 21 may apply where a promise to marry is the proximate cause of sexual surrender and the promise was in reality a sham — a deceptive device to entice the woman. Liability under Article 21 is not for the mere promise but for the fraud and deceit and the willful injury to honor and reputation committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The Court relied on prior decisions and authorities discussing seduction: recovery is warranted only where inducement, deceit, or abuse of confidence—i.e., seduction—caused the woman to yield; mere mutual lust or intercourse voluntarily entered into does not sustain Article 21 recovery. The Court cited Hermosisima (denial where voluntary love and binding by pregnancy were at issue) and Tanjanco (no recovery where facts did not support seduction), emphasizing that seduction requires inducement and deceit producing voluntary surrender in reliance on promise.

Consideration of Petitioner's Defenses and Cultural Argument

Petitioner argued lack of intent to injure, absence of promise, unfamiliarity with Filipino customs as an Iranian Muslim, entitlement to multiple wives under Muslim law, existence of a prior common-law wife now legally married, and that private respondent consented (pari delicto). The Court rejected these defenses: unfamiliarity with local customs does not excuse fraudulent or deceitful conduct contrary to local morals and public policy; claims about Muslim practices did not negate deceit or inability to contract in the manner

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.