Title
Garcia vs. Thio
Case
G.R. No. 154878
Decision Date
Mar 16, 2007
Carolyn Garcia sued Rica Thio for unpaid loans of US$100,000 and P500,000. Thio denied liability, claiming she facilitated the loans for a third party. The Supreme Court ruled Thio liable for the principal amounts but voided the high interest rates, imposing 12% legal interest instead.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 154878)

Factual Background

In February 1995 petitioner issued a crossed Metrobank check dated February 24, 1995 for US$100,000 payable to the order of Marilou Santiago and a crossed CityTrust check dated June 29, 1995 for P500,000 payable to the order of Marilou Santiago. Respondent received the crossed checks and, according to petitioner, thereafter made periodic payments of the agreed monthly interest: US$3,000 (or peso equivalents of P76,500 and P76,000 in certain months) on specified dates in 1995, and P20,000 monthly on specified dates in late 1995. Petitioner alleged that the principal amounts became due on October 26 and November 5, 1995 respectively, but respondent failed to pay despite demand. Respondent denied being the borrower, contending that petitioner’s checks were made payable to Santiago, that respondent merely delivered the crossed checks at petitioner’s request and accommodated interest payments by issuing her own checks, and that Santiago was the actual borrower who replaced certain checks with cash.

Trial Court Proceedings

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages in Civil Case No. 96-266 seeking US$100,000 with interest at 3% per month from October 26, 1995 and P500,000 with interest at 4% per month from November 5, 1995, plus attorney’s fees and actual damages. The RTC found in favor of petitioner, concluding that respondent borrowed the amounts claimed. The RTC rendered judgment directing respondent to pay US$100,000 (or its peso equivalent) with interest at 3% per month from October 26, 1995, P500,000 with interest at 4% per month from November 5, 1995, P100,000 as attorney’s fees, and P50,000 as actual damages, and dismissed respondent’s counterclaim.

Court of Appeals' Ruling

On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed. The CA held that petitioner failed to prove that respondent received the loan proceeds. The CA emphasized that both checks were crossed and payable to Marilou Santiago, which, in the CA’s view, prevented respondent from becoming the payee or a holder in due course upon receipt of the checks. The CA explained the legal effects of crossing a check and concluded that the mere receipt by respondent of crossed checks payable to a third person did not constitute issuance and delivery of money to respondent so as to perfect a contract of loan between petitioner and respondent.

Issues Presented

The questions submitted for resolution included whether actual and physical delivery of money directly from lender to borrower was the only means to perfect a contract of loan; whether respondent’s admission of paying interest estopped her from denying the loan; whether respondent’s counsel’s written non-objection to documentary exhibits constituted a judicial admission under Rule 129, Sec. 4, Rules of Court; whether the Supreme Court was bound by the Court of Appeals’ findings of fact; whether the RTC’s finding on privity of contract had been overturned by the CA; whether respondent could change the theory of her case on appeal; whether petitioner was entitled to interest in the absence of a written stipulation; and whether the CA properly deleted the RTC’s awards of attorney’s fees and actual damages.

Parties' Contentions

Petitioner maintained that respondent instructed that the checks be made payable to Santiago and that respondent received and controlled the checks so that respondent in effect borrowed the funds and re-lent them to Santiago, paying petitioner the agreed monthly interest. Petitioner argued that respondent’s issuance of checks to cover interest demonstrated that respondent was the debtor and that delivery for purposes of a loan was effected by placing the instruments in respondent’s control. Respondent contended that petitioner’s loans were to Santiago, not to respondent; that respondent merely acted as intermediary; that respondent’s issuance of postdated checks was an accommodation at petitioner’s request and was not payment of interest representing respondent’s liability for principal; and that Santiago, not respondent, must account for the proceeds.

The Supreme Court's Holding

The Supreme Court granted the petition for review under Rule 45 because of the contradictory factual findings of the RTC and the CA. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the CA decision and affirmed the RTC’s finding that respondent borrowed US$100,000 and P500,000 from petitioner. The Court modified the RTC award by deleting the contractual monthly interest rates and substituting legal interest of 12% per annum from November 21, 1995, the date petitioner sent her demand letter. The Court deleted the awards of actual damages and attorney’s fees for lack of factual basis in the RTC decision.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court first recalled that a loan is a real contract perfected upon delivery of the object of the contract, citing Article 1934 and the principle in Article 1953 that the person who receives a loan of money acquires ownership and is bound to pay an equal amount. The determinative question was whether delivery occurred to respondent despite the checks being crossed and payable to a third person. The Court concluded that delivery was effected because the instruments were placed in respondent’s control and possession under an arrangement whereby respondent re-lent the amounts to Santiago. The Court relied on several factors: petitioner’s lack of acquaintance with Santiago made it improbable she would lend large sums to a stranger without written security; the testimony of Leticia Ruiz that respondent planned to borrow from petitioner at a lower interest rate and re-lend to Santiago at a higher rate; respondent’s own issuance of checks in peso equivalents to cover monthly interest for the respective loans, which the Court found incredible if respondent were not the debtor; Santiago’s insolvency petition listing respondent as a creditor; and respondent’s failure to present Santiago as a witness, invoking the presumption under Rule 131, Sec. 3(e) that willfully suppressed evidence would be adverse. On estoppel and admissions, the Court treated respondent’s conduct and paym

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