Title
Garcia vs. Sesbreno
Case
A.C. No. 7973, 10457
Decision Date
Feb 3, 2015
Dr. Garcia filed disbarment complaints against Atty. SesbreAo, alleging his homicide conviction involved moral turpitude. The Supreme Court ruled the crime demonstrated moral turpitude, disbarring SesbreAo immediately.
A

Case Summary (A.C. No. 7973, 10457)

Petitioner’s Allegations

Garcia alleged he married Virginia Alcantara in 1965, they separated in 1971 and their marriage was later annulled. Garcia claimed that in 2005 respondent, acting for Garcia’s daughters, filed a support action against him (dismissed), and later filed further pleadings after Garcia’s return from Japan in 2007. Garcia charged that respondent had been previously convicted of homicide and was then on parole, and that homicide is a crime involving moral turpitude rendering respondent unfit to practice law.

Respondent’s Position

Sesbreão denied that the complaint merited disbarment, asserting the complaints were motivated by malice and retaliation for his representation of Garcia’s daughters. He contended his sentence had been commuted and that any accessory penalties were deleted or inapplicable. He maintained that homicide does not necessarily involve moral turpitude and argued that disqualification, if any, applied only during the term of the sentence. He also claimed executive clemency restored his civil and political rights.

Key Dates and Procedural History

Two complaints were filed: one before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP‑CBD) on 29 July 2008 (CBC Case No. 08‑2273, later redocketed A.C. No. 10457) and another before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 30 July 2008 (A.C. No. 7973). The Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for investigation on 18 January 2010. The IBP‑CBD issued a report and recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of Governors (Resolution No. XX‑2013‑19) on 12 February 2013; a motion for reconsideration was filed; the IBP Board denied reconsideration by Resolution No. XX‑2014‑31 dated 11 February 2014. The Court consolidated the two cases by resolution dated 30 September 2014 and rendered its decision affirming disbarment.

Applicable Law

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended by the Court by reason of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court applied the 1987 Constitution in its analysis of executive clemency, specifically Section 19, Article VII, which contemplates reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remission of fines and forfeitures. The Court relied on established definitions and precedents regarding moral turpitude and the effect of executive clemency.

Controlling Issue

The sole issue agreed upon and resolved was whether a conviction for the crime of homicide, as adjudicated in respondent’s criminal case, involved moral turpitude sufficient to warrant disbarment.

IBP‑CBD Findings and Recommendation

The IBP‑CBD recognized that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on circumstances. Reviewing this Court’s criminal decision, the IBP‑CBD concluded that the particular facts showed moral turpitude: the victims were not foes nor had they wronged respondent; the killings arose from respondent’s disproportionate, vindictive and cruel conduct, displaying arrogance and a misplaced sense of superiority. Citing precedent (including Soriano v. Dizon), the IBP‑CBD recommended disbarment and striking respondent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP Board of Governors adopted this recommendation.

Court’s Review of the Criminal Facts

The Court examined the facts recited in the criminal decision: Amparado and Yapchangco were walking past respondent’s house without provocation when respondent emerged, aimed a rifle, and fired. Witnesses described rapid, indiscriminate firing that struck Amparado and damaged property. The Court found that the victims were merely in the wrong place at the wrong time and that respondent’s unprovoked, excessive conduct led to the death of Amparado, supporting a finding of moral turpitude in the particular homicide conviction.

Executive Clemency and Its Legal Effect

The Court rejected respondent’s contention that executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights. The clemency granted was a commutation of sentence, not an absolute and unconditional pardon; the commutation reduced the term of imprisonment but did not expressly remit acces

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