Title
Garcia vs. Sesbreno
Case
A.C. No. 7973, 10457
Decision Date
Feb 3, 2015
Dr. Garcia filed disbarment complaints against Atty. SesbreAo, alleging his homicide conviction involved moral turpitude. The Supreme Court ruled the crime demonstrated moral turpitude, disbarring SesbreAo immediately.

Case Summary (A.C. No. 7973, 10457)

Factual Background

Garcia alleged that he married Virginia Alcantara in 1965 and that they had two children, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, from which they later separated and whose marriage was annulled in 1992. Garcia alleged that in 2005 and again in 2007 Atty. Sesbreno, acting for Garcia’s daughters, filed actions for support against him and his sister. Garcia also alleged knowledge of Sesbreno’s conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU‑31733 by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, and that Sesbreno was at liberty on parole.

Proceedings Before the IBP and Consolidation

On 29 July 2008 Garcia filed a complaint against Sesbreno before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP‑CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08‑2273, alleging that Sesbreno continued to practice law despite conviction for homicide. On 30 July 2008 Garcia filed a similar complaint before the Office of the Bar Confidant, docketed as A.C. No. 7973. The IBP‑CBD consolidated the matters and, after investigation, agreed with the parties that the sole issue was whether a conviction for homicide involved moral turpitude.

IBP‑CBD Findings and Recommendation

The IBP‑CBD reviewed this Court’s criminal decision convicting Sesbreno of homicide and noted the factual circumstances surrounding the killing of Luciano Amparado. The IBP‑CBD found that the victim and his companion were unprovoked passersby and that Sesbreno fired indiscriminately, reflecting extreme arrogance, vindictiveness, and cruelty. Citing Soriano v. Atty. Dizon, the IBP‑CBD concluded that the attendant circumstances showed moral turpitude and recommended disbarment and striking Sesbreno’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP Board of Governors adopted that recommendation in Resolution No. XX‑2013‑19 dated 12 February 2013 and later denied Sesbreno’s motion for reconsideration in Resolution No. XX‑2014‑31 dated 11 February 2014.

Sesbreno’s Defenses and Contentions

Sesbreno contended that his sentence had been commuted and that the phrase “with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law” had been deleted, thus restoring his civil and political rights. He further argued that homicide does not necessarily involve moral turpitude and that Garcia’s complaints were motivated by malice and retaliation for Sesbreno’s representation of Garcia’s daughters. Sesbreno invoked In re Atty. Parcasio to argue that executive clemency could restore a lawyer’s full civil and political rights where a pardon is absolute and unconditional.

Supreme Court’s Review of Criminal Record and Circumstances

The Court reviewed its earlier decision in which it modified the RTC judgment, found Sesbreno guilty of homicide, and imposed a sentence of nine years and one day of prision mayor to sixteen years and four months of reclusion temporal, with accessory penalties and an indemnity of P50,000.00. The Court summarized the material facts: Sesbreno emerged from his house without provocation, aimed a rifle, and fired at Luciano Amparado and his companion; eyewitnesses corroborated that the victims merely passed by and that Sesbreno fired rapidly, hitting the victim and causing his death.

Legal Standard on Moral Turpitude

The Court reiterated that Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court authorizes disbarment for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude and that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court adopted the definition that moral turpitude denotes baseness, vileness, or depravity in duties owed to fellow men or society, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. The Court recalled International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, which held that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude and that determination depends on the attendant circumstances.

Application of the Standard to the Present Facts

Applying the standard, the Court agreed with the IBP‑CBD that the facts surrounding the killing showed moral turpitude. The Court emphasized that the victims did not provoke or wrong the respondent and that the respondent’s inordinate and indiscriminate use of deadly force reflected vindictiveness, cruelty, and a misplaced sense of superiority that undermined his fitness to remain a member of the legal profession.

Executive Clemency and Accessory Penalties

The Court rejected Sesbreno’s contention that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights. The Court distinguished In re Atty. Parcasio, where the pardon was absolute and unconditional, from the present case in which the Order of Commutation did not state that accessory

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