Title
Garcia vs. Drilon
Case
G.R. No. 179267
Decision Date
Jun 25, 2013
Petitioner challenged R.A. 9262's constitutionality after a TPO was issued against him. SC upheld the law, ruling it valid under equal protection, due process, and family protection principles, dismissing claims of undue delegation of judicial power.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 179267)

Factual Antecedents

Private respondent filed a verified petition under R.A. 9262 on March 23, 2006, alleging physical, psychological, emotional and economic abuse by petitioner arising from his marital infidelity and controlling behavior. The RTC found reasonable ground to believe imminent danger of violence against respondent and children, and issued successive Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) directing various reliefs including removal from the family home, distancing and non‑contact, surrender of firearms, support payments, prohibition against dissipation of conjugal assets, accounting obligations, and a bond to keep the peace.

Allegations of Abuse and Family Circumstances

The petition recounted petitioner's dominant, controlling behavior, isolation of respondent, physical assaults (bruises, bleeding), assaults on the daughter Jo‑Ann, respondent’s suicide attempt and subsequent therapy, and petitioner’s extramarital affair with a bank manager. Petitioner controlled family businesses and finances; respondent alleged deprivation of access to business information and threatened loss of financial support and custody.

RTC Orders and Scope of Reliefs

The RTC issued multiple TPOs (March 24, April 24, May 24, August 23, 2006), each effective for 30 days and repeatedly renewed. Reliefs included temporary removal of respondent from family home (regardless of ownership), stay‑away orders (1,000 meters), prohibition of all contact, surrender of firearms, provisional monthly support (substantial sums and rental), preservation of use of certain vehicles and properties, accounting of corporate advances, bond to keep the peace, and orders to the Register of Deeds to withhold transfers of specified properties.

Petitioner’s Procedural Challenges and Relief Sought

Petitioner opposed renewals and sought modification of TPOs, arguing procedural defects (three‑day notice rule, lack of hearing notice), and objected to particular reliefs (return of corporate vehicle to J‑Bros Trading Corporation, reduction of five‑million peso bond). He filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals, challenging (a) constitutionality of R.A. 9262 under equal protection and due process, and (b) validity of TPOs as products of an invalid law.

Court of Appeals Ruling and Procedural Posture

The CA initially issued a 60‑day TRO against enforcement of the TPOs. It later dismissed petitioner’s prohibition petition (January 24, 2007) for two principal procedural reasons: (1) petitioner failed to raise the constitutional issue at the earliest opportunity in the RTC proceedings (the trial court had jurisdiction to resolve constitutionality); and (2) the petition for prohibition constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the trial court’s interlocutory orders and protection orders subject to review by appeal. The CA’s dismissal was affirmed in resolution denying reconsideration.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Petitioner presented five principal issues: (I) whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure to raise the constitutional issue at the earliest opportunity and because it was a collateral attack; (II) whether R.A. 9262 violates the equal protection clause as discriminatory against men; (III) whether R.A. 9262 violates due process; (IV) whether the law contravenes state policy to protect the family; and (V) whether R.A. 9262 unlawfully delegates judicial power to barangay officials by authorizing Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs).

Supreme Court on Procedural Properness and Jurisdiction to Decide Constitutionality

The Court held the CA correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition on procedural grounds because: (a) the RTC, designated as a Family Court under R.A. 8369 and given original and exclusive jurisdiction over VAWC cases by Section 7 of R.A. 9262, is competent to determine constitutional questions; (b) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity (in pleadings before the RTC) so appellate courts do not anticipate constitutional questions absent necessity; (c) the opposition in summary proceedings under A.M. No. 04‑10‑11‑SC does not prohibit raising constitutional defenses — the bar on counterclaims, cross‑claims or third‑party complaints does not extend to constitutional challenges; and (d) the summary nature of proceedings does not preclude judicial determination of constitutional issues because the question is one of law and a court may order further hearing on legal issues per Section 25 of the rule. The Court also held the CA’s TRO that enjoined TPO enforcement was improper because Section 22(j) of the Rule disallows certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against interlocutory orders of the trial court and because injunctions against protection orders would frustrate the law’s protective purpose.

Supreme Court’s Approach to the Merits — Deference and Willingness to Decide

Although upholding the CA’s procedural dismissal, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to address the constitutional challenges on the merits due to the public importance and novelty of the questions raised and private respondent’s request to resolve the issue.

Legislative Intent and Scope of R.A. 9262

The Court recognized legislative deliberations showing Congress considered broader measures but ultimately limited the statute to women and children because they are the primary and most likely victims of domestic violence. The Court emphasized it will not question the wisdom or policy judgment of Congress absent constitutional infirmity and that challenges on policy grounds must be addressed to the legislature.

Equal Protection Analysis — Standard and Application

The Court applied the established rational‑basis standard for legislative classifications but undertook the four‑part Vera test: (1) the classification must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the law’s purpose; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the class. It found R.A. 9262’s gender‑based classification valid: (a) women and children are subject to substantial distinctions (unequal power relations, greater likelihood of victimization, pervasive gender bias), supported by local and international statistics and studies cited in legislative history and expert reports; (b) the classification is germane to the statute’s declared purpose of protecting dignity, human rights, and family members particularly women and children; (c) the law applies to future cases and to all women and children within its defined scope; and (d) the law’s definitions and enumerated acts of violence are sufficiently specific to guide enforcement and defense and are not unconstitutionally vague.

Discussion of Intermediate Scrutiny and Concurrences

Although the ponencia used rational‑basis analysis, concurring opinions (notably Justice Leonardo‑De Castro) argued for intermediate (middle‑tier) scrutiny for gender classifications, requiring that the classification serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to those objectives; she found the law would survive intermediate scrutiny because it advances important governmental objectives (human rights protection, gender equality, empowerment of women) and is substantially related to them. Other concurrences (Justices Brion, Abad, Leonen) elaborated on the reasoning, with variations: Justice Brion favored the reasonableness test and urged restraint in imposing heightened scrutiny; Justice Abad endorsed the substantive equality/ameliorative rationale grounded in CEDAW and the need for remedial measures; Justice Leonen emphasized standing and justiciability concerns and noted petitioner’s lack of victim status in the underlying facts.

Due Process Analysis

The Court held that R.A. 9262 and its procedures do not violate due process. A TPO issued ex parte is constitutionally permissible where urgency exists to prevent imminent harm; procedural due process is satisfied because the petition is verified, affidavits are attached, and the respondent is given immediate notice and opportunity to file an opposition within five days and a hearing is scheduled. The Court analogized ex parte protection orders to other provisional remedies (e.g., preliminary attachment) where notice and hearing are dispensed with to prevent irreversible harm, emphasizing the temporary nature of TPOs (30 days, renewable) and availability of subsequent adversarial process.

Delegation to Barangay Officials and Separation of Powers

The Court rejected the argument that BPOs constitute an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power. It characterized BPO issuance as an executive function incidental to barangay officials’ statutory duty to enforce laws and maintain public order under the Local Government Code. The issuance is executive and provisional, aimed at immediate protection; barangay officials are required to assist victims to seek judicial TPOs and BPOs are effective for only 15 days, after which court remedies are pursued. The Court noted that preliminary fact‑finding and application of law by non‑judicial officers do not per se constitute an exercise of judicial power.

State Po

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