Title
Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 93252
Decision Date
Nov 8, 1991
Mayor Ganzon challenged multiple preventive suspension orders; Supreme Court upheld suspensions but allowed simultaneous service, enabling his reinstatement after full compliance.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 137842)

Factual Background

Beginning in 1988, ten administrative complaints alleging abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct and related charges were filed against Mayor Ganzon. Secretary Santos issued three preventive suspension orders dated 11 August 1988, 11 October 1988 and 3 May 1990 (each for 60 days). A fourth preventive suspension was issued on 3 July 1991 in relation to Administrative Case No. 51-90. Litigation followed at the Court of Appeals and at this Court challenging the validity and enforcement of those suspension orders; multiple TROs, motions, and remedies for prohibition and mandamus were invoked by the parties.

Procedural History Leading to the Main Decision

The Court of Appeals dismissed the initial petitions for lack of merit. This Court, in its main decision promulgated 5 August 1991, affirmed the validity of the preventive suspension orders and lifted an earlier TRO issued by this Court. The main decision affirmed the 60-day suspensions, ordered consolidation of pending administrative cases, and specifically provided that Mayor Ganzon may not be made to serve future suspensions for acts committed prior to 11 August 1988. After promulgation of the main decision, Secretary Santos issued a memorandum (29 August 1991) declaring the third suspension (3 May 1990) in force; the Court of Appeals issued a TRO on 3 September 1991 enjoining enforcement of that memorandum, and this Court issued a restraining order on 5 September 1991 directing the Court of Appeals to cease implementation of its TRO. Petitioner subsequently moved to dissolve that 5 September restraining order.

Core Legal Issue

The central question resolved in the present resolution was the date on which Mayor Ganzon could lawfully re-assume the mayoralty — in other words, how the respective preventive suspension orders had actually been served, how much of each remained to be served after interruptions by court orders, and whether overlapping suspensions could be credited simultaneously so as to shorten the aggregate period of suspension.

Court’s Findings on Actual Service of Suspensions

The Court examined the parties’ competing accounts and contemporaneous official documents to determine when Mayor Ganzon actually served each suspension. It found: (a) the first suspension (11 August 1988) had been fully served; (b) the second suspension (11 October 1988) remained unserved at that time because its enforcement had been restrained by an RTC order; (c) the third suspension (3 May 1990) was served from 4 May 1990 until 18 May 1990 — fourteen days — because a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 on 18 May 1990 interrupted further service; and (d) the fourth suspension (3 July 1991) was served from 5 July 1991 through 3 September 1991 and was admitted by respondents to have been fully served.

Computation of Remaining Suspension Time and Options for Service

Because the third suspension entailed a 60-day period and only 14 days had been served, 46 days remained to be served. The Court identified two possible modes for completing those 46 days consistent with the main decision: (1) commence service immediately upon promulgation of the main decision (5 August 1991) and continue until the 46 days were completed; or (2) begin remaining service after the end of the fourth suspension (i.e., starting 4 September 1991), which would result in completion on 20 October 1991. The Court emphasized accurate computation rules, employing Article 13 of the Civil Code (exclude first day, include last day) when counting the days.

Rationale and Adoption of Simultaneous Service for Overlapping Suspensions

The Court allowed, in the exceptional circumstances of this case, concurrent (simultaneous) crediting of overlapping suspension service between the third and fourth preventive suspensions. The Court’s reasoning is twofold: (1) permitting simultaneous service benefits the elective official and the local polity by lessening cumulative punitive effects that appear to have emanated from piecemeal suspensions; and (2) the main decision criticized the Secretary’s piecemeal imposition of successive suspensions instead of consolidating related administrative cases, and simultaneous service offsets that procedural approach. Applying concurrent crediting, the Court calculated that 29 overlapping days (5 August–3 September 1991) counted toward both the third and fourth suspensions, reducing the remaining days for the third suspension from 46 to 17; those 17 days ran from 4 September 1991 through 20 September 1991, completing the third suspension on 20 September 1991.

Application of the Local Government Code (Section 63)

The Court expressly took judicial notice of the recently approved Local Government Code of 1991 (scheduled to take effect on 1 January 1992) and cited Section 63, which limits any single preventive suspension of a local elective official to 60 days and provides that, in event of several administrative cases, an elective official cannot be preventively suspended for more than 90 days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension. The Court used the Code’s policy and numeric limits to support allowing simultaneous crediting in favor of the elective official under the peculiar facts before it.

Treatment of the Second Suspension and Related RTC Injunction

The main decision had affirmed three suspension orders (first, second and third). The Court concluded that, consistent with its affirmance, the second suspension — which had previously been enjoined by an

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