Title
Galvez vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Company, Incorporated
Case
G.R. No. L-12581
Decision Date
May 29, 1959
Galvez's counsel filed for execution of costs despite a pending clarification motion, leading to contempt and imprisonment for failing to return excess funds.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-12581)

Factual Background: Costs, Execution, and Garnishment

After the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in C. A.-G. R. No. 15437-R, it awarded costs to Galvez. The attorneys for Galvez then filed a bill of costs with the Clerk of Court of Manila in the total amount of P502.35. The clerk’s office received the bill on January 17, and on the same day the defendant-appellant’s counsel received a copy. No opposition followed immediately. Counsel for Galvez then filed an ex parte motion for execution on January 23, withdrew it the next day, and filed another motion. On January 25, a writ of execution was issued, but on January 24 the defendant-appellant filed an opposition to the bill, asserting that the trial court’s judgment contained no finding on costs and that the Court of Appeals had only granted costs in general terms, so the recoverable amount should be P60.00.

Faced with difficulty in determining the meaning of the Court of Appeals’ general award of costs, Judge Narvasa issued an order dated February 2, giving the defendant-appellant five days to seek clarification of the Court of Appeals’ decision as to costs. Despite that opportunity, the Court of First Instance proceeded, on the following February 13, upon an ex parte motion, and ordered the sheriff to deliver the amount to Galvez’s counsel.

The Excess Collection and the Court of Appeals Clarification

Meanwhile, the writ of execution issued on January 25 had been carried out. Funds of the defendant-appellant were garnished at the Philippine Bank of Commerce to the amount of P472.67, collected by the clerk of court on January 27, 1957, and received by Atty. De Gracia on behalf of Galvez’s counsel. The defendant-appellant’s motion for clarification in the Court of Appeals was later resolved on February 22, 1957, in a resolution holding that the costs granted were those incurred in the appellate court only.

That clarification was submitted to the Court of First Instance on March 13, 1957. On March 15, Galvez’s counsel opposed the request to reduce costs to P20 and to return the balance already received. On March 16, the Court of First Instance granted the defendant-appellant’s petition, reduced costs to P20.00, and ordered the return of the balance of P473.00 to the defendant-appellant. A motion for reconsideration was presented on March 19, but the court was informed by the sheriff that the amount ordered to be returned—P473—had already been received on February 14 by Atty. De Gracia of Galvez’s counsel.

First Order to Return and the Setting Aside of That Order

Because the writ had already been executed and the funds were already with Galvez’s counsel, the Court of First Instance set aside its order directing the sheriff to return the excess on March 25, effectively recognizing that the court could no longer compel the sheriff to recover the amount. On April 16, however, the court entered another order requiring Galvez’s counsel to return P473 to the defendant-appellant. Notice of this order was served on April 22, 1957. On April 29, the clerk of court manifested that counsel had been required to return the sum within five days, but that the period had expired without any return being made.

Contempt Proceedings Triggered by Non-Compliance

Thereafter, the defendant-appellant requested the issuance of a writ of execution against Galvez’s counsel’s properties to enforce payment of P473. Galvez’s counsel opposed the motion, but on May 24 the court directed compliance within ten days from notice; a copy was served on May 27. Galvez’s counsel then challenged the order’s validity, claiming that P400 of the received amount constituted premiums paid for an injunction bond filed in the Court of Appeals, and argued that those premiums were recoverable as part of appellate costs.

When no payment was forthcoming, the defendant-appellant’s counsel moved on June 7, 1957 to have Galvez’s counsel declared in contempt. The Court of First Instance issued an order requiring counsel to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. On June 26, after hearing counsel’s explanations, the court issued the contempt order that became the subject of the appeal. It declared Galvez’s counsel in contempt and ordered that Atty. De Gracia be placed in custody and kept in confinement by the sheriff until compliance with the order for return of the amount, or until further order.

The order’s stated basis for contempt was that counsel knew the motion for clarification had been filed in the Court of Appeals on February 7, and that they had filed opposition on February 11, yet they still filed an urgent ex parte motion for execution and succeeded in obtaining delivery of the excessive costs while clarification remained unresolved.

The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal

On appeal, it was argued for Galvez’s counsel that the act was not contemptuous because the delay was allegedly attributable to the defendant-appellant itself, which filed the motion for clarification only on February 7, the last day given. It was also pointed out that the order did not expressly direct that the defendant-appellant was to obtain the Court of Appeals’ clarification within the five-day period; it merely required that it seek clarification within that time. Finally, counsel contended that the contempt order amounted to imprisonment for failure to pay a questionable debt.

The Court’s Ruling and Disposition

The Court affirmed the order of contempt. It held that the contempt order was proper and directed compliance with its requirement to return the amount of P472.00 to the defendant-appellant. The Court ordered that the contempt order, insofar as it required return, be enforced according to its terms, and it denied costs.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court rejected the argument that the imprisonment was for non-payment of a questionable debt. It observed that the defendant-appellant did not claim that Galvez’s counsel no longer possessed the disputed money. The Court further characterized the order as requiring compliance with a simple directive to return excess costs paid under doubtful conditions. It noted that the contempt order was issued only after a significant delay: the court’s April 16 order requiring return had been issued well in advance, and the contempt order followed after the lapse of 70 days from the first order requiring return.

The Court emphasized that courts should not tolerate unjustifiable delay in returning sums obtained under doubtful conditions. It reasoned that only the threat of imprisonment could compel obedience to judicial orders. The Court grounded its conclusion in Section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes imprisonment when the contempt consists in the omission to do an act still within the co

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