G.R. No. L-22018 - Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-22018)

Material Allegations by the Plaintiff

The plaintiff alleged prior ownership and possession by his late father and adjudication in his favor in an oral partition among heirs. He claimed he could not take actual possession because of an unwarranted adverse claim by the defendant or the defendant’s tenant (Abion Pantilone), who allegedly asserted title based on a sale from Fe Nicolas. The complaint also alleged that the defendant, being an alien, could not legally own the land under the Constitution (as pleaded) and that the plaintiff incurred or would incur attorney’s fees and other expenses prosecuting the action.

Defendant’s Answer and Specific Pleadings

In response, the defendant: (1) denied the material averments of paragraph 4 of the complaint, stating he never asserted title or possessory rights arising from any deed by Fe Nicolas and disclaimed any dominical or possessory rights as alleged; (2) denied liability for plaintiff’s alleged counsel fees while not expressly denying that the plaintiff engaged counsel; and (3) stated lack of sufficient knowledge to form belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, thereby denying those paragraphs on that basis.

Trial Court’s Ruling on the Pleadings

The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding the defendant’s answer failed to present a genuine issue of fact. The court declared plaintiff the owner, free from any cloud of adverse claim by the defendant, ordered delivery of possession, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs. The defendant’s motion for reconsideration and/or new trial (which included an affidavit reiterating he had no real right or interest) was denied by the trial court.

Appellate Analysis — Effect of “Negative Pregnant” Denial

The appellate court analyzed the form of the defendant’s denial and concluded it amounted to a “negative pregnant.” A negative‑pregnant denial occurs where the denial is ambiguous such that it appears to deny only a qualification while effectively admitting the material fact. Because the defendant’s response to paragraph 4 denied the manner in which possessory rights were exercised but did not clearly deny the existence of an adverse claim, the denial was treated as equivalent to an admission of the core factual allegation. Under this reasoning, the answer failed to raise a triable issue on the ownership/possession claim.

Appellate Analysis — Attorney’s Fees and Legal Issues vs. Factual Denials

Regarding the plaintiff’s allegation about incurring counsel fees, the defendant’s pleading explicitly denied liability for such fees but did not deny the factual contention that plaintiff contracted counsel. The appellate court emphasized that the denial was of legal liability rather than of the operative fact (that counsel was engaged). Because the defendant neither admitted nor denied the material factual allegation, the court found judgment on the pleadings proper with respect to that issue, citing Alemany v. Sweeney for the proposition that failure to properly plead a factual denial supports judgment where pleadings admit facts relied upon.

Appellate Analysis — Specific Denials, “No Knowledge” Pleading, and Rule 9

The defendant’s specific traverses to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 were in the form of lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief. Paragraphs 6 and 7 concerned damages; paragraph 5 alleged that a cloud over title had been raised. The appellate court observed that paragraphs 6 and 7 were damage allegations and that a specific denial of amount is not required by Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, by moving for judgment on the pleadings, the plaintiff was deemed to have admitted those matters in the defendant’s pleading that were taken together with those of his own that were admitted; consequently, the plaintiff was barred from recovering damages on issues deemed admitted by his proc

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-22018)

Citation and Court

Reported at 130 Phil. 51; G.R. No. L-22018; decision dated January 17, 1968.
Opinion penned by Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Direct appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 145 (Ni. 1737-Sorsogon) of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.
Final disposition: appealed judgment affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Concurrence by Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Plaintiff-Appellee: Apolonio Galofa.
Defendant-Appellant: Nee Bon Sing (later amended to include one Maria Castro and one Apion Pantilone; Maria Castro could not be served and was presumably fictitious; Apion Pantilone was dropped and excluded as a party defendant by order dated 15 November 1962).
Procedural issue on appeal: whether the defendant's answer to the complaint tendered a genuine issue, hence whether judgment on the pleadings was proper.

Facts Alleged by Plaintiff (Material Allegations)

The parcel of land is located in Sta. Lourdes, Barcelona, Sorsogon.
Plaintiff alleges prior ownership and possession by his late father, Francisco Galofa.
Plaintiff alleges adjudication in his favor in an oral partition among co-heirs.
Plaintiff alleges inability to take actual possession of the property because of an "unwarranted adverse claim of rights of ownership and possession" by the defendant and/or his tenant or encargado, Abion Pantilone.
Plaintiff alleges that the adverse claim was based on an alleged sale by one Fe Nicolas to defendant, and alleges that Fe Nicolas had no right to legally dispose of the property because he was not the owner.
Plaintiff further alleges that the defendant, being an alien, is not allowed under the law to own and possess real properties, citing the Constitution and/or the Krivenko case.
Plaintiff alleges he was compelled to retain counsel for no less than P1,500.00 and/or has spent or will spend P500.00 because of this litigation.
Complaint contains paragraphs numbered including paragraph 4 (adverse claim), paragraph 5 (conclusion that a cloud on title was raised), paragraphs 6 and 7 (damages), and paragraph 9 (attorney fees and expenses reference).

Defendant's Answer (Material Responses)

To paragraph 4: Defendant "denies the material averments contained in paragraph 4 of the Complaint," and states the truth is that he "never asserted title of ownership to the property described in the Complaint to anybody," nor did he have any deed of conveyance executed by Fe Nicolas in his favor, nor did he claim possessory right either by himself or through another.
To the allegation of counsel fees (paragraph 9/8 as alleged in the complaint): Defendant does not deny the fact that plaintiff contracted counsel but denies any liability for such fees, asserting that if plaintiff contracted counsel and will spend the amounts alleged, it is plaintiff's own personal responsibility and defendant assumes no liability.
To paragraphs 5, 6 and 7: Defendant stated that he "does not possess any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the (original) Complaint and therefore, denies the same."
In his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, the defendant annexed his own affidavit reiterating that he had "no real right or interest whatsoever not having been involved in any way with any transaction affecting the title or possession of the same."

Relief Sought by Plaintiff

Recovery of possession and to quiet title over the described parcel.
Attorney's fees and costs for having instituted the action.
Alleged damages (including an allegation of P2,000.00 per agricultural year in paragraph 6 as referenced in the decision).

Lower Court Ruling (Court of First Instance)

The lower court, on motion by plaintiff that defendant's answer failed to tender an issue, rendered judgment on the pleadings.
Judgment declared plaintiff the owner of the property "free from any cloud arising from any a