Galindez vs. Salamanca-Guzman

Procedural Setting and Decisions Reviewed

The case began in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, San Jose City, with multiple complaints for Forcible Entry docketed as Civil Case Nos. (14) 3991 to (14) 3995, later consolidated into a joint decision. The MTCC rendered its Joint Decision dated November 7, 2014, dismissing all complaints for lack of cause of action. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, San Jose City affirmed in toto the MTCC’s decision through a Joint Decision dated May 11, 2015. The Court of Appeals then reversed both the RTC and MTCC through a Decision dated November 29, 2016 and ordered petitioners to vacate and surrender the subject premises. The petitioners sought relief from that reversal via a petition for review on Rule 45.

Origination: Multiple Complaints for Forcible Entry

The complaints were filed by respondents before the MTCC and shared essentially the same core allegations. Respondents claimed ownership and possession of their respective titled lots in Barangay Palestina, and asserted that each lot formed accretions by the passage of time, supported by a Sketch Plan (Exhibit “G”). Respondents further alleged that in November 2013, petitioners forcibly entered the lots, including the accretions, by means of force, strategy, or stealth, and that respondents then sought barangay conciliation through the Tanggapan ng Lupong Tagapamayapa (Lupon). When the parties failed to settle, the Lupon issued certifications to file action, enabling respondents to file the complaints. In each complaint, respondents prayed that petitioners and all persons claiming under them be ordered to vacate and surrender the subject lots and accretions.

Petitioners’ Defense and Theory of Possession

Petitioners filed answers with counterclaim in each case, substantially raising a unified defense. They alleged that the land respondents claimed as accretion was already present and being used when Liberato Locquiao (Locquiao) acquired a parcel of land covered by TCT No. (NT-78186)-5252-A. Petitioners claimed that when Locquiao acquired Lot 2638-B, he asked Vitaliano Ganado (Ganado) to administer it. They alleged that while clearing Locquiao’s property, Ganado noticed another adjacent parcel covered with thick bushes and cleared and made it productive. They further asserted that around 1975, petitioners Galindez was enlisted to cultivate the land at the end of Locquiao’s and adjacent properties, and around 1990, Liberato was enlisted to assist. Petitioners insisted that the alleged accretion was not formed by accretion in the manner claimed by respondents, and that it belonged to Ganado. They also alleged that respondents never possessed the contested property because Ganado had been in possession since 1967.

Evidentiary Submissions Before the MTCC

The record showed that the parties went through mediation unsuccessfully and then submitted position papers, evidence, and judicial affidavits. Respondents presented judicial affidavits from several witnesses, including Medriano, Guzman, Collado, Roldan, Carino, Diosdado Soriano, Victoria Dupitas, Barangay Captain Rodrigo Mamaed, and other witnesses, including an incumbent Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) Chairperson Anastacio Santos. Petitioners presented judicial affidavits from BARC Chairpersons Vicente Tangonan and Anastacio, as well as from Ganado, Galindez, and Liberato. The MTCC thus rendered its decision based on the affidavits and documents submitted before it.

The MTCC’s Joint Decision: Dismissal for Failure to Prove Prior Physical Possession

In its Joint Decision dated November 7, 2014, the MTCC dismissed the complaints for lack of cause of action. It found that respondents failed to prove their alleged prior physical possession of the contested property. The MTCC reasoned that apart from respondents’ own allegations and their witnesses’ statements, respondents presented no other persuasive evidence establishing prior physical possession. It noted that respondents failed to specify, with adequate factual precision, the areas claimed as accretions and even could not pinpoint the location and extent of their respective alleged accretions. The MTCC also reiterated the evidentiary principle that testimony must not only come from credible witnesses but must also be credible in itself. In contrast, it gave weight to the testimony of the BARC Chairpersons Tangonan and Anastacio, who stated that Ganado had prior physical possession of the contested property.

The MTCC added that since respondents anchored their claimed possession on ownership and since more than one year had allegedly passed from the time petitioners allegedly took possession, the appropriate remedy might be accion publiciana, rather than forcible entry. Respondents then filed a notice of appeal and, crucially, soon after, additional affidavits were filed with the MTCC.

The RTC’s Joint Decision: Affirmance and Credibility Findings

On appeal, the RTC, in its Joint Decision dated May 11, 2015, affirmed the MTCC in toto. The RTC ruled that respondents’ testimonies and those of their witnesses were unworthy of belief due to bias, and it found petitioners’ witnesses to be more credible. It emphasized that the BARC Chairpersons Tangonan and Anastacio were older and were not related to petitioners, thus they allegedly had no personal stake in the outcome. It also noted that respondents may not have been aware of petitioners’ occupation of the accretion prior to respondents becoming registered owners of their parcels. Nevertheless, the RTC stressed that peaceful occupation of titled parcels was not proof of prior physical possession of the alleged accretion.

The RTC further found that petitioners showed actual possession of the contested property at relevant times because, as presented, petitioners were constituted as farm helpers by Ganado in 1975 and 1990, and Ganado had actual and physical possession of adjacent land by the river since 1967. The RTC declared that respondents’ evidence failed to show that they were dispossessed by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, as required for forcible entry. It also rejected the credibility of Barangay Captain Mamaed’s testimony and documents, finding that the “Patunay” contained conclusions without adequate factual grounding and that it was improbable for a large area to be fenced and occupied within a day without notice or tolerance by respondents.

The Court of Appeals Reversal: Ordering Petitioners to Vacate

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated November 29, 2016, reversed the RTC and ordered petitioners to vacate and surrender the subject premises. The CA held that the RTC erred in its factual findings and that respondents proved their cause of action by preponderance of evidence.

The CA found that respondents established prior physical possession through: (a) respondents’ and witnesses’ testimonies, including those of Barangay Captain Mamaed, Dupitas, and Diosdado; (b) the certification and Sketch Plan of Engr. Magtuto; (c) a blotter entry; and (d) “Patunay” documents by Barangay Captain Mamaed. The CA held that certifications or “Patunays” issued by the Punong Barangay through Barangay Captain Mamaed were presumed to be regular in the absence of proof to rebut such presumption.

The CA also addressed discrepancies in the BARC Chairpersons’ affidavits, ruling that they could not be relied upon for containing conflicting statements, and it treated both earlier and later affidavits as supporting respondents’ theory. In reaching its conclusions, the CA considered evidence that was allegedly filed after the MTCC had already decided, including the second Judicial Affidavits of the BARC Chairpersons and evidence submitted for the first time on appeal to the RTC, including Engr. Magtuto’s supplemental affidavit and certification. The CA’s resolution dated March 31, 2017 denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, prompting the present petition.

Issues Raised by Petitioners

Petitioners argued: first, that the CA’s decision and resolution were contrary to law and jurisprudence; and second, that the CA’s decision was unsupported by the evidence on record. Under Rule 45, the first issue was treated as a question of law. The second issue was treated as involving review of factual findings, which the Court allowed because the trial courts’ findings conflicted with the CA’s.

Governing Standards: Summary Procedure and Forcible Entry Elements

The Court underscored that forcible entry cases are governed by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Under Sec. 9 of that framework, within a fixed period after the preliminary conference order, parties must submit the affidavits of their witnesses and their evidence on factual issues, together with their position papers. After that stage, additional affidavits or evidence may be submitted only upon order of the court, if the court finds it necessary to clarify material facts, consistent with Sec. 10. The Court thus treated the late submission of affidavits as governed by strict procedural limits.

The Court also reiterated the substantive elements of forcible entry: plaintiffs must allege and prove (a) prior physical possession; (b) dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and (c) filing within one year from learning of the deprivation. It stressed that the only issue in forcible entry cases is prior physical possession de facto, not title.

The Court’s Core Procedural Ruling: Error in Considering Belated Evidence

The Court ruled that the CA was not correct in considering the second Judicial Affidavits executed by BARC Chairpersons Tangonan and Anastacio, and the Supplemental Judicial Affidavit and certification of Engr. Magtuto, because these were presented irregularly.

The Court held that the second Judicial Affidavits were filed only days after the MTCC’s joint decision and after respondents filed their notice of appeal. It characterized the submission as hig