Title
Gaerlan vs. Republic
Case
G.R. No. 192717
Decision Date
Mar 12, 2014
Petitioner sought land title registration but failed to prove land was alienable and disposable or possession since 1945; SC upheld CA’s dismissal.
land registration
title
alienable and disposable
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 192717)

Factual Background

On April 10, 1992, petitioner filed her application for original registration of title over Lot 18793, Cad-237. In support of the application, she alleged that she acquired the property in November 1989 from Mamerta Tan by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. She stated that she caused the property to be declared for taxation in her name and received Tax Declaration Nos. 99893 and 058351. She attached documentary exhibits including the tracing cloth plan, technical description, surveyors report, the deed of sale, and tax declaration materials.

After the trial court set the case for initial hearing, the Republic, through the OSG, filed an Opposition on August 25, 1992. The opposition invoked, among others, the lack of evidence of possession by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the insufficiency of the muniments of title and tax declarations to establish a bona fide acquisition, the inapplicability of a claim based on Spanish title, and the theory that the land was a portion of the public domain and thus not registrable.

During the hearings, petitioner testified that she purchased the land on November 28, 1989, declared it for tax purposes under her name, paid taxes up to 1991, and took possession and caused a survey. She also presented Mamerta Tan, who testified that she sold the subject land to petitioner in 1989, and that she herself acquired ownership in 1975 after she bought it from Teresita Tan. A key witness was Honesto Velez, City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City, who testified regarding the land history card for cadastral lot 4342 and tax declarations showing petitioner as owner of a portion corresponding to 1,061 square meters under Tax Declaration No. 058351.

Based on the evidence adduced, the RTC later rendered judgment granting petitioner’s application. It declared petitioner owner in fee simple and ordered registration of Lot 18793, Cad-237 in her name.

RTC Judgment Granting Registration

On November 20, 2001, the RTC issued Judgment granting petitioner’s application for registration of title. The dispositive portion reflected the trial court’s conclusion that there was no evidence presented by the oppositor and that petitioner was the owner in fee simple of the land subject of the application, specifically Lot 18793, Cad-237 with an area of 1,061 square meters, more or less, to be registered in her name in accordance with the technical description.

Court of Appeals Review and Dismissal of Application

The Republic appealed to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN. On March 11, 2010, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC judgment and dismissed petitioner’s application for registration. The CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove that the land was alienable and disposable. It emphasized that the applicant must establish that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the subject public domain land as alienable and disposable, and that the land falls within the approved area as verified through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The CA also stressed that the applicant must present the copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

The CA further found no evidentiary support for the claim of the required possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It held that petitioner failed to show that she or her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier. On these bases, the CA held that petitioner was not entitled to registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.

On May 20, 2010, the CA issued a resolution which sustained the reversal and dismissal, leading petitioner to file the present petition for review on certiorari.

Parties’ Contentions on Review

In her petition, petitioner asserted that the CA erred in denying her application. She claimed that the land had already been classified as alienable and disposable as early as 1925, and that possession through her predecessor-in-interest Potenciano Abragan began in 1929. She explained that Potenciano Abragan had requested the original survey of Lot 4342, Cad-237, which had an original area of 12,293 square meters, and she maintained that the parcel applied for—Lot 18793, Cad-237 with an area of 1,061 square meters—was a portion of that larger lot.

Petitioner sought to introduce additional evidence at the appellate level: BL Form No. 700-2A, reflecting the survey conducted on November 28, 1929 with Potenciano Abragan as cadastral survey claimant, and a CENRO Certification stating that Lot 4342, Cad-237 fell within an area classified as alienable and disposable under Project 8, Block I and Land Classification (LC) Map No. 585, certified and approved on December 31, 1925. She also reiterated that she and her witnesses testified on actual possession, including acts of declaring the property for taxation and paying taxes.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition. It argued that under Rule 45, only questions of law could be raised and that petitioner was attempting, for the first time at the level of this petition, to introduce additional evidence. It contended that admission of the additional documents would require a review of the probative value of evidence, which falls outside the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. It also argued that petitioner had not presented the necessary DENR-approved land classification documentation during the proceedings below and that her evidence of possession did not satisfy the requirement of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Legal Issues

The controversy centered on whether the CA correctly dismissed the application for registration of title by holding that petitioner failed to satisfy the requisites under P.D. No. 1529, particularly: first, the requirement that the land be proven to be alienable and disposable through the proper DENR classification and release, and second, the requirement that the applicant and predecessors-in-interest have been in the required type of possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

A preliminary issue also arose as to whether petitioner’s petition was limited to questions of law, given the Republic’s contention that petitioner was raising issues that required factual re-evaluation due to her proposed additional evidence.

The Court’s Discussion on Scope of Review Under Rule 45

The Court first addressed respondent’s objection that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45. It reiterated the settled distinction between questions of law and questions of fact. It held that a question of law exists when the dispute concerns what the law is on a given set of facts and does not require examination of probative value. Conversely, it described questions of fact as arising from controversies over the truth or falsity of alleged facts.

The Court then observed that petitioner sought a review of the CA’s conclusion regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support legal conclusions. It found no genuine factual dispute and held that the petition presented questions properly cognizable under Rule 45, since petitioner’s challenge focused on the legal sufficiency of the evidence relied upon by the CA to deny registration.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Alienable and Disposable Land

On the merits, the Court agreed with the CA. It restated that under P.D. No. 1529—in relation to Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended—an applicant must establish three elements: (1) that the subject land is disposable and alienable of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and predecessors-in-interest exercised open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that possession was under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The Court emphasized that each element must be proven by clear, positive and convincing evidence. It applied the Regalian doctrine, reaffirming that all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that the burden to overcome the presumption of State ownership lies with the applicant. It held that an applicant must present incontrovertible evidence proving that the land is alienable and disposable.

To establish alienability, the Court reiterated the need for a positive act of government, such as a presidential proclamation or executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports, or a legislative act. It recognized that an applicant may present a certification from government; however, the certification must show that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the specific land as alienable and disposable, and that the land sought to be registered falls within the approved area verified through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original DENR classification, certified as true by the legal custodian of the official records.

The Court held that petitioner’s submissions did not satisfy these requirements. Petitioner presented a CENRO Certification stating that Lot 4342, Cad-237 fell within the alienable and disposable area, and she presented LC Map No. 543, certified and approved on December 31, 1925. The Court found that the attached certification was inadequate to prove alienability and disposability. It relied on Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., holding that a CENRO certification is insufficient unless it sufficiently demonstrates DENR Secretary approval and release, and that the applicant must present the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true by the proper custodian.

The Court also referenced Republic v. Medida to explain why CENRO/PENRO certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated

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