Title
Gaa vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case
G.R. No. L-69809
Decision Date
Oct 16, 1986
A lawyer used an extension phone to overhear a private conversation, leading to charges under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. The Supreme Court ruled that extension phones are not prohibited devices under the law, acquitting the accused.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 204793)

Petitioner

Edgardo A. Gaanan was accused, convicted, and sentenced for violating Section 1 of RA No. 4200 based on his having listened to a private telephone call on an extension line at the request of Atty. Laconico and later executed an affidavit describing the conversation.

Respondent

The People of the Philippines prosecuted Gaanan for unlawful interception of communications under RA No. 4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s conviction, holding that the conversation was private and that the telephone extension used by the petitioner fell within the statute’s phrase “device or arrangement.”

Key Dates

Relevant factual dates: the principal telephone conversations and events occurred on October 22, 1975 (initial call and related events). Trial and appellate proceedings culminated before the Court’s decision in 1986. (The decision date itself is not included in this initial header per instruction.)

Applicable Law and Constitution

Primary statute: Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act), specifically Section 1, which penalizes tapping any wire or cable or, “by using any other device or arrangement,” secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording private communications and prohibits possession, replay, dissemination or transcription of such records except when used as evidence in certain proceedings. Applicable constitutional framework for judicial reasoning: the 1973 Constitution (the operative constitution at the time the decision was rendered).

Facts

Atty. Pintor and his client Montebon discussed settlement terms in Pintor’s home and Pintor telephoned Laconico. Laconico summoned petitioner Gaanan to his office and asked Gaanan to secretly listen to Pintor’s telephone conversation via a telephone extension so Laconico could hear the proposed settlement terms. Gaanan listened and later executed an affidavit recounting the conversation. Pintor charged Gaanan and Laconico under RA No. 4200. At trial both were convicted; the appellate court affirmed.

Procedural History

Trial court convicted Gaanan and Laconico under Section 1 of RA No. 4200 and imposed one year imprisonment each with costs. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction on August 16, 1984, finding the communication private, the petitioner had overheard without complainant’s consent, and the extension telephone qualified as a prohibited “device or arrangement.” The petitioner sought certiorari relief to the Supreme Court challenging (a) privacy of the call, (b) whether an extension telephone is a covered “device or arrangement,” (c) whether petitioner had authority to listen, and (d) alleged ambiguity in RA No. 4200.

Issue Presented

Whether an extension telephone constitutes a prohibited “device or arrangement” under Section 1 of RA No. 4200 such that use of an extension to overhear a private telephone conversation constitutes unlawful interception and criminal liability thereunder.

Statutory Text and Statutory Construction Principles

Section 1 of RA No. 4200 proscribes “tapping any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement” to secretly overhear, intercept or record private communications and enumerates sample devices “commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described.” As a penal statute, RA No. 4200 must be strictly construed in favor of the accused; ambiguous provisions excluding clearly familiar, ordinary devices that do not perform the same function as the enumerated intercepting/recording instruments are to be interpreted narrowly.

Court’s Analysis of “Device or Arrangement”

The Court analyzed whether an extension telephone is akin to the enumerated instruments (which are specialized devices used to intercept or record communications) or whether it is a common, ordinary telephone accessory whose presence should be expected by callers. The Court emphasized that “device or arrangement” should be read to include instruments of the same or similar nature as the enumerated ones—i.e., instruments whose use is tantamount to tapping the main telephone line and whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party being called.

Application of Precedent and Legislative History

The Court relied on statutory construction principles and cited precedent recognizing that particularization followed by a general expression is ordinarily restricted to the particular items enumerated. It also considered legislative history in the Congressional Record showing that lawmakers were concerned primarily with penalizing recording and deliberate interception devices and that telephones (including party lines) were discussed and ultimately not included among enumerated devices. The Court referenced Rathbun v. United States to illustrate that callers assume the risk that the called party may have an extension permitting others to overhear; under that rationale, mere use of an extension does not constitute interception.

Policy Considerations and Practical Effects

The Court noted policy consequences of a contrary ruling: criminalizing ordinary extension use could chill citizens from reporting crimes or cooperating with authorities, would criminalize ordinary office practices (secretaries or

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