Case Summary (G.R. No. 192791)
Case Background
• Carague was appointed COA Chairman for a fixed seven-year term (Feb 2, 2001–Feb 2, 2008).
• Villar was appointed COA Commissioner for seven years (Feb 2, 2004–Feb 2, 2011).
• After Carague’s term expired, Villar served briefly as Acting Chairman (Feb 4–Apr 14, 2008).
• On Apr 18, 2008, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Villar Chairman of COA “until Feb 2, 2011,” and the Commission on Appointments confirmed him on June 11, 2008.
• Petitioner challenged this appointment as unconstitutional under Rule 65 certiorari.
Procedural Posture and Mootness
• Villar vacated the chairmanship upon the appointment of Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan in 2011, rendering direct relief moot.
• Court invoked exceptions to mootness: alleged grave constitutional violation; exceptional public interest; need for guiding principles; and recurring issue likely to evade review.
Standing and Justiciability
• Petitioner’s status as taxpayer and concerned citizen was deemed sufficient under the Court’s liberalized standing doctrine, given the matter’s transcendental importance.
• All procedural requisites for judicial review by certiorari were satisfied: actual controversy, ripeness, proper party, and earliest opportunity to raise constitutionality.
Scope of Judicial Review by Certiorari
• Under Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, certiorari may correct grave abuse of discretion by government officers and determine constitutional compliance.
• “Grave abuse of discretion” connotes arbitrary, capricious action equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Constitutional Provision on COA Terms and Reappointment
• Art. IX-D, Sec. 1(2) provides:
– COA Chairman and Commissioners serve seven years “without reappointment.”
– First appointees’ terms are seven, five, and three years “without reappointment.”
– Appointment to any vacancy “shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.”
– No temporary or acting designations.
Rotational Plan and Staggered Terms
• The Constitution mandates term staggering to ensure continuity and protect independence by preventing a single administration from appointing more than one commissioner every two years.
• First appointees’ common start date (Feb 2, 1987) and varying term lengths established a recurring two-year cycle of vacancies.
• Subsequent appointments to expired-term vacancies must be for a fresh seven-year term; vacancies from death, disability, resignation, or impeachment must be filled only for the unexpired portion.
Interpretation of the Reappointment Ban
• Plain-meaning rule: clear, unambiguous constitutional text must be applied literally.
• “Without reappointment” bars only a second appointment to the same office following full term service, not promotions to different offices, per the majority.
• Parties presented conflicting readings: petitioner argued promotional appointment equals prohibited reappointment; respondent claimed promotional appointments are permitted if they comply with term-length rules.
Majority Ruling on Validity of Villar’s Appointment
• The crucial question: Was Villar’s elevation from Commissioner (with four years’ service) to Chairman valid under the fixed-term and vacancy-filling rules?
• A successor to an expired-term vacancy must receive a full seven-year term. Villar’s preexisting four years as Commissioner made a full seven-year Chairman term impossible.
• A shorter three-year appointment breached the “term of seven years” requirement for expired-term vacancies.
• Therefore, Villar’s appointment was unconstitutional on two grounds: violation of the mandatory full seven-year term requirement and disruption of the rotational scheme (aggregate service rule).
Doctrinal Postulates from the Decision
- Appointments after staggered-term expirations must be for a full seven years; any shorter term is void.
- Appointments to vacancies from death, resignation, disability, or impeachment are limited to the unexpired portion.
- Service for a full seven-year term bars any reappointment to the same position.
- “Reappointment” means a second appointment to the same office; movement to a different office is a new appointment.
- No temporary or acting appointments are permitted.
Supreme Court’s Conclusion
• Villar’s appointm
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 192791)
Facts of the Case
- On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Guillermo N. Carague as COA Chairman for seven years (Feb 2 2001–Feb 2 2008).
- On February 7, 2004, the same President appointed Reynaldo A. Villar as third COA Commissioner for seven years (Feb 2 2004–Feb 2 2011).
- Upon Carague’s term expiration on Feb 2 2008, Villar served as Acting Chairman from Feb 4 2008 to Apr 14 2008.
- On April 18, 2008, Villar was appointed COA Chairman with term until Feb 2 2011; the Commission on Appointments confirmed him on June 11 2008.
- Evelyn R. San Buenaventura was appointed COA Commissioner to serve the unexpired term of Villar as Commissioner (up to Feb 2 2011).
- On Feb 22 2011, Villar notified President Aquino of his intention to step down; he vacated the office upon appointment of Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan as COA Chairman.
Procedural Posture
- Dennis A. B. Funa filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 challenging the constitutionality of Villar’s appointment.
- Respondent Villar contended petitioner lacked standing and certiorari was improper; the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) suggested quo warranto or declaratory relief instead.
- Subsequent appointments rendered the case moot, prompting the Court to consider mootness exceptions.
Mootness and Exceptions
- The controversy became moot and academic upon Villar’s resignation and new appointments.
- The Court applied exceptions from David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:
• Grave constitutional violation
• Exceptional character and paramount public interest
• Need to formulate controlling principles
• Capable of repetition yet evading review - Found all four exceptions present, warranting resolution despite mootness.
Justiciability and Standing
- Rule 65 requisites for judicial review:
• Actual justiciable controversy
• Ripeness for adjudication
• Proper party (locus standi)
• Constitutionality raised at the earliest opportunity - Petitioner, a taxpayer and citizen, was granted standing under the liberalized doctrine for issues of transcendental importance.
Remedy: Certiorari
- Under the 1987 Constitution’s expanded review, certiorari corrects “grave abuse of discretion” by government officials.
- Grave abuse of discretion: capricious, whimsical exercise of judgment equivale