Title
Franco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case
G.R. No. 71137
Decision Date
Oct 5, 1989
Bus collision caused by driver negligence led to deaths; employer held primarily liable under quasi-delict, not subsidiary liability. Damages adjusted, indemnity increased.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 71137)

Procedural Posture and Key Dates

Civil Case No. 2154 was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City (filed November 11, 1974). The trial court rendered judgment on May 17, 1978. The Court of Appeals issued its decision modifying awards (dated January 2, 1985), and denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration (denial dated May 13, 1985). The present petition to the Supreme Court raised two principal legal issues for review.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether the action for recovery of damages was predicated upon a crime (subsidiary liability under Articles 102–103 of the Revised Penal Code) or upon quasi-delict (primary civil liability under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code). 2. Whether the appellate court may increase the award of damages in favor of appellees (Chuay and Lugue) who did not appeal the trial court’s judgment.

Facts Material to Liability and Damages

At approximately 7:30 p.m. on October 18, 1974, the Franco Bus, driven by Macario Yuro, swerved left to avoid a parked truck and collided with an oncoming Isuzu minibus driven by Magdaleno Lugue. The minibus was dragged some 15 meters and overturned into the highway canal; it became a total wreck. The collision caused the deaths of both drivers and two passengers (Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay). Plaintiffs claimed actual and compensatory damages for the destroyed minibus (P50,000) and loss of average net income (P120 daily or P3,600 monthly), plus claimed amounts for deaths and loss of earning capacity (specified amounts in the complaint).

Trial Court Ruling

The trial court concluded the matter involved criminal negligence (reckless imprudence) giving rise to civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code; it rejected the defendants’ affirmative defense that they exercised due diligence in selection and supervision of employees. The trial court awarded damages to plaintiffs (detailed sums), and ordered attorney’s fees and interest.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s characterization of the driver’s conduct as reckless or criminal imprudence and treated the appellants’ civil obligation as arising from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, imposing subsidiary liability on the employer. The Court of Appeals increased the damages awarded to certain plaintiffs (notably raising awards for death and loss of earning capacity for Chuay and Lugue) while otherwise affirming the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioners’ Contentions on Review

Petitioners argued the complaint alleged ordinary civil liability (quasi-delict) under the Civil Code and thus afforded them the defense under Article 2180 — that they exercised “all the diligence of a good father of a family” in selecting and supervising their driver. They also argued the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to increase awards for appellees who did not appeal the trial court’s decision.

Applicable Law

  • Articles 102–103, Revised Penal Code (subsidiary civil liability of employers for felonies committed by employees in discharge of duties).
  • Articles 2176, 2177, and 2180, Civil Code (quasi-delict/culpa aquiliana, separation of civil liability from penal liability, employer liability for employees acting within scope of tasks, and the due-diligence defense).

Legal Distinction Emphasized by the Court

The Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental distinction: subsidiary liability under Articles 102–103 RPC is contingent upon a prior criminal finding of the employee’s guilt (the employee’s primary liability must be established in criminal proceedings), whereas primary civil liability under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code constitutes a tortious obligation of the employer that is independent of criminal prosecution but subject to the due-diligence defense. If no criminal action is instituted or possible (e.g., because the employee died), Article 103 cannot serve as the basis for subsidiary liability.

Court’s Analysis and Resolution on Liability

Because no criminal prosecution or conviction of the deceased driver could be instituted (the driver died), the Court held that the employer’s subsidiary liability under Article 103 could not be invoked. The action filed was properly treated as a civil action predicated on quasi-delict under the Civil Code, making the employer primarily civilly liable unless it could prove it observed all the diligence of a good father of a family. The Supreme Court found the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts — that petitioners failed to prove the due-diligence defense — to be well supported by t

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