A.M. No. P-09-2636 - Francisco vs. Galvez

Case Summary (A.M. No. P-09-2636)

Factual Background

The controversy arose from the marital dispute of Landicho and Evelyn Carandang, who were married on February 3, 1975 in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Carandang represented herself as single and without any legal impediment to contract marriage. In October 2001, Carandang filed for divorce in the Superior Court of Rancho Cucamonga, County of San Bernardino, Los Angeles, California, USA. In January 2002, she obtained a divorce decree against Landicho and was awarded spousal support of US $1,100.00 per month. Landicho regularly provided monthly support from January 2002 until September 2006.

Landicho later discovered that Carandang had a prior marriage in the Philippines to Norberto Bagnate on August 2, 1973, which meant she had a legal impediment when she married Landicho in 1975. Landicho then filed an action to stop payment of support and to declare the divorce decree invalid. During the proceedings, Carandang presented a questioned Decision dated December 16, 1974, purportedly issued by Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo (then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Courts of Pateros and Fort Bonifacio, Rizal). Carandang used the questioned decision to show that her earlier marriage with her first husband had already been nullified as early as 1974, and thus she allegedly had no impediment at the time of her marriage with Landicho.

Landicho countered that the questioned decision was spurious. He argued that the former trial court had no jurisdiction to try cases for annulment of marriage, and he also pointed out that the supposed decision was registered only in 2007. Later, in a Decision dated May 4, 2008, the Regional Trial Court of Pateros, Branch 262, declared the questioned decision null and void and directed the Office of the Local Registrar of Makati City and the National Statistics Office to cancel the annotation of the annulment of marriage between Bagnate and Carandang.

Prior Attempt to Administer Liability

After the RTC decision, Landicho, through Atty. Francisco, first filed an administrative complaint against Judge Sto. Domingo for issuing the spurious decision. That complaint was terminated because Judge Sto. Domingo had already retired from service on September 20, 1997.

Landicho then instituted the present administrative complaint against Galvez, as it was alleged that she had certified the spurious decision and issued the certificate of finality.

Respondent’s Explanation and the Investigation

In her Comment dated 17 September 2007, Galvez stated that on April 3, 2007, a certain Rebecca Bautista, accompanied by Ms. Perla A. Chavez (an employee of the Office of the Civil Registrar-Pateros), approached her and introduced Bautista as a relative of Carandang. Bautista showed Galvez a duplicate copy of the questioned December 16, 1974 Decision and requested her to certify it and issue a certificate of finality.

Galvez claimed she initially refused, citing that there were no remaining records of Fort Bonifacio cases in the court of Pateros. She then alleged that Bautista and Chavez insisted she could still certify and issue finality because she was familiar with Judge Sto. Domingo’s signature. Galvez said she complied after searching for other orders and decisions bearing Judge Sto. Domingo’s signature that were available in the office, then compared those signatures with the signature appearing on the questioned decision, and concluded they were similar. She added that at the time the questioned decision was rendered in 1974, she was merely a clerk and was allegedly unaware that the MTC of Pateros had no jurisdiction over annulment cases. She further invoked good faith and asserted that she relied on the circumstances presented and the signature comparison.

Chavez admitted that she was the one who convinced and reassured Galvez to issue the certification despite the lack of records.

After the OCA recommended investigation, the Supreme Court referred the matter to Executive Judge Amelia C. Manalastas of the RTC of Pasig for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In her Compliance dated October 3, 2008, Judge Manalastas found Galvez liable only for simple negligence for failing to exercise diligence in violation of Sections 1 and 3, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. The OCA later recommended that Galvez be suspended from service for one (1) month and one (1) day for simple neglect of duty.

The Supreme Court’s Evaluation of Galvez’s Conduct

The Court rejected the recommendation and found Galvez’s actions to show more than simple negligence. The Court stressed that public office is a public trust and that the conduct of all personnel connected with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk, carries a heavy burden of responsibility. It held that the evidence established Galvez’s guilt because, in certifying the disputed decision and issuing the certificate of finality, she did not observe the diligence required of court personnel.

The Court identified multiple negligent acts. First, it held that Galvez knew there were no existing records that could have served as a basis for the certifications. Second, it found that she did not exert efforts to inquire with authorized persons about whether the court that supposedly rendered the decision had jurisdiction to try and decide an annulment case, or whether the document presented for certification was valid and authentic. Third, it found that she relied solely on her familiarity with the signature of the late Judge Sto. Domingo. Fourth, it noted she failed to properly attend to the fact that the decision had doubtful origin, considering it was dated more than thirty years earlier. Fifth, the Court found that she carelessly relied on assurances from Chavez, who was not even a court employee.

The Court anchored the standard of conduct on Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which requires court personnel to perform official duties properly and with diligence. It emphasized that there was nothing proper in certifying a mere photocopy without verifying its truthfulness with available resources. It further reasoned that reliance on one person’s familiarity with another person’s signature cannot support a certification, because a certificate is a written assurance or official representation that a certain act occurred or a legal formality was complied with. Thus, to certify is to attest the truthfulness of the document, and without records to verify truthfulness and authenticity, no certification should issue. The Court also found it significant that there was no record of official receipt for the issuance of the certifications.

The Court concluded that Galvez’s lackadaisical attitude showed inefficiency and incompetence. It held that her conduct amounted to gross negligence, and in light of the gravity of the repercussions, it refused to characterize the fault as merely simple neglect. It added that Galvez should have informed the presiding judge that there were no records to support the certification. It also stated that by certifying under the court seal, Galvez jeopardized the integrity of the judiciary when the certified decision later proved to be spurious and non-existent. The Court viewed her acts as reflecting adversely on the integrity and efficiency of the judiciary.

Rejection of the “Good Faith” Defense

The Court also dismissed Galvez’s claim of good faith. It explained that good faith, in common usage, denotes honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances that should prompt inquiry, together with the absence of information or belief of facts making the transaction unconscientious. Applying that standard, the Court held that Galvez could not be considered to have acted in good faith because she herself admitted that there were no court records to support the certification. It also noted that she failed to take precautionary measures to determine authenticity of the document, which appeared suspicious on its face.

The Court stressed again that a clerk of court occupies a sensitive position that requires competence and efficiency to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice and to prevent any act or omission that may taint the judiciary.

Analogy to Prior Doctrine on Gross Neglect

The Court referenced Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan v. Judge Nicasio Bartolome and treated Galvez’s case as corollary. In that earlier case, the Court had categorized as a grave offense of gross neglect of duty the releasing of an accused on temporary liberty despite the absence of supporting documents for bail. The Court reasoned that, in the present case, Galvez certified a questionable decision and issued a certificate of finality without any records to support the certifications. For the Court, this similarly demonstrated gross neglect of duty.

Penalty and Classification of the Offense

On penalty, the Court held that gross neglect of duty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Case in the Civil Service. It considered Galvez’s plea that it was her first offense, but it ruled that the gravity of the offense negated the application of the “first offense” mitigating circumstance. The Court also reasoned that certifying a de

Case Syllabus (A.M. No. P-09-2636)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Complainant Atty. Eduardo E. Francisco filed an administrative complaint against respondent Liza O. Galvez, then Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Clerk of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pateros, Branch 73.
The complaint charged grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a court employee for issuing a certified photocopy of a decision later declared spurious and an undated certificate of finality of that decision.
The case proceeded to investigation and report under the auspices of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and a referral to Executive Judge Amelia C. Manalastas for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Judge Manalastas found respondent guilty of simple negligence.
The OCA recommended a penalty of suspension from the service for one (1) month and one (1) day based on simple neglect of duty.
The Court disagreed with the findings and recommendations below and proceeded to its own determination of liability and penalty.

Key Factual Allegations

Lamberto Ilagan Landicho had a marriage to Evelyn Carandang on February 3, 1975 in Canada after Carandang represented that she was single.
In October 2001, Carandang filed for divorce against Landicho in the Superior Court of Rancho Cucamonga, County of San Bernardino, Los Angeles, California, USA.
In January 2002, Carandang obtained a divorce decree against Landicho and was awarded spousal support of US $1,100.00 a month.
Landicho supported Carandang monthly from January 2002 to September 2006, until he discovered Carandang had a prior marriage to Norberto Bagnate on August 2, 1973 in the Philippines.
Landicho later pursued an action to stop payment of support and to declare the divorce decree invalid.
During that proceeding, Carandang relied on a purported Decision dated December 16, 1974, allegedly issued by Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo, to show that her prior marriage had already been nullified by then.
Landicho opposed the use of the December 16, 1974 Decision by alleging it was spurious, emphasizing that the trial court said to have rendered it lacked jurisdiction over annulment cases and that the decision was registered only in 2007.
In a Decision dated May 4, 2008, the Regional Trial Court of Pateros, Branch 262 declared the questioned decision null and void and directed cancellation of the related annotation with the Office of the Local Registrar of Makati City and the National Statistics Office.
Landicho initially filed an administrative complaint against Judge Sto. Domingo for the issuance of the spurious decision, but the complaint was terminated due to his retirement on September 20, 1997.
Landicho then filed the present complaint against Galvez, alleging she certified the spurious decision and issued the certificate of finality.
Respondent Galvez narrated that in April 3, 2007, Rebecca Bautista and Ms. Perla A. Chavez (an employee of the Office of the Civil Registrar-Pateros) approached her, requested certification of the duplicate copy of the December 16, 1974 Decision, and sought issuance of a certificate of finality.
Galvez stated she initially refused because there were no more records of Fort Bonifacio cases in the court of Pateros.
Galvez further claimed that Bautista and Chavez insisted she could certify because she was familiar with Judge Sto. Domingo’s signature.
Galvez asserted she searched for other orders and decisions bearing Judge Sto. Domingo’s signature, compared them to the signature on the questioned decision, and concluded the signatures were similar.
Galvez admitted she certified the questioned decision and issued the certificate of finality despite the absence of records to verify authenticity and despite lack of jurisdictional awareness on the limits of the MTC regarding annulment cases.
Chavez admitted she convinced and reassured respondent to proceed with the certification despite lack of records.
The record contained no showing of an official receipt for the issuance of the certifications.

Issues Presented

The Court determined whether respondent Liza O. Galvez was administratively liable for issuing certifications of a decision and certificate of finality that were later adjudged spurious and null and void.
The Court addressed whether respondent’s acts constituted merely simple negligence or rose to gross neglect of duty.
The Court considered whether good faith could exculpate respondent in certifying the questioned decision and issuing the certificate of finality.
The Court resolved the appropriate administrative penalty in view of the severity of respondent’s lapses.

Applicable Standards and Rules

The Court emphasized the constitutional and jurisprudential principle that public office is a public trust and that the conduct of all personnel connected with the administration of justice must be circumscribed by heavy responsibility.
The Court applied the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, specifically Canon IV, Section 1, requiring that court personnel perform official duties properly and with diligence.
The Court also adverted to Canon IV, Section 3, requiring court personnel not to alter, falsify, destroy, or mutilate any record within their control, as an ethical boundary for court employees dealing with official records.
The Court cited Rule 136, Rules of Court on Court Record and General Duties of Clerks and Stenographers, particularly Section 11, “Certified Copies,” whi