G.R. No. L-11024 - Angeles vs. Court of Appeals

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-11024)

Factual Background

Petitioner, then President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company, lost his temper and uttered abusive and insulting words to several employees between 9 and 12 April 1980. Five employees filed separate Informations charging him with grave oral defamation on four different days. The MeTC, Branch 61, Makati, convicted petitioner in four of the five cases on 2 January 1990 and sentenced him to one year and one day to one year and eight months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," ordered indemnity and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. He was acquitted in one case for the persistent failure of the offended party to appear.

Trial and Appellate Proceedings

Petitioner appealed from the MeTC to the RTC, asserting errors that sought acquittal or reversal. The RTC affirmed the MeTC's findings of guilt but appreciated a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation and reduced the penalty in each case to a straight term of eight months imprisonment. Petitioner did not further perfect any appeal from the RTC, and the RTC decision became final. The MeTC then set the case for execution and issued a warrant of arrest.

Application for Probation and Relief in the Court of Appeals

Before his arrest, petitioner filed an application for probation with the MeTC. The MeTC denied the application, citing Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on several grounds: petitioner had failed to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91; he had not sought reconsideration of the MeTC order; the denial was not shown to be capricious or arbitrary; the petition for probation was filed out of time; and Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, expressly barred probation where the defendant had perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. A motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals was likewise denied.

Issue Presented

Whether petitioner qualified to avail himself of probation under P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990, despite having appealed his conviction from the MeTC to the RTC which affirmed liability but reduced the duration of the penalties.

Petitioner's Contentions

Petitioner maintained that he had not lost the right to probation because his appeal was taken to secure a reduction of the penalties imposed by the MeTC so that he could qualify for probation; he argued that his appeal was prompted by the need to render himself eligible for the benefits of the Probation Law and not to pursue a strategy of opportunism after a failed appeal.

Supreme Court Decision and Disposition

The Court, through Justice Bellosillo, denied the petition and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court concluded that petitioner was no longer eligible to seek probation because he had perfected an appeal from the conviction of the MeTC. The Court held that, under Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." The Court also found the application for probation to have been filed outside the period prescribed by the Probation Law and noted that petitioner had not shown that his appeal was limited solely to reducing the penalty.

Court's Legal Reasoning — Nature of Probation and Statutory Construction

The Court emphasized that probation is a special privilege, an act of grace and clemency, and not a right of the accused. The grant of probation is discretionary and rests primarily upon the interest of society. The Court read Section 4 literally and followed controlling jurisprudence, including Llamado v. Court of Appeals, to conclude that the statute's negative clause and the mandatory term "shall" preclude an application for probation by one who has perfected an appeal. The Court rejected the invitation to adopt an equitable exception that would permit petitioners who appealed solely to reduce penalties to later seek probation. Quoting and relying on prior decisions, the Court stated that where statutory language is plain and definite there is no room for liberality that would alter the words of the legislature.

Court's Reasoning — Multiple Sentences, Timeliness, and Purpose of Appeal

The Court addressed the question whether multiple prison terms must be aggregated for probation eligibility and declared that multiple prison terms imposed in one decision are distinct and should not be added for purposes of determining probationability. The Court relied on the use of the word "maximum" in Section 9(a) to show legislative intent to treat each penalty separately. The Court nonetheless found that petitioner forfeited the opportunity to seek probation by perfecting an appeal and, independently, by filing his probation application after the period for perfecting an appeal had lapsed and after a warrant for arrest had been issued. The Court further observed that petitioner’s appeal primarily sought acquittal rather than solely a reduction in penalty, and that the record did not demonstrate that petitioner had manifested a timely, spontaneous acceptance of culpability that the Probation Law contemplates.

Procedural and Evidentiary Points Noted

The Court observed procedural shortcomings in petitioner's defense strategy, noting that petitioner should have moved to quash under Section 3, par. (e), Rule 117 if he sought to challenge the charging of multiple offenses, but that failure to do so may now operate as waiver under Section 8, Rule 117. The Court also found it dispositive that petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the MeTC's denial before invoking certiorari in the Court of Appeals, and that petitioner failed to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Mendoza

Justice Mendoza dissented and would have reversed the Court of Appeals. He argued that where an accused is originally disqualified from probation by a sentence that, in its totality, exceeds the probationable maximum, and the sentence is reduced on appeal to within the allowable range, the accused should be permitted to avail himself of probation. Justice Mendoza read the amendatory history of Section 4 as aimed at preventing opportunistic appeals but not at denying probation to those who become eligible by virtue of a valid modification on appeal. He maintained that the

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-11024)

Parties and Procedural Posture

PABLO C. FRANCISCO was the accused and later petitioner who sought probation after finality of an appellate decision affirming his conviction.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS were the respondents whose rulings denying probation were reviewed.
The Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati convicted petitioner of grave oral defamation in four of five informations and sentenced him to prision correccional for "each crime committed on each date of each case" and awarded damages and attorney's fees.
The petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court which affirmed guilt but reduced each sentence to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment per case.
The petitioner did not further appeal the RTC decision which therefore became final and a warrant for his arrest issued for execution of sentence prior to his probation application.
The MeTC denied his application for probation and the Court of Appeals dismissed his certiorari petition on grounds including untimeliness, failure to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, and the statutory prohibition against probation after perfection of appeal.
The Supreme Court, in the present recourse, affirmed the denial of probation and denied the petition for review.

Key Factual Allegations

Petitioner, as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company, allegedly hurled abusive and vulgar epithets at employees during incidents from April nine to April twelve, 1980.
Five employees instituted five separate informations, each charging petitioner with grave oral defamation on four different days, resulting in sixteen counts in the aggregate.
The MeTC convicted petitioner in four of the five cases and acquitted him in one for failure of the offended party to testify.
The RTC appreciated a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation and reduced the duration of the penalties but affirmed culpability in all counts affirmed by the MeTC.
Petitioner applied for probation only after the RTC decision became final and a warrant for his arrest was issued.

Statutory Framework

P.D. 968 (Probation Law of 1976), as amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990, governs eligibility and procedure for probation.
Section 4, P.D. 968 provides for grant of probation "upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal" and expressly provides that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."
Section 9, par. (a), P.D. 968 disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years."
Rule 117, Sec. 3(e) and Sec. 8, Rules of Court concerning motions to quash and waiver were invoked with respect to multiple offenses charged in the informations.
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 and the decision in Llamado v. Court of Appeals were cited as controlling jurisprudence on the mutual exclusivity of appeal and probation.

Issues Presented

Whether petitioner remained eligible to apply for probation after he perfected an appeal from the MeTC to the RTC.
Whether multiple prison terms imposed for separate offenses in a single judgment are to be