Case Summary (G.R. No. 95667)
Facts
Nieto filed his certificate of candidacy for re-election in the May 2016 polls. Francisco alleged that Nieto authorized the expenditure of public funds to pave Imelda Avenue in Cainta Green Park Village on April 1–2, 2016—within the 45-day election ban—constituting an illegal contribution and misuse of public funds in violation of Secs. 261(v) and 104 of the OEC. Nieto countered that the project was awarded through public bidding on March 15, 2016, with the Notice of Award dated March 21, 2016, thus falling under the bidding exception in Sec. 261(v)(1)(b).
Procedural History before the COMELEC
After marking evidence and filing memoranda, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition on August 16, 2016, holding that a candidate cannot be disqualified absent a prior final judgment of a competent court or a finding by the Commission itself. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC En Banc on February 2, 2017, which applied the doctrine in Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC requiring a predicate judgment.
Ruling of the COMELEC
Both the Second Division and the En Banc ruled that under Poe, disqualification under Sec. 68 of the OEC demands a prior final judgment or Commission finding of guilt. Absent such, they held, the COMELEC lacked the basis to disqualify Nieto.
Issues Presented
- Whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in requiring a prior court judgment to sustain a Sec. 68 disqualification petition.
- Whether substantial evidence exists that Nieto violated Secs. 261(v) and 104 of the OEC.
Material Date Rule and Timeliness
The Court found Francisco’s petition deficient for failing to specify when he received the COMELEC Second Division’s August 16, 2016 resolution. Under Rule 64, Sec. 3, the 30-day period for filing runs from notice of denial, with the reconsideration interval deducted from the total. Francisco’s failure to state the receipt date rendered timely filing indeterminable and provided an independent ground for dismissal.
Evolution and Jurisdiction of the COMELEC
Tracing constitutional history from the 1935 to the 1987 Charter, the Court underscored that COMELEC’s powers evolved from purely administrative to quasi-judicial, vested with exclusive jurisdiction over election contests under Article IX-C, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Administrative bodies with adjudicatory functions must observe due process, including fact-finding and evidentiary hearings.
Distinction between Remedies: Sec. 68 vs. Sec. 78
The Court clarified that Sections 68 and 78 of the OEC govern different remedies. Sec. 68 petitions for disqualification address candidate disqualifications based on enumerated election offenses, while Sec. 78 petitions to deny or cancel a certificate of candidacy involve material misrepresentations in the COC. The Poe doctrine, dealing with Sec. 78 COC cancellations, does not apply to Sec. 68 disqualifications.
Prior Judgment Requirement
The Court held that Sec. 68 itself contemplates two grounds for disqualification: a final judgment by a court or a finding by the COMELEC. The disjunctive “or” indicates Congress intended both bodies to have authority. Imposing a prior criminal conviction as a precondition would raise the proof standard to beyond reasonable doubt, contrary to administrative summary proceedings requiring only substantial evidence.
Burden and Standard of Proof in Disqualification
In disqualification proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving the election offense by substantial evidence—a preponderance standard. Separate criminal (beyond reasona
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 95667)
Nature of the Case
- Petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, seeking to nullify the COMELEC En Banc Resolution of February 2, 2017
- Challenge to the dismissal of Francisco’s Petition for Disqualification against Nieto
- Central question: whether a disqualification petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code can proceed absent a prior final judgment finding the candidate guilty of an election offense
Facts of the Case
- Petitioner Francisco is a registered voter in Cainta, Rizal; private respondent Nieto was elected mayor in 2013 and re-elected in 2016
- On April 8, 2016, Francisco filed SPA 16-062(DC), alleging that Nieto caused public funds to be expended for asphalt-paving Imelda Avenue on April 1–2, 2016—within the 45-day election ban
- Francisco contended the paving constituted an illegal contribution under Section 104 and an expenditure of public funds under Section 261(v) of the OEC
- Nieto answered on April 22, 2016, asserting that the paving was awarded by public bidding on March 15, 2016, with Notice of Award on March 21, 2016, thus falling under the exception in Section 261(v)(1)(b)
- A preliminary conference was held on May 5, 2016; parties marked evidence and filed memoranda by May 16, 2016; the case was deemed submitted
- Nieto was proclaimed re-elected mayor after the 2016 polls
COMELEC Second Division’s Decision
- Promulgated on August 16, 2016, dismissing Francisco’s disqualification petition
- Held that Section 68 disqualification requires either:
- A final judgment by a competent court finding the candidate guilty of an election offense, or
- A Commission finding of disqualification in a prior proceeding
- Cited Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC: absence of an authorized pre-election proceeding to determine candidate qualifications
- Concluded that in the absence of a prior court decision or Commission finding, disqualification cannot be ordered
COMELEC En Banc’s Decision
- Denied Francisco’s motion for reconsideration on September 8, 2016; affirmed Second Division’s dismissal
- Reiterated the Poe doctrine: disqualification petitions under Section 68 cannot prosper without a prior final judgment or Commission finding of disqualification
- Cited the principle that Supreme Court decisions interpreting law form part of the Philippine legal system
- February 2, 2017 Resolution affirmed dismissal for la