G.R. No. 131457 - Fortich vs. Corona

Case Summary (G.R. No. 131457)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

April 24, 1998: Decision of the Second Division (subject to motions for reconsideration).
November 17, 1998: Resolution of the Second Division reflecting a 2–2 vote on motions for reconsideration and deeming the Decision affirmed.
December 2–3, 1998: Respondents’ and intervenors’ motions for reconsideration of the November 17, 1998 Resolution, with prayers to refer the case to the Court en banc.
January 27, 1999: Resolution noting without action an intervenors’ December 3, 1998 motion (held to be a forbidden second motion for reconsideration). Subsequent motions (including one dated March 2, 1999) were later addressed in the present Resolution.

Governing Law and Rules

Constitutional provision relied upon: Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the 1987 Constitution — requiring concurrence of a majority of division members who participated in deliberations, at least three votes, and providing that when the required number is not obtained the case shall be decided en banc.
Rules of civil procedure: 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 52, Section 2 and Rule 56, Section 4 — prohibiting second motions for reconsideration except with prior leave of court in extraordinary cases.

Court’s Analytical Framework on Division Votes and En Banc Referral

The Court interpreted Article VIII, Section 4(3) to distinguish between “cases” (which are “decided”) and “matters” (which are “resolved”), and applied the interpretive principle reddendo singula singulis so that the term “decided” corresponds to “cases” while “resolved” corresponds to “matters.” Under that construction, only cases that fail to obtain the required number of votes in a division are automatically referred to the Court en banc for decision. Motions for reconsideration were treated as “matters” distinct from the underlying “case.” Hence, when a division, in resolving a motion for reconsideration, records an even split (in this instance 2–2), the motion itself fails and the underlying decision remains in effect — the motion is deemed lost and the prior decision is affirmed. The November 17, 1998 Resolution followed this reasoning and concluded that the April 24, 1998 Decision stood.

Application of Constitutional Rule to the Present Motions

Respondents and intervenors argued that a 2–2 vote required en banc referral under Article VIII, Section 4(3). The Court rejected this contention, holding that the constitutional second sentence requiring en banc referral refers specifically to “cases,” not to “matters” such as motions for reconsideration. The Court reasoned that if a division’s vote on a motion for reconsideration results in a tie, there remains an existing decision (the original decision being reconsidered) which is not thereby undone; consequently, no en banc referral is triggered by a tie on a motion. The Court affirmed its prior Resolution of November 17, 1998 to this effect.

Novelty of Issues and En Banc Considerations

The Court addressed the movants’ contention that the issues raised warranted en banc consideration as matters of first impression. The Second Division, citing prior precedent (Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals), found that the specific issue of whether local government units need DAR approval to reclassify agricultural land was not novel and thus did not merit en banc review. The Second Division emphasized that the questions presented lacked sufficient extraordinary import to justify full Court participation.

Substance: Validity of the “Win‑Win” Resolution and Effects of Finality

On the substantive matter central to the controversy, the Court ruled that the “Win‑Win” Resolution of November 7, 1997 is void and of no legal effect because the OP decision of March 29, 1996 had already become final and executory before the filing of the motion for reconsideration that purportedly supported the Win‑Win Resolution. The Court emphasized the principle that finality of decisions protects the substantive rights of the prevailing party; as Justice Panganiban’s words were adopted by the majority, a winning party has a correlative right to the finality of the resolution of the case. Finality vested rights in petitioners and in the public interest in the property’s development, which underlay the Court’s substantive disposition.

Procedural Bar: Second Motions for Reconsideration and Exceptions

All post‑November 17, 1998 motions seeking reconsideration and en banc referral were treated as second motions for reconsideration. The Court applied Rule 56 §4 in relation to Rule 52 §2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to conclude that these second motions were generally prohibited. While the Court acknowledged that exceptional circumstances could permit a second motion with prior leave, movants did not secure prior leave nor demonstrated extraordinary reasons to warrant the Court’s indulgence. The motions were therefore characterized as mere rehashes of previously rejected arguments and were denied.

Legal Standing of the Intervenors

The Court addressed intervenors’ claims of real party‑in‑interest status based on alleged CLOAs and seasonal farmworker status. It held that (1) intervenors are seasonal farmworkers and not regular farmworkers entitled to ownership; their asserted right is limited to a just share in the fruits of the land rather than ownership; (2) the Win‑Win Resolution itself contemplated that the DAR must still carefully determine qualified beneficiaries, so no definitive DAR finding had vested intervenors with sufficient interest; and (3) any CLOAs allegedly issued under the now‑null Win‑Win Resolution cannot confer legal rights because no rights can lawfully arise from a null and void resolution. Consequently, intervenors lacked the requisite legal perso

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 131457)

Nature of the Resolution and Pending Incidents

This resolution addresses pending incidents: respondents’ and intervenors’ separate motions for reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated November 17, 1998, and their motions to refer the case to the Court en banc.
The motions under consideration were filed after an earlier Decision of April 24, 1998 and after a subsequent Resolution of November 17, 1998 in which the Court voted two–two on the separate motions for reconsideration, resulting in the Decision being deemed affirmed.
Respondents and intervenors jointly contend that the two–two vote did not effectively resolve the motions for reconsideration and that the matter should have been referred to the Court en banc pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution.
The resolution also notes respondents’ and intervenors’ attack on the Court’s January 27, 1999 Resolution that noted without action intervenors’ Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc filed December 3, 1998.

Procedural Posture and Specific Motions

Intervenors filed a motion dated December 3, 1998 titled “Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc.”
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a “Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)” on December 3, 1998 (registered mail evidence attached).
Respondents also filed a “Manifestation and Motion” and submitted a Registered Mail Bill as evidence of filing by registered mail.
Subsequent filings included intervenors’ “Urgent Omnibus Motion For The Supreme Court Sitting En Banc To Annul The Second Division’s Resolution Dated 27 January 1999 And Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion For Reconsideration Filed By The Intervenors,” dated March 2, 1999.

Reliefs Sought by Movants

Both respondents and intervenors sought referral of the case to the Court en banc.
Respondents additionally sought an urgent prayer for issuance of a restraining order in their December 2/3, 1998 motion.

Core Legal Argument by Respondents and Intervenors

Movants argue that because the earlier motions for reconsideration were resolved by a two–two vote, the required number to carry a decision (three) was not met; therefore, under Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution the case should have been referred to and decided by the Court en banc.
Movants also argued that issues presented are of first impression and of sufficient importance to warrant en banc consideration.

Constitutional Provision Quoted and Central to Dispute

The resolution quotes Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution in full as relied upon by movants:
"Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc : Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc ."

Court’s Interpretive Approach to the Constitutional Provision

The Court reads Article VIII, Section 4(3) as differentiating between "cases" and "matters": cases are "decided" while matters (which include motions) are "resolved," applying the interpretive rule reddendo singula singulis (assigning words to their proper subjects).
The Court concludes that the second sentence of the provision—referring to referral to the Court en banc when the required number is not obtained—applies only to "cases" and not to "matters" such as motions for reconsideration.
The Court reasons that Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to disposition of cases by a division: if a tie arises in voting on a case (so that no decision is reached), the case must be referred en banc; but if the tie arises on a motion for reconsideration of an already-decided case, the underlying decision remains intact because the division has failed to muster sufficient votes to reconsider it.
The Court therefore treats a tie in voting on a motion for reconsideration as resulting in the motion’s loss and the original decision being deemed affirmed.

Application of the Constitutional Interpretation to the Present Motions

The Court applies the distinction to conclude that the two–two vote on the motions for reconsideration resulted in those motions being lost and the April 24, 1998 Decision being deemed affirmed.
The Court holds that movants’ contention that the November 17, 1998 Resolution did not dispose of their earlier motions is flawed.
Consequently, the current motions for reconsideration are characterized by the Court as second motions for reconsideration, which are prohibited under Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, unless express leave of court is first obtained.

Court’s Rationale on Second Motions for Reconsideration

The Court notes the general prohibition on second motions for reconsideration, with a limited exception where extraordinarily persuasive reasons are shown and express leave of court is obtained first, citing Ortigas and Company Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, et al., 254 SCRA 234 (1996).
The Court finds that movants did not ask for prior leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration and failed to demonstrate exceptional reasons to warrant entertaining such a second motion.
The Court characterizes the present motions as rehashes of the motions denied in the November 17, 1998 Resolution and observes that the allegations had already been raise