Case Summary (G.R. No. 75723)
Key Dates and Procedural Posture
February 1983: verbal permission granted by Floro to Llenado to use Road Lots 4 and 5. April 7, 1983: Floro barricaded Road Lot 5. April 13, 1983: complaint for easement of right of way filed (Civil Case No. 6834‑M) with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. July 15, 1983: trial court issued preliminary mandatory injunction subject to bond. October 16, 1984: trial court dismissed complaint and awarded damages to Floro on counterclaim. February 11, 1986: Court of Appeals reversed, ordering creation of compulsory easement and awarding damages to Llenado while requiring Llenado to pay indemnity to Floro. Subsequent motions, partial execution pending appeal, and restraining order followed. Petition for review under Rule 45 was granted; decision date of the Supreme Court was June 2, 1995, applying the 1987 Constitution as the governing charter.
Legal Issues Presented
(1) Whether a valid voluntary contract of easement (right of way) was created by the verbal permission given by Floro to the Llenados. (2) Whether the Llenados, as owner/developer of a subdivision, could compel imposition of a compulsory easement of right of way over the existing roads (Road Lots 4 and 5) of the adjacent Floro Park Subdivision instead of developing the access road shown in their duly approved subdivision plan.
Governing Law and Standards of Review
Constitutional basis: 1987 Philippine Constitution applies (decision in 1995). Statutory and regulatory sources relied upon: Civil Code provisions on legal easement (Articles 649 and 650), Articles 2224–2225 on temperate damages, and Presidential Decree No. 957, Section 29 (developer duty to secure, develop and maintain right of way to public road). Standard of appellate review: Rule 45 confines the Supreme Court ordinarily to errors of law; however, established exceptions permit review of Court of Appeals’ findings of fact when certain conditions (e.g., grave abuse of discretion, findings manifestly mistaken, conflicts with trial court findings) exist — the Court found such an exception here and examined the factual record.
Voluntary Easement: Factual and Legal Findings
The Court found no perfected voluntary contract of easement. The parties admitted that usage in March 1983 was by Floro’s verbal tolerance while Floro’s lawyer would prepare documentation; the Llenados themselves testified that terms were to be drafted and no compensation had been agreed or paid. Floro’s later imposition of conditions (allegedly requiring security, roadway improvements at Llenado’s expense, planting, payment of street lighting, construction of a bridge) was contested and rejected by Orlando as onerous. The Court applied precedent (Dionisio v. Ortiz) and concluded that mere tolerance or a temporary oral allowance, without agreement on essential terms (notably compensation), does not constitute a valid voluntary easement.
Compulsory Easement: Legal Requirements and Burden
To establish a compulsory (legal) easement under Articles 649 and 650, the dominant estate owner must prove: (1) the tenement is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment (or prepayment) of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the dominant estate’s proprietor; and (4) the claimed right of way is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent, the shortest route. The burden to prove these prerequisites rests squarely upon the party claiming the legal easement.
The Ipapo Access Road and the Adequacy of Outlets
The Court emphasized that the approved subdivision plans of Emmanuel Homes (later Llenado Homes) — submitted to and approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) — showed an access road across the Ipapo riceland. HSRC testimony established that the access road need not be paved but the developer must secure consent and develop the right of way; approval was conditioned upon showing a right of way clearance from Ipapo. The Llenados adopted the Emmanuel Homes plan, retained the Ipapo access in their Consolidation Subdivision Plan, applied for and received licenses permitting development, and later sought amendments. The existence of that planned right of way meant the Llenado subdivision was not without an alternative outlet, and thus the first prerequisite (no adequate outlet) was not satisfied.
Failure to Prepay or Seek Fixing of Indemnity
Article 649 requires payment of proper indemnity; judicial precedent clarifies that prepayment means delivery of proper indemnity or at least a prayer within the action seeking judicial fixing of the indemnity when voluntary agreement fails. The Court found that Llenado’s complaint did not pray for judicial fixing of the indemnity, nor did he present proof of compliance with this requisite. Failure to seek or secure indemnity precluded satisfaction of the second prerequisite.
Causation of Isolation and Developer’s Own Acts
The Court found that the isolation of the Llenado Homes Subdivision resulted from the acts or omissions of the subdivision owner/developer. Evidence showed the Ipapo right of way was procured (by earlier owner) and retained in the approved plan but not developed into even a dirt road. The Court considered the applicant’s failure to develop the planned access road — despite the relative absence of cultivation on the Ipapo riceland and presence of only an adobe fence — as a voluntary choice to avoid inconvenience and expense. Because the alleged lack of access derived from the dominant owner’s own conduct, the third prerequisite was not met.
Necessity Versus Mere Convenience; Public Policy Considerations
The Court reiterated controlling jurisprudence that compulsory servitudes require real necessity, not mere convenience. Prior cases (e.g., Ramos v. Gatchalian, Rivera v. IAC, Costabella) were cited to show that an alternative outlet, even if inconvenient or undeveloped, will ordinarily defeat a request for a compulsory easement. The Court also cautioned against permitting a practice whereby developers include fictitious access provisions in subdivision plans to secure approval and later abandon development, then seek compulsory easements over neighboring properties — a result contrary to the purpose of PD No. 957 to protect subdivision buyers and to require owners/developers to develop access shown in approved plans.
Rejection of New Evidence Considered by Court of Appeals
The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in considering a July 3, 1985 letter from Marcial Ipapo (asserting non-co
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 75723)
Case Caption, Citation and Court
- Supreme Court of the Philippines, Third Division, G.R. No. 75723.
- Reported at 314 Phil. 715.
- Decision promulgated June 2, 1995.
- Opinion authored by Justice Romero; concurrence by Justices Feliciano (Chairman), Melo, Vitug, and Francisco.
Principal Parties
- Petitioner: Simeon Floro — owner/developer of Floro Park Subdivision, Barangay Saluysoy, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
- Private Respondent: Orlando A. Llenado (deceased) — registered owner of two parcels totalling approximately 34,573 square meters, known as Llenado Homes Subdivision; deceased November 7, 1983 and substituted by his wife Wenifreda T. Llenado as administratrix of his estate and legal guardian of their minor children.
- Additional Respondent: Court of Appeals — had rendered decision adverse to petitioner and in favor of private respondents.
- Minor children of Orlando and Wenifreda Llenado: Maria Gracia (omitted in petition), Maria Dexina (Ma. Bexina), Avelino and Antonio (three named in petition).
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
- Whether a valid voluntary contract of easement of right of way existed when the owner of one estate voluntarily allowed the owner of an adjacent estate passage through his property for a limited time and without compensation.
- Whether an owner/developer of a subdivision may demand a compulsory easement of right of way over existing roads of an adjacent subdivision instead of developing the subdivision's proposed access road as provided in the duly approved subdivision plan.
Material Facts — Property Descriptions and Plans
- Floro Park Subdivision:
- Owned by Simeon Floro.
- Has its own ingress and egress to MacArthur Highway by way of Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing.
- Llenado Homes Subdivision:
- Two parcels total area roughly 34,573 sq. meters (source cites 34,973 sq. m. in plan attachments; records exhibit references provided).
- Prior to Llenado’s purchase, known as Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, originally developed by Soledad Ortega and previously owned by Francisco de Castro.
- Bounded on the south by Palanas Creek (5–6 meter-wide) separating it from Floro Park, and on the west by ricelands of Marcial Ipapo, Montaos and Guevarra.
- Llenado Homes had no existing road or passage to MacArthur Highway at the time of dispute.
- The Emmanuel Homes/Llenado Homes subdivision plans, duly approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC), specifically provided a proposed access road traversing the Ipapo riceland (the "Ipapo access road"). Consolidation/approved plans retained Ipapo access road when Llenado adopted the Emmanuel plans and applied for permits in his name.
- HSRC records: the Emmanuel Homes application attached a sketch plan, waterline layout, vicinity plan, road plan layout, and consolidation subdivision plan; Road Lot 3 and alignment indicated access via the Ipapo property toward MacArthur Highway.
Chronology — Key Events and Procedural History
- February 1983: Floro granted verbal permission to the Llenados to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of Floro Park as passage to/from MacArthur Highway.
- March 1983: Llenados used Road Lots 4 and 5; use was without compensation and allegedly by tolerance pending preparation of papers.
- April 7, 1983: Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, preventing use by Llenados.
- April 13, 1983: Orlando Llenado filed complaint in RTC Malolos (Civil Case No. 6834‑M) for Easement of Right of Way with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages; case assigned to Branch XIX (Judge Camilo Montesa).
- July 15, 1983: RTC granted prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon filing of bond of P100,000.00 by Llenado; ordered Floro to open the road and enjoined him from preventing passage until further order.
- August 12, 1983: RTC denied Floro’s motion for reconsideration.
- Floro filed a certiorari/prohibition petition in the Court of Appeals but later withdrew; CA granted motion to withdraw and declared case closed on March 30, 1984.
- Orlando Llenado died November 7, 1983; substitution by Wenifreda was ordered January 23, 1984.
- Trial on merits resumed; October 16, 1984: RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of merit and dissolved the preliminary mandatory injunction. RTC awarded on Floro’s counterclaim: (a) P30,000 actual damages; (b) P77,500 compensation for use of property; (c) P15,000 attorney’s fees; and costs.
- Llenado appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- February 11, 1986: Court of Appeals set aside the trial court decision and ordered (summary of dispositive relief):
- Granting establishment of legal/compulsory easement of right of way through Road Lots 4 and 5 in favor of Llenado Homes.
- Ordering immediate removal of obstructions and payment by Floro to Llenado: P60,000 temperate damages; P100,000 moral damages; P30,000 attorney’s fees.
- Ordering Llenado to pay Floro P60,000 within ten days as indemnity for the right of way pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code.
- Ordering defendant to pay costs and that mutual liabilities be legally compensated.
- August 14, 1986: CA denied Floro’s motion for reconsideration and granted Llenado’s motion for partial execution pending appeal upon posting a P100,000 bond; writ of partial execution issued October 2, 1986 (after this petition filed).
- October 29, 1986: On Floro’s motion, Supreme Court issued restraining order enjoining CA from carrying out its writ of partial execution pending appeal.
- Other administrative matter: November 29, 1985 — Minister of Public Works and Highways ordered removal/demolition of a concrete culvert constructed across Palanas Creek as illegal under PD 296, LI 19 and PD 1067; ordered removal at expense of private respondent to be carried out by Chief Civil Engineer, Bulacan Engineering District.
- Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was given due course; Supreme Court considered jurisdictional and substantive questions.
Trial Court Findings (RTC)
- Issued preliminary mandatory injunction on July 15, 1983 after ocular inspection; required bond.
- On merits (October 16, 1984), RTC dismissed complaint for lack of merit and lifted the writ.
- RTC found use during March was by tolerance; rejected establishment of compulsory easement.
- RTC awarded damages to Floro on counteclaim: P30,000 actual damages; P77,500 compensation for use; P15,000 attorney’s fees; costs.
- Trial court emphasized that conversion/approval of Lot 14, Block 6 into a road lot did not ipso facto connect Road Lots 5 and 4 in the absence of consent/approval of Floro Park’s owner, and the approved end of Road Lot 3 remained the shortest and direct indicated access.
Court of Appeals Decision and Orders
- CA set aside RTC decision and established a compulsory easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 in favor of Llenado Homes.
- CA ordered immediate removal of obstructions and awarded Llenado P60,000 temperate damages, P100,000 moral damages, and P30,000 attorney’s fees.
- CA ordered Llenado to pay Floro P60,000 as indemnity under Article 649 within ten days.
- CA allowed partial execution pending appeal upon posting of a P100,000 bond.
- CA, in separate resolutions, denied Floro’s motions for reconsideration and granted partial execution; one justice dissented on a resolution.
Evidentiary and Procedural Points Noted by Supreme Court
- Standard of review under Rule 45: ordinarily limited to errors of law by Court of Appeals; findings of fact by CA are generally conclusive. However, established exceptions permit the Supreme Court to review findings of fact when circumstances enumerated in Remalante v. Tibe and subsequent cases are present.
- The present case falls within those exceptions because the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals were contrary to those of the trial court, thereby permitting the Supreme Court to scrutinize the evidence.
- The CA considered a letter of Marcial Ipapo dated July 3, 1985 addressed to HSRC denying any right of way in favor of Soledad Ortega; Supreme Court found this new matter inadmissible because it was not authenticated under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, and the CA erred in considering it in its resolution for motion for reconsideration.
Supreme Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Voluntary Easement:
- It is undisputed that in February 1983 Floro granted verbal permission to the Llenados to pass through Road Lots 4 and 5.
- Whether the permission was for March only, without compensation and as a neighborly gesture to enable installation of stone monuments, or was in relation to an easement, the essential fact is that no contract of easement of right of