Title
Florendo vs. Philam Plans, Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 186983
Decision Date
Feb 22, 2012
Manuel Florendo concealed his health conditions in a pension plan application, leading to the denial of his wife’s claim after his death. The Supreme Court upheld the denial, ruling that Manuel’s concealment violated the duty of utmost good faith in insurance contracts.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 186983)

Relevant Dates and Financial Terms

Application filed: October 23, 1997.
Pension Plan Agreement issued: October 30, 1997 (Pension Plan Agreement PP43005584).
Death of insured: September 15, 1998.
Regional Trial Court judgment in favor of petitioner: March 30, 2006.
Court of Appeals reversal: December 18, 2007.
Supreme Court decision affirming CA: February 22, 2012.
Plan price and values: pre-need price P997,050.00 (payable in 10 years); maturity value P2,890,000.00 after 20 years.

Structure and Effect of the Pension Plan

The comprehensive pension plan sold by Philam Plans included pension benefits and an automatic life insurance component provided under a Group Master Policy issued by Philam Life. The group policy: (a) automatically provided life insurance, including accidental death, to plan purchasers; (b) provided that if the plan holder died before maturity the beneficiary would receive proceeds equivalent to the pre-need price (the life-insurance proceeds); and (c) allowed the life insurance to cover unpaid premiums so that the beneficiary could still receive the maturity value at the plan’s maturity.

Facts on Application and Medical History

Manuel signed the application but left Perla (the soliciting agent) to supply the information required on the form; Ma. Celeste Abcede signed as sales counselor. The application contained explicit representations and declarations, including a statement that the applicant had never been treated for heart condition, diabetes, and other listed illnesses in the last five years, and an instruction to give details in provided spaces if any answers revealed otherwise. Manuel died within eleven months of issuance. Philam Life later determined Manuel had a pacemaker implanted previously, was on maintenance medication for a heart condition, and was being treated with insulin for diabetes.

Procedural History and Lower Courts’ Findings

Lourdes filed a claim for benefits which Philam Plans/Philam Life denied on grounds of concealment of material medical facts. Lourdes sued Philam Plans and the agents; the RTC found Manuel not guilty of concealment and ordered respondents jointly and severally to pay the insurance proceeds, the maturity benefit upon maturity, moral damages, and costs. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, holding that insurance contracts are contracts of utmost good faith requiring disclosure of material facts, and that Manuel had concealed material facts. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in its entirety.

Issue Framing on Appeal

The Supreme Court analyzed three principal issues: (1) whether Manuel concealed his medical conditions by leaving blank the relevant questions on the application; (2) whether Manuel is bound by any failure of the soliciting agent(s) to declare his true health condition (i.e., agency/imputed knowledge); and (3) whether Philam Plans’ approval of the application and acceptance of premiums precluded denial of the claim (i.e., whether insurer waived right to contest given issuance and premium collection).

On Concealment and the Applicant’s Representations

The Court emphasized that Manuel, by signing the application, adopted and certified the truth of its written representations and declarations. The application explicitly asked whether the applicant had been treated for certain conditions in the past five years and directed the applicant to fill in details if those statements were otherwise. By signing without completing those spaces, the Court treated the blanks as an implicit representation that the negative statements were true. Given medical facts later uncovered—ongoing treatment with Coumadin for venous thrombosis, insulin for diabetes, and the presence of a pacemaker—the Court concluded these were within the disclosure scope and that Manuel had concealed material information when he signed the application without disclosure.

On Agent-Filled Applications and Applicant’s Responsibility

The Court rejected the contention that Perla’s involvement insulated Manuel from responsibility. The application contained an express certification that the information was written by the applicant or under his direction. Even if Perla filled in the form, Manuel certified her action and thereby bound himself to the content. The Court reiterated that an applicant cannot sign and disown responsibility for untruthful or incomplete disclosures, particularly in insurance contracts where the insurer relies on applicant representations.

On Imputed Knowledge of the Agent

While the Court acknowledged the doctrine of imputed knowledge under Section 30 of the Insurance Code (i.e., knowledge of an agent imputed to the insurer), it observed that imputing Perla’s knowledge would not resolve all issues because it was not alleged or established that Perla knew of all of Manuel’s afflictions (specifically, the two conditions requiring medical treatment). Thus, the applicant’s own nondisclosure remained determinative.

On the Effect of the Pacemaker and Temporal Scope of Disclosure

Although the pacemaker had been implanted decades earlier, the Court explained that the continued presence of the pacemaker and continuing treatment for heart condition and diabetes amounted to ongoing medical conditions that fell withi

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