Case Summary (G.R. No. 179554)
Key Dates and Procedural History
- June 21, 2011: PAGCOR filed the complaint.
- July 19, 2011: Complaint endorsed for preliminary investigation.
- August–September 2011: Ombudsman ordered counter-affidavits; Rene sought and received ten additional days and filed his counter-affidavit on September 5, 2011.
- September 22, 2014: Ombudsman issued a joint resolution finding probable cause.
- January 28, 2015: Joint order denying motions for reconsideration.
- June 3, 2016: Informations filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB16-CRM-0326 and SB16-CRM-0327).
- March 6, 2017 – July 4, 2017: Ombudsman moved to amend informations; amendments admitted by the Sandiganbayan.
- July 20, 2017: Rene filed motion to quash for inordinate delay.
- October 11, 2017: Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash.
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 followed.
Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis
The constitutional basis applied is Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution (right to speedy disposition of cases). The Court applied the analytical framework set forth in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan and related jurisprudence to determine whether the right was violated, including the multi-factor balancing test and the burden-shifting rules when statutory or procedural timeframes are exceeded.
Issue Presented
Whether the Ombudsman’s delay in concluding the preliminary investigation and filing informations—measured from the initiation of the complaint—constituted an inordinate delay violating Rene’s constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, and whether Rene waived that right by failing to assert it earlier before the Ombudsman.
Legal Standard for Speedy Disposition (as applied)
- Distinction: Right to speedy disposition (applicable to judicial and quasi-judicial bodies) is different from right to speedy trial (applicable to courts).
- Trigger and periods: A case is considered initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint. Where the Ombudsman’s rules do not specify time limits, the Rules of Court periods are applied suppletorily (e.g., Section 3(f), Rule 112 — 10 days). The Ombudsman later prescribed internal periods (12 months for simple cases; 24 months for complex cases), with possible extensions for justifiable reasons.
- Burden-shifting (per Cagang): If the delay occurs within prescribed periods and the defense raises the right within those periods, the defense bears the initial burden to justify invocation. If delay extends beyond prescribed periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to justify the delay. When the defense bears the burden, it must show malice/political motivation or lack of evidence and that it did not contribute to delay; when burden shifts to prosecution, it must show (1) prescribed procedures were followed, (2) complexity/volume of evidence made delay inevitable, and (3) no prejudice to the accused.
- Waiver: Waiver of the constitutional right must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and proven by persuasive evidence; mere silence or failure to follow up with the Ombudsman does not establish waiver. The accused has no duty to pursue or expedite the state’s investigation.
Application to the Facts — Existence and Extent of Delay
The Court compared the operative dates: complaint filed June 21, 2011 and the joint resolution finding probable cause issued September 22, 2014 (three years and three months later). Under any applicable benchmark (10 days, 12 months, or 24 months), the Ombudsman exceeded the prescribed or reasonable time for concluding the preliminary investigation. Consequently, the burden to justify the delay shifted to the Ombudsman/prosecution.
Ombudsman’s Justification and Court’s Assessment
The Ombudsman’s response emphasized the need to carefully weigh evidence, the volume of cases before it, and the duty to avoid hasty resolutions. However, the Ombudsman did not substantively demonstrate in the record the particularized complexities, volume of evidence, geographic coverage, number of respondents, amount of public funds, or other case-specific factors that would render the delay reasonable and inevitable. General assertions about a steady stream of cases and the necessity of careful review, without concrete, case-specific demonstration, were held insufficient to discharge the prosecution’s burden once the prescribed periods were exceeded.
Waiver and Assertion of Right
The Court reaffirmed that waiver of the right to speedy disposition cannot be presumed from silence. The elements of a valid waiver — existence of the right, knowledge of the right, and actual intention to relinquish it — must be affirmatively shown. Rene’s failure to raise the issue before the Ombudsman did not constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver. The Court emphasized precedent holding that respondents have no duty to follow up with the Ombudsman or to ensure progression of the investigation; the Ombudsman is charged with expediting complaints. Re
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 179554)
Case Caption, Court, and Decision Date
- Decision of the Supreme Court, First Division, G.R. Nos. 235965-66, dated February 15, 2022.
- Petitioner: Rene C. Figueroa.
- Respondents: Sandiganbayan, Special Third Division; Office of the Ombudsman represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor; Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR).
- Opinion authored by Justice M. Lopez.
- Disposition signed with concurrence by Chief Justice Gesmundo (Chairperson), and Justices Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and J. Lopez, JJ.
Nature of Petition and Relief Sought
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
- Relief sought: annulment of Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated October 11, 2017 in SB16-CRM-0326 and SB16-CRM-0327 which denied petitioner Rene C. Figueroa’s motion to quash the informations.
- Ground for relief: alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan in denying the motion to quash on the basis of inordinate delay and violation of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
Antecedent Facts (as alleged and in the record)
- June 21, 2011: PAGCOR filed a Complaint against Rene Figueroa and other officers for corruption.
- July 19, 2011: Complaint was endorsed for preliminary investigation.
- July 29, 2011: Office of the Ombudsman directed Rene and other officers to file counter-affidavits within ten (10) days from notice.
- August 16, 2011: Rene received a copy of the Ombudsman order; requested an additional ten (10) days to file counter-affidavit.
- September 5, 2011: Rene filed his counter-affidavit.
- September 22, 2014: Ombudsman issued a joint resolution recommending filing of informations, finding probable cause against Rene and co-respondents.
- January 12, 2015: Rene filed motion for reconsideration of the joint resolution.
- January 28, 2015: Ombudsman issued a joint order denying motions for reconsideration of Rene and co-respondents.
- June 3, 2016: Ombudsman filed two informations against Rene and co-respondents (SB16-CRM-0326 and SB16-CRM-0327).
- March 6, 2017: Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended amendments to the informations to indicate middle names and correct designation of Rene as Executive Vice-President and Head of the Research and Development Department; Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved recommendation on same date.
- March 6, 2017: Ombudsman moved for admission of the amended informations.
- July 4, 2017: Sandiganbayan admitted the amended informations, characterizing amendments as merely formal and permissible pre-arraignment.
- July 20, 2017: Rene moved to quash the informations, alleging inordinate delay (more than six years from filing of complaint to motion to quash) and violation of right to speedy disposition; argued Ombudsman had not decided cases promptly as shown by motion to amend informations.
- October 11, 2017: Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash.
- Rene sought reconsideration from the Sandiganbayan, which was denied, and then filed the present Rule 65 petition.
Sandiganbayan’s Rationale in Denying Motion to Quash (as recited in the record)
- The Sandiganbayan held that the delay was reasonable and part of the ordinary process of justice; mere mathematical reckoning of time is not sufficient.
- The Court cited the constitutional test that prohibits unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays; it considered the length of delay, reason for delay, assertion or failure to assert the right, and prejudice suffered.
- Concluded there was no unreasonable or oppressive delay in the Ombudsman’s preliminary investigation and no showing that the prosecution deliberately delayed to gain advantage.
- Emphasized that Rene failed to raise the speedy disposition issue before the Ombudsman; the belated assertion before the Sandiganbayan militated against Rene’s claim.
- The Sandiganbayan noted that accused were not yet arraigned when the amendments were made, allowing both formal and substantial amendments pre-arraignment.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
- Whether there was an inordinate delay in the conduct of the Ombudsman’s preliminary investigation that violated petitioner Rene C. Figueroa’s constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases under Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution.
- Whether Rene waived his right to speedy disposition by not asserting it before the Ombudsman.
- Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash.
Governing Legal Standards and Authorities Cited by the Court
- Article III, Section 16, 1987 Constitution: right to speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
- Cagang v. Sandiganbayan (837 Phil. 815, 880-882 (2018)) — Court’s clarified mode of analysis when right to speedy disposition or speedy trial is invoked:
- Distinction between right to speedy trial (invoked before courts) and right to speedy disposition (invoked before any tribunal).
- Formal complaint filing marks initiation of case for purposes of the right; Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation; delays beyond this period are taken against the prosecution.
- Allocation of burden of proof: defense bears burden if right invoked within prescribed time periods; if delay occurs beyond prescribed period and right is invoked, burden shifts to prosecution to justify delay.
- Factors to be weighed: length of delay, reason for delay, assertion of right, prejudice, complexity and volume of evidence, possible malicious or politically motivated prosecution, and waiver.
- Timeliness of raising the right: must be invoked upon lapse of statutory or procedural periods; failure to timely move may constitute waiver.
- Javier v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 237947, June 10, 2020) and Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 236177-210, February 3, 2021) — discussed for extended application of