Title
Ferdo vs. St. Scholastica's College
Case
G.R. No. 161107
Decision Date
Mar 12, 2013
Marikina City's Ordinance No. 192, requiring "see-thru" fences and setbacks, was ruled invalid by the Supreme Court for infringing on property rights, privacy, and due process, and constituting an uncompensated taking of private property.
fernando
marikina city
city mayor
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 161107)

Key Places and Property

Respondent SSC owns four contiguous parcels totaling 56,306.80 square meters in Marikina Heights, covered by TCT No. 91537. The property contains SSA‑Marikina, residences and formation/retirement houses for Benedictine sisters, enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence constructed approximately thirty to forty years prior.

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

Municipal Ordinance No. 192 (Series of 1994), with subsequent amendments by Ordinances Nos. 217 (1995) and 200 (1998), was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina. In April 2000 the City ordered respondents to demolish and modify the fence and set it back about six meters. Respondents filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction in RTC Marikina (SCA Case No. 2000‑381‑MK). RTC granted relief; CA affirmed on December 1, 2003. The petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by a Rule 45 petition.

Ordinance No. 192: Structure and Specific Provisions

Purpose and Coverage of the Ordinance

Ordinance No. 192 regulates the construction of fences, walls, and gates on lots used or classified for residential, commercial, industrial, or special purposes. Its stated objectives include public safety, discouraging concealment of unlawful acts, promoting “neighborliness,” and beautification in line with a “Clean and Green” program.

Material Provisions Challenged

Section 3.1: standard heights—front yard fences limited to one (1) meter; fences exceeding one meter must be an “open fence” at least eighty percent (80%) see‑thru. Section 5: no walls or fences shall be built within a five (5) meter parking area allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial, industrial, educational, and religious institutions. Section 7 provided transitory periods for conformity by various types of establishments, including educational institutions.

Factual and Legal Contentions of the Parties

Respondents’ Claims

Respondents contended that enforcement of Sections 3.1 and 5 would (1) constitute an appropriation of private property without just compensation by effectively depriving them of approximately 3,762.36 square meters (and destroying structures and improvements), (2) violate substantive due process and privacy (given residential use by Benedictine sisters), and (3) be unnecessary to achieve the ordinance’s stated safety or beautification aims. They asserted that appropriation could only be effected through eminent domain.

Petitioners’ Defense

The City asserted the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power to promote health, safety, morals, good order, and general welfare. The City later conceded before the Supreme Court that Section 5 was invalid but maintained Section 3.1 remained valid and enforceable. The City also argued Section 5 was cured by a later Zoning Ordinance No. 303 (Series of 2000), a contention raised for the first time on appeal.

Trial and Intermediate Appellate Rulings

RTC Ruling

The Regional Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and, on the merits, granted the petition for prohibition ordering the City permanently to desist from enforcing Ordinance No. 192 against the respondents’ Marikina property. The RTC held that enforcement would amount to an appropriation without due process and just compensation, that the see‑thru requirement infringed privacy and was unsupported by security concerns, and that beautification alone did not justify such an exercise of police power.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC, finding Ordinance No. 192 invaded personal and property rights, was unreasonable and oppressive, and was not a valid exercise of police power insofar as it sought effectively to take property for public use. The CA also rejected the characterization of the ordinance as curative and noted that procedural regularity in enactment did not cure substantive defects.

Legal Standards Applied by the Supreme Court

Police Power and Tests of Validity

The Supreme Court analyzed the ordinance under the 1987 Constitution and applicable provisions of the Local Government Code. It reiterated that local governments exercise police power under Section 16 of R.A. No. 7160 and explained the established tests: rational relationship (or rational basis), intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. The Court applied the rational relationship test and the two‑pronged requisites from Social Justice Society v. Atienza: (1) the measure must serve the public generally (not a particular class), and (2) the means employed must be reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive on individuals.

Analysis and Holdings on the Five‑Meter Setback (Section 5)

Court’s Reasoning on Section 5 (Setback)

The Court agreed that Section 5’s five‑meter setback would result in the appropriation of 3,762.36 square meters for public use without just compensation, thereby amounting to a taking violative of Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The Court held that ownership retained by respondents would not negate a compensable taking where the regulation substantially impairs useful property rights. The stated aims of preventing concealment of unlawful acts, neighborliness, and beautification lacked a logical connection to the creation of a public parking strip; beautification alone could not justify permanent divestment of beneficial use.

Rejection of Cure by Zoning Ordinance No. 303

The Supreme Court refused to accept the City’s argument that Ordinance No. 303 (zoning ordinance enacted December 20, 2000) cured Section 5’s constitutional infirmity. The Court noted procedural and substantive differences between the ordinances, found the contention raised belatedly on appeal (not in the trial court), and concluded the zoning ordinance could not retroactively validate Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 in the context of the petition for prohibition directed specifically at Ordinance No. 192.

Analysis and Holdings on the 80% See‑Thru Requirement (Section 3.1)

Court’s Reasoning on Section 3.1 (80% See‑Thru)

The Court held Section 3.1 invalid as an unreasonable and unduly oppressive exercise of police power. The City failed to show that an 80% see‑thru fence is reasonably necessary to accomplish the declared aim of preventing concealment of unlawful acts. The Court observed that a solid concrete wall had provided effective security for decades and that an exposed, see‑thru fence might not enhance, and could arguably diminish, security. The mandatory see‑thru rule also implicated respondents’ right to privacy, given residential usages within the property (Benedictine sisters), and interfered with respondents’ right to determine how best to protect their property.

Retroactivity and Curative Statute Argument

Curative Statute Argument Rejected

The petitioners contended Ordinance No. 192 was curative of alleged deficiencies in the National Building Code and thus could be applied retroactively. The Court clarified that curative statutes validate prior acts that would otherwise be void and are meant to remedy legal defects; Ordinance

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