Title
Ferdo vs. St. Scholastica's College
Case
G.R. No. 161107
Decision Date
Mar 12, 2013
Marikina City's Ordinance No. 192, requiring "see-thru" fences and setbacks, was ruled invalid by the Supreme Court for infringing on property rights, privacy, and due process, and constituting an uncompensated taking of private property.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 161107)

Factual Background

St. Scholastica’s College owned a 56,306.80 square meter parcel in Marikina Heights covered by TCT No. 91537 on which St. Scholastica’s Academy–Marikina, Inc. and residences for Benedictine sisters and related facilities were located and enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty years earlier; improvements abutted the fence along West Drive. The City of Marikina enacted Ordinance No. 192 to regulate fences and walls, prescribing, among others, a one-meter front fence limit and a requirement that any fence in excess of one meter be at least eighty percent see-thru, and barring fences within a five-meter parking allowance between the front monument line and the building line for certain establishments.

Administrative Directive and Respondents’ Objections

On April 2, 2000, the City ordered the respondents to demolish their concrete fence, replace it with an 80% see-thru fence when over one meter, and move it back about six meters to provide parking space; the respondents sought an extension on April 26, 2000 and thereafter filed a petition for prohibition with an application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the RTC, alleging that enforcement would amount to appropriation of private property without due process and would violate privacy and other rights.

Trial Court Proceedings and Interim Relief

The RTC, Branch 273, issued a writ of preliminary injunction on June 30, 2000 enjoining enforcement of the demolition order and, after trial, granted the petition for prohibition by Decision dated October 2, 2002, ordering the city to desist permanently from implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the respondents’ property.

RTC Findings on Merits

The RTC held that ordering demolition and relocation of the fence would amount to an appropriation of property that could only be effected by eminent domain and could not be accomplished under the guise of police power; it found the see-thru requirement contrary to privacy rights of the Benedictine sisters residing on the premises; it considered the ordinance neither remedial nor curative; and it observed that retroactive application could not impair vested substantive rights.

Appellate Disposition

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in its December 1, 2003 Decision, reasoning that Ordinance No. 192 not only regulated but also effected a taking of private property without due process and just compensation, that the setback provision would make parking available to the public outside school control, and that the ordinance failed substantive due process despite compliance with procedural steps such as public hearings.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The petitioners challenged the CA decision on four grounds: that the CA erred in declaring Ordinance No. 192 an invalid exercise of police power; that the CA erred in treating the ordinance as an exercise of eminent domain; that the CA erred in finding a violation of due process; and that the CA erred in ruling the ordinance could not be given retroactive application. The petitioners conceded the invalidity of Section 5 in earlier pleadings but later argued that Zoning Ordinance No. 303, Series of 2000 cured that defect.

Legal Standard on Police Power and Tests of Validity

The Court reiterated that police power is the plenary authority to promote health, morals, safety, and general welfare, and that municipalities exercise delegated police power under Sec. 16 of the Local Government Code. It restated the established tests for the validity of local ordinances, drawn from precedent: a valid ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or statute, must not be unfair or oppressive, must not be partial or discriminatory, must regulate but not prohibit trade, must be general and consistent with public policy, and must not be unreasonable. The Court explained application of the rational relationship test and the more exacting intermediate and strict scrutiny standards, and adopted the requisites articulated in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr. that police power measures must address public interests as distinguished from particular class interests and employ means reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Ruling Overview and Standard Applied

Applying the foregoing standards, the Court concluded that the challenged provisions failed the rational relationship test because the means employed were not reasonably necessary to achieve the asserted public objectives and were unduly oppressive to private rights. The Court held that absence of concurrence between a lawful subject and lawful method rendered the measure an arbitrary intrusion on private rights and a violation of due process.

Specific Ruling on Section 5 (Five-Meter Setback)

The Court found Section 5, which forbade walls and fences within a five-meter parking allowance between the front monument line and the building line, to effectuate a taking of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of respondents’ property for public use without just compensation and thus to contravene Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that ownership would remain with the respondents and found no logical or necessary connection between providing a parking area and the ordinance’s articulated goals of preventing concealment of unlawful acts or fostering neighborliness; it further rejected beautification as a sufficient justification for permanent divestment of beneficial use and declined to accept that Zoning Ordinance No. 303 cured the defect because that argument was raised for the first time on appeal and because the two ordinances differ in purpose and subject.

Specific Ruling on Section 3.1 (80% See-Thru Fence)

The Court also declared Section 3.1 invalid as an unreasonable and oppressive encroachment on property and privacy rights. It held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that an 80% see-thru fence was reasonably necessary to deter crime or provide greater security than the existing solid concrete wall, which had provided protection for decades. The Court observed that compelling exposure of the premises could entice criminals and could be easier to bypass.

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