Title
Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corp. vs. Canada
Case
G.R. No. L-49686
Decision Date
Aug 31, 1988
Juan Jabutay sold half of Lot 6733 to Eustaquio Paraiso, later sold to Vicente Canada. During a partition case, Jabutay registered and sold the lot to Gochan without notice. Canada sued to annul the sale, but the Supreme Court ruled Gochan, as an innocent purchaser, was not bound by the partition judgment due to lack of lis pendens and due process violations.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-49686)

Parties, Venue, and Governing Legal Framework

The partition case was Civil Case No. R-1630 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The appellate proceedings included CA-G.R. No. 22909-R, which affirmed the partition judgment, and later CA-G.R. No. 49278-R, which upheld the RTC’s partition and execution orders against Gochan. The core statutory framework invoked was Act 496, specifically Section 79 (now Section 76 of the Property Registration Law, P.D. 1529), on the doctrine of lis pendens, and Section 39, Act 496, on the effect of registration under the Torrens system. The decision also referred to the doctrine that a purchaser in good faith for value is protected where the title is already registered, citing Director of Lands vs. Martin, 84 Phil. 140.

Genesis of the Co-Ownership and the Partition Action

Juan Jabutay owned Lot No. 6733. On August 11, 1939, Jabutay sold a one-half pro-indiviso portion of Lot 6733 to Eustaquio Paraiso for P600, representing attorney’s fees of Jabutay’s lawyer, Atty. Sofronio Savellon. Despite the sale, Jabutay continued to occupy Paraiso’s half as lessee. After more than two decades, on July 20, 1951, Paraiso sold his one-half undivided portion to Vicente Canada, without informing Jabutay. On July 31, 1951, Canada filed an action for partition against Jabutay, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1630 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In a decision dated July 5, 1957, the trial court declared Canada and Jabutay co-owners and ordered partition in equal parts.

Appellate Affirmance and Jabutay’s Surreptitious Registration

Jabutay appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 22909-R. During the pendency of the appeal, Jabutay applied for registration of Lot 6733 in his own name without notice to Canada. On March 2, 1959, OCT No. 51 issued to Jabutay. On April 22, 1959, Jabutay sold the entire Lot 6733 to Gochan, which paid the stipulated consideration and took possession without knowledge of the pending partition appeal. Jabutay’s OCT No. 51 was cancelled and TCT 19612 was issued to Gochan. Canada did not record any notice of lis pendens on the back of Jabutay’s title at the time of the corporate purchase.

Canada’s Annulment Suit and the Late Annotation of Lis Pendens

After discovering that Lot 6733 had been registered in Jabutay’s name and sold to Gochan, Canada filed on April 30, 1959 an action to annul the sale, cancel Gochan’s title, secure a new title in his name, and claim damages. The matter was docketed as Civil Case No. R-6130, entitled “Vicente Canada vs. Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation, Juan Jabutay, et al.” On February 12, 1962, Canada caused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated on Gochan’s TCT No. 19612. In CA-G.R. No. 22909-R, the Court of Appeals affirmed the partition judgment on June 18, 1964.

Substitution of Parties and Attempts to Execute the Partition Judgment

Canada’s counsel filed a motion for reconsideration on July 28, 1964, asserting that Mona Lisa Ma. Reyes acquired Canada’s interest by dacion en pago, and requesting substitution of parties in the partition caption. The motion did not disclose that Mona Lisa Ma. Reyes was his daughter. The Court of Appeals later ordered that Mona Lisa Ma. Reyes be substituted for Vicente Canada as plaintiff, and that the heir or heirs of Felix Gochan and/or his estate be considered additional party defendants. On July 20, 1966, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration and ordered inclusion as additional defendant of Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation, the purchaser of the whole lot. The Court of Appeals granted a later motion to change the case caption to include Reyes, the heir or heirs of Felix Gochan and/or his estate, and Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation.

Gochan attempted to challenge the Court of Appeals action through a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-26627), but the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a minute resolution dated October 10, 1966. Reyes then sought execution of the partition decision in Civil Case No. R-1630 on May 11, 1968, but the sheriff returned the writ unsatisfied due to the existence of the other pending case in connection with the same lot.

Gochan’s Non-Implementation Argument and the Trial Court’s First Denial of Execution

After the heirs of Canada moved to quash the writ of execution, the RTC ultimately denied Reyes’s motion for execution in Civil Case No. R-6130 on October 2, 1969. The trial court observed that the judgment sought to be executed referred to the “heirs of Felix Gochan and/or his estate,” which were not the owners of the property, because the registered owner was Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation, a juridical entity separate from its stockholders. The RTC further noted that Gochan became the registered owner on April 22, 1959, long before Canada’s notice of lis pendens was annotated on February 12, 1962. The trial court held that the only remedy left for the plaintiff was to proceed against the corporation as any other party litigant, consistent with the right to due process or the right to be heard.

Reyes moved for reconsideration, but it was denied. Reyes thereafter attempted to re-activate execution by seeking a modification of the Court of Appeals resolution, and the Court of Appeals issued an order indicating that the writ of execution may issue against defendants including Gochan.

The Second Alias Writ, the Appointment of Commissioners, and the Appeal

Following the Court of Appeals’ August 26, 1970 ruling, Reyes pursued execution in the RTC. On October 13, 1970, the RTC granted a second alias writ of execution against defendants including Gochan. Gochan moved to set aside the order and writ of execution, but the RTC denied it without prejudice to seeking clarification from the Court of Appeals. The RTC later appointed commissioners on February 6, 1971, and the commissioners submitted their report dividing Lot 6733 into two parts on April 13, 1971. Gochan opposed the commissioners’ report, asserting lack of jurisdiction, denial of due process, pendency of another case involving the same land, and res judicata. The RTC approved the commissioners’ report on June 10, 1971. Gochan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC order on December 19, 1978 in CA-G.R. No. 49278-R. Gochan then filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

The Parties’ Core Contentions Before the Supreme Court

Gochan argued that it was the registered owner in fee simple of Lot 6733 and that it was never duly summoned or brought into Civil Case No. R-1630. It contended that the Court of Appeals’ later action, which purported to change the partition case caption and include Gochan as an additional defendant at a late stage, could not confer jurisdiction. Gochan also claimed that it had not been heard in the partition case and that the decision could not be executed against it without violating due process. It further maintained that because no notice of lis pendens had been recorded on Jabutay’s title prior to Gochan’s purchase, the partition judgment did not bind it.

Reyes, as successor-in-interest of Canada, relied on the Court of Appeals’ resolution altering the partition case caption and on the executory effect of the affirmed partition judgment, contending that execution against the purchaser was warranted.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Court granted the petition. It held that the Court of Appeals, by bringing Gochan into the case long after the partition decision had become final and executory, acted in a manner that departed from accepted judicial procedure and warranted the Court’s supervisory power. The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction when it issued an order changing the partition case by impleading Gochan as an additional defendant long after its jurisdiction had ceased. It further held that, as the registered owner, Gochan was not bound by the partition judgment because it was never summoned in Civil Case No. R-1630 and no lis pendens notice was recorded on Jabutay’s title at the time Gochan purchased the lot. Consequently, the Court of Appeals resolution impleading Gochan was declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and the partition and execution orders were set aside.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on lis pendens, Jurisdiction, and Due Process

The Court rejected reliance on Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court as the basis for binding Gochan, explaining that the applicable rule was Section 79 of Act 496 (now Section 76 of P.D. 1529). That provision required that, for an action or proceeding affecting registered land, the institution of the action must be memoranda in the appropriate land registration records, including references to the title and the volume and page of the registration book entry. The Court stated that this was the essence of lis pendens: decisions in such cases bind only the parties, unless notice of the pending action is properly recorded to bind third persons and the whole world.

Applying the statutory rule, the Court held that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1630, affirmed in CA-G.R. No. 22909-R on June 18, 1964, did not bind Gochan. The Court emphasized that Jabutay’s title was clean and free from liens and encumbrances at the time of Gochan’s purchase on April 22, 1959. Although Canada later annotated a notice of lis pendens on February 12, 1962, this occurred after judgment in the partition case had already been rendered on July 5, 1957 and after Gochan had already become the registered owner. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals resolution of August 26, 1970, which impleaded Gochan by merely changing the title of the already-decided case, was void for lack of jurisdiction because the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction had ceased after its judgment had become final and executory and had been duly entered on August 20, 1967.

The Court further framed the matter as a due process violation. By impleading Gochan during the exec

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