Title
Evangelista vs. Sandiganbayan
Case
G.R. No. 112313
Decision Date
Jun 16, 1995
Mayor Evangelista accused of graft for denying a permit to a marine filling station applicant while favoring another; Ombudsman's conflicting recommendations led to a valid Information filing, upheld by the Supreme Court.
mayor
motion to quash
denial

Case Summary (G.R. No. 112313)

Complaint and Preliminary Investigation

On 2 August 1991, De Ocampo filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman accusing petitioner of violating Sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019. She alleged that Mayor Evangelista acted maliciously in denying her application for a Locational Clearance and Mayor’s Permit for her proposed marine filling station project. She further alleged manifest partiality, asserting that the petitioner intervened in behalf of Adolfo Gonzales in his application for dealership with Petron and the Energy Regulatory Board.

During the preliminary investigation process, an Ombudsman Investigator, Francisco Samala, issued a resolution dated 4 May 1992 recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner. The resolution was then referred to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review. On 28 October 1992, Special Prosecution Officer Wendell Barreras-Sulit issued a memorandum concurring in the recommendation and drafted the Information. On 12 November 1992, Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto directed SPO Reynaldo A. Alhambra to review the case.

Conflicting Recommendations in the Office of the Special Prosecutor

On 24 November 1992, SPO Alhambra recommended dismissal of the complaint. Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De G. Ferrer recommended disapproval of Alhambra’s memorandum and argued that the mayor was indictable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 due to what Ferrer characterized as a whimsical refusal to issue locational clearance to the complainant, taking into account evidence that the property was within the commercial area. This characterization drew on the Declaration, Certification of the Provincial Assessor, and the Locational Clearance issued by the HLURB.

Special Prosecutor Desierto then concurred in the direction to dismiss, stating that his conclusion was based on the evidence and not on inferences. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved Desierto’s recommendation. Following this, De Ocampo moved for reconsideration of the dismissal.

Reconsideration and the Filing of the Information

After reconsideration, the process changed direction. In an order dated 5 July 1993, SPO Reynaldo L. Mendoza denied De Ocampo’s motion for reconsideration, but thereafter, DSP Ferrer, SP Desierto, and Ombudsman Vasquez changed their original actions. DSP Ferrer recommended approval of the order, while SP Desierto did not concur with the order of dismissal, stating that under the Zoning Ordinance of 1989 and an HLURB finding that the lot was commercial in nature, there appeared to be no cogent reason for petitioner’s refusal, and that a prima facie case for violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3(e) existed. Ombudsman Vasquez likewise disapproved the order, explaining that a closer look convinced him to concur with OMBI Samala, SPO Sulit, and SP Desierto. Consequently, on 7 September 1993, the corresponding Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan.

Motion to Quash and the Issue of Alleged Finality

Petitioner then moved for reconsideration and challenged the Information’s validity. He alleged that the Information was irregular because it relied on conflicting resolutions—SPO Sulit had recommended filing, while SPO Alhambra had recommended dismissal. The motion was denied by SPO Manuel A. Corpuz in a resolution dated 21 September 1993. Corpuz ruled that the question of whether a prima facie case exists is within the authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor. He also emphasized that a preliminary investigation had been conducted and that the parties had been given an opportunity to submit evidence. Thus, once an Information was filed in court based on the prima facie determination after preliminary investigation, it was considered regular and valid because the respondent had been given his day in court.

After the Information was filed, petitioner moved to quash before the Sandiganbayan, invoking that the Ombudsman had already dismissed the complaint and that the Information was disapproved by the Ombudsman. On 8 November 1993, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. Petitioner then challenged the propriety of this denial before the Supreme Court, particularly asserting that the Information was unlawful because of the alleged reversal of SPO Sulit’s position by SPO Alhambra and the earlier approval of dismissal by the Ombudsman. Petitioner further asserted that once the complaint was dismissed and no appeal was taken, the dismissal became final and executory.

The Supreme Court’s Evaluation of the “Discrepancy” in the Certified Photocopies

The Supreme Court examined the petitioner’s argument and found it unavailing. The “dilemma” was traced to an apparent discrepancy between two certified photocopies of an order of SPO Mendoza—Annex “D” attached to the petition, and Annex “1” in the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General. In Annex “D,” the record showed that SP Desierto appeared to have concurred in the dismissal of the complaint. However, the Supreme Court noted a typewritten note next to the space for his signature that contradicted that alleged concurrence, stating that, given the zoning and HLURB findings that the lot was commercial, there was no cogent reason for refusal and that a prima facie case existed for violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3(e), with recommendation for approval of the Information prepared by SPO Sulit.

In Annex “1,” the Supreme Court observed that between the typed phrase “I CONCUR” over SP Desierto’s name, handwritten words “DO NOT” had been inserted. Petitioner suggested manipulation, and he theorized that the handwritten notation might have been authored by DSP Ferrer rather than by SP Desierto. The Supreme Court rejected these speculations. It held that it was not illogical for SP Desierto to reconsider his previous stand. It stressed that a motion for reconsideration afforded the prosecutors opportunity for a second look and for rectification of any mistakes. It further held that the distinction between typewritten and handwritten notations was not controlling where their content was substantially the same, aside from minor typographical omissions. It therefore viewed SP Desierto’s non-concurrence in Annex “D” as consistent with the notation.

The Court similarly ruled that DSP Ferrer could not have written the “prima facie” notation on Annex “D” because Ferrer had recommended approval of the dismissal at that stage and thus could not logically have authored language advocating approval of the Information. The Court also found no persuasive significance in the difference between the handwritten notation in Annex “D” and DSP Ferrer’s handwritten notation on SPO Alhambra’s memorandum.

Ombudsman Vasquez’s Notation and Allegations of Speculation

The Supreme Court also analyzed Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez’s markings. Annex “D” showed that Ombudsman Vasquez appeared to have concurred with SPO Mendoza’s order through a typewritten phrase “Original signed” above his name and the word “Approved.” In Annex “1,” the word “Approved” had a handwritten prefix “Dis” attached, and his signature was affixed thereto. A handwritten note below his name read: “A closer look convinced me to concur with OMBI Samala, SPO Sulit and SP Desierto.”

Petitioner attempted to cast doubt on the authorship and timing of Ombudsman Vasquez’s notation, theorizing that the Ombudsman could not have been misled by SP Desierto’s earlier dismissal recommendation and that the handwritten notation might have encroached upon the certification that it was a “true xerox copy,” indicating the notation might have been written after the stamp was placed. The Supreme Court held those claims to be mere speculation. It noted that Ombudsman Vasquez’s basis was succinctly stated in his resolution, and it found it difficult to determine whether his notation was written over the certification stamp because the stamp was not clear. The Court added that, in a subsequent resolution of SPO Corpuz upholding the validity of the Information, SP Desierto recommended approval, and that Ombudsman Vasquez approved the resolution. It found a similarity between SP Desierto’s handwritten notations in the separate documents, supporting the inference that both notations were written by SP Desierto.

Authority After Preliminary Investigation and Absence of Grave Abuse

The Supreme Court further reasoned that, even if petitioner had perceived contradictions in the earlier order of SPO Mendoza as reflected in one annex, petitioner could have been alerted by the later resolution of SPO Corpuz and the final approval by Ombudsman Vasquez. The Court emphasized that annexes “D” and “1” were both certified photocopies of the original, yet their appearances suggested that one was not a photocopy of a duplicate original but rather a reproduction of the original. The controversy, the Court suggested, might have been avoided had petitioner received a copy of SPO Mendoza’s order that exactly matched the copy in the Office of the Solicitor General’s possession, or if petitioner had accurately appreciated the

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