G.R. No. 142913 - Estate of Salvador Serra Serra vs. Heirs of Hernaez

Case Summary (G.R. No. 142913)

Factual Background

On December 27, 1967, a petition for reconstitution of allegedly lost original certificates of title (OCT) and owner’s duplicate copies was filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bacolod City. The petition, filed by Eleuterio Hernaez’s successors-in-interest, namely Primitivo, Rogaciana, and Luisa, all surnamed Hernaez, covered Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre, in Negros Occidental. On April 6, 1968, the CFI granted the petition and ordered the reconstitution of the subject OCTs and their duplicate copies. The Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental then issued reconstituted OCT Nos. RO-10173, RO-10174, and RO-10175 for the respective lots.

These reconstituted OCTs were subsequently cancelled on May 29, 1969, upon presentation by the Hernaez group of a “declaration of heirship.” In their place, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-51546, T-51547, and T-51548 were issued in the name of the Hernaez successors. Upon learning of these TCTs, Salvador Serra Serra, acting for his co-heirs, caused the registration of an adverse claim and moved for the cancellation of the reconstituted titles.

Early Proceedings and the Supreme Court’s 1991 Ruling

The trial court denied petitioners’ motion to cancel the reconstituted titles and, instead, granted the Hernaez group’s prayer to be placed in possession of the subject properties. Petitioners challenged this ruling through a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-00139. On June 7, 1971, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which it later lifted through a resolution dated August 3, 1971. Petitioners then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. L-34080, consolidated with G.R. No. L-34693, seeking to nullify the resolution lifting the writ.

On March 22, 1991, the Supreme Court granted the petitions. It set aside the Court of Appeals’ order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction, declared the writ of possession issued in the cadastral case NULL and VOID, and remanded the records to the trial court for the hearing of petitioners’ motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles. The Supreme Court also ordered private respondents to return to petitioners possession of the properties, and it maintained a temporary restraining order effective until the issue of ownership and/or possession was finally resolved by a competent court.

Judgment on the Motion for Cancellation in 1998

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s remand, the trial court heard petitioners’ motion for cancellation of the certificates of title. On November 25, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the Serra Serra petition for lack of merit, but it also ruled in substance that the TCTs issued in the Hernaez group’s name were defective. The dispositive portion declared certain TCTs NULL and VOID on the ground that they were issued to foreigners, specifically citing Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27644 covering Lot No. 1316 (Kabankalan Cadastre) and Lot No. 2685 (Ilog Cadastre), and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22344 covering Lot No. 717-A and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22351 (Ilog Cadastre). The court then declared the Hernaez group owners of the lots covered by the reconstituted-derived titles—T-51546 for Lot No. 1316, T-51547 for Lot No. 2685, and T-51548 for Lot No. 717—and ordered petitioners to return possession to the Hernaez oppositors.

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals and the Petition for Certiorari

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. On March 3, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that there was no cogent reason to disturb the trial court’s decision, particularly after the court a quo found the evidence sufficient to uphold the reconstituted certificates of title. The Court of Appeals emphasized the established principle that in actions for annulment and/or reconveyance, the party seeking such relief must prove the right by clear and convincing evidence, not merely by preponderance of evidence. It further found that petitioners failed to present the original certificates of title for the subject lots. It also noted that petitioners were Spanish citizens, hence allegedly disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution.

Petitioners sought reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied it on April 17, 2000, leading to the present Rule 45 petition.

Parties’ Contentions in the Supreme Court

Petitioners assigned two main errors. First, they argued that the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted course of judicial proceedings by requiring compliance with the rule that a motion for reconsideration must be filed before resorting to certiorari under Rule 65, asserting that the rule admits well-settled exceptions such as situations where the same issues were already raised and passed upon by the trial court, where a party was deprived of due process, or where the writ was urgent.

Second, they contended that the Court of Appeals decided a substantive question contrary to law, particularly Republic Act No. 26, and contrary to the applicable Supreme Court decision in SERRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. L-34080, March 22, 1991.

The Court’s Ruling on Procedural Default

The Supreme Court denied the petition. It held that although petitioners acknowledged a procedural lapse, they did not provide a valid basis to bring their case within any exception to the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The Court reiterated that a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non condition for certiorari. It explained that the requirement serves to grant the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error through a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. It further stated that petitioners’ failure deprived the trial court of the chance to rectify any unwitting error or unfair imputation, and it characterized the motion for reconsideration as the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

Substantive Considerations and the Burden of Proof

Even assuming, arguendo, that certiorari was the proper remedy, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Court of Appeals’ dismissal. It agreed with the lower courts’ view that petitioners were Spanish citizens and therefore disqualified from acquiring private lands in the Philippines as a general rule. It reiterated the governing principle that only Filipino citizens can acquire private lands, and the recognized exceptions are (a) acquisition by hereditary succession, or (b) acquisition by a foreigner who was formerly a natural-born Filipino who lost Philippine citizenship.

The Court found that the record lacked any showing that petitioners acquired the properties through a qualified mode. Petitioners’ bare allegation that they acquired the lots from Salvador Serra Serra was deemed to have no probative value in the absence of sufficient proof that Salvador was not disqualified to own or hold private property and that he could legally transmit a title capable of being inherited by petitioners. The Court also addressed possession. It held that petitioners’ possession of TCTs and their actual possession of the lands—while strong indicia of ownership in general—were not necessarily conclusive where the claim of ownership rested on a dubious foundation. Since petitioners challenged the Hernaez group’s proprietary claim, the Court held that the burden rested on petitioners to establish their superior right. It noted that they failed to present in evidence the OCT in the name of Salvador, and the trial court had treated this non-presentation as casting doubt on the veracity of petitioners’ claim. The maxim “He who asserts must prove” thus supported the trial court’s conclusion that petitioners did not establish superior proprietary rights over respondents’ lots.

Finally, the Supreme Court applied deference to concurrent factual findings. It emphasized that the factual findings of the trial court, as adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, were binding and would not be disturbed on appeal. It also recalled that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not review factual matters in a Rule 45 petition beyond recognized legal errors. Because the Court of Appeals’ factual conclusions aligned with those of the trial court, the Supreme Court declined to reweigh evidence.

Legal Basis and Disposition

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ certiorari petition due to their failure to file a motion for reconsideration, and it further found that the Court of Appeals’ substantive affirmance was supported by the governing rules on burden of proof in actions to annul or reconvey title, the evidentiary significance of the absence of the relevant ori

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 142913)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Petitioners were the Estate of Salvador Serra Serra (Spec. Proc. No. 242) and the Estate of Gregorio Serra Serra (Spec. Proc. No. 240), represented by the Judicial Co-Administrator Luis Isasi and private co-heirs: Margarita Serra Serra, Francisca Teresa Serra Serra, and Francisco Jose Serra Serra.
Respondents were the Heirs of Primitivo Hernaez (represented by Presentacion Hernaez Belbar), the Heirs of Luisa Hernaez (represented by Wilfredo Gayares, Lolita Gayares, Julieta Fortaleza, and Rosauro Fortaleza), and the Heirs of Rogaciana Hernaez (represented by Lourdes Moncera).
Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to assail the March 3, 2000 Court of Appeals decision and the April 17, 2000 resolution denying reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals decision was rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 52817 and dismissed petitioners’ certiorari petition for lack of merit.
The Supreme Court denied the Rule 45 petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals rulings.

Originating Land Matter

The dispute began with a petition for reconstitution of alleged lost original certificates of title (OCT) and owner’s duplicate copies, filed on December 27, 1967 with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bacolod City.
The reconstitution petition sought titles covering Lot No. 1316 of the Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of the Ilog Cadastre, in the Province of Negros Occidental.
The original reconstitution petition was filed by Primitivo, Rogaciana, and Luisa, all surnamed Hernaez, as successors-in-interest.
On April 6, 1968, the CFI granted the petition and ordered the reconstitution of the subject OCTs and their duplicate copies.
After reconstitution, the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental issued reconstituted OCT Nos. RO-10173, RO-10174, and RO-10175 for Lot Nos. 1316, 2685, and 717, respectively.
The reconstituted OCTs were cancelled on May 29, 1969 upon presentation by Hernaez of a “declaration of heirship”, after which the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) were issued: T-51546, T-51547, and T-51548.
Upon learning of the TCTs, Salvador Serra Serra, for and in behalf of his co-heirs, registered an adverse claim and moved for cancellation of the reconstituted titles.

Incidents on Possession and Preliminary Litigation

The trial court denied petitioners’ motion to cancel the reconstituted titles.
The trial court instead granted Hernaez’s prayer to be placed in possession of the subject properties.
Petitioners challenged the trial court’s ruling through a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-00139.
On June 7, 1971, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which it ordered lifted in a resolution dated August 3, 1971.
Petitioners sought Supreme Court relief by filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. L-34080 and consolidated with G.R. No. L-34693.
On March 22, 1991, the Supreme Court granted the petitions and set aside the Court of Appeals order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction.
The Supreme Court declared the writ of possession issued in Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Records No. 163 as NULL and VOID.
The Supreme Court remanded the records to the trial court for hearing of the motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles.
The Supreme Court ordered private respondents to return possession to petitioners.
The Supreme Court also stated that its temporary restraining order issued on February 15, 1972 enjoining interference with petitioners’ possession would remain effective until ownership and/or possession was finally settled by a competent court.

Trial Court’s 1998 Judgment

After remand, the trial court heard petitioners’ motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles.
On November 25, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the oppositors Hernaez.
The trial court dismissed petitioners’ petition filed November 4, 1968 for lack of merit.
The trial court declared certain TCTs as NULL and VOID for having allegedly been issued to foreigners, including Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27644 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22344 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22351.
The trial court declared Hernaez as owners of the subject lots covered by the reconstituted titles, specifically: Lot No. 1316 under T-51546, Lot No. 2685 under T-51547, and Lot No. 717 under T-51548.
The trial court ordered petitioners to return possession of the lots to Hernaez.

Court of Appeals Disposition

Petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration with the trial court.
Petitioners instead assailed the trial court’s decision via another petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On March 3, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals found no cogent reason to disturb the trial court’s decision because the trial court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to uphold the reconstituted certificates of title.
The Court of Appeals applied the principle that in actions involving annulment and/or reconveyance of title, the claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence rather than by mere preponderance of evidence.
The Court of Appeals noted that petitioners failed to present in court as evidence the original certificates of title for the relevant lots.
The Court of Appeals also found petitioners to be Spanish citizens and therefore, as aliens, disqualified to acquire land in the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution.
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ reliance on the strength of their possession and their c