G.R. No. L-30375 - Escribano vs. Avila

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-30375)

Petitioner

Jose Escribano — charged with libel by radio for allegedly stating in a broadcast that Pendatun was “the worst animal that ever lived” in the province. Escribano challenged the authority of Judge Avila to conduct the preliminary investigation and sought relief by way of certiorari and prohibition to annul Judge Avila’s orders.

Respondents

Hon. David P. Avila — Judge who received the complaint, conducted the preliminary investigation, found probable cause, issued an arrest warrant, fixed bail, and referred the case to the city fiscal; Salipada K. Pendatun — complainant who filed the libel complaint directly with the CFI and whose evidence supported a finding of probable cause.

Key Dates

Alleged defamatory radio broadcast: August 26, 1968.
Complaint filed with the Court of First Instance: September 25, 1968.
Judge Avila’s orders asserting authority and receiving evidence: March 5, 20, 27, and March 29, 1969 (one order finding probable cause and ordering arrest and referral).
Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the Supreme Court: April 1, 1969; supplemental petition April 18, 1969.
Warrant of arrest issued: March 31, 1969.
City fiscal filed an information before April 16, 1969.
Supreme Court resolution restraining arraignment: August 10, 1970.
Decision rendered by the Supreme Court (En Banc): September 12, 1978.

Applicable Law and Rules

Article 360, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363 (1965) — lays down venue rules for criminal and civil actions in cases of written defamation and prescribes that preliminary investigations “shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted.”
Section 13, Rule 112, Rules of Court — authorizes the judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary examination and investigation where a complaint is filed directly with the CFI, or to refer it to the municipal judge.
City charter (Republic Act No. 2364, as amended by R.A. 3332) — Section 23(f) grants the city attorney authority to investigate crimes and prepare informations; Section 78 authorizes the municipal or city court to conduct preliminary investigations “for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishments.”
Constitutional provision relied on in the opinion: the warrant/probable cause clause of the 1973 Constitution (quoted in the decision) that warrants issue only upon probable cause “to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.”

Facts Relevant to Jurisdiction and Procedure

Pendatun filed a sworn complaint for libel directly with the CFI of Cotabato, supported by an affidavit from Acting Governor Datumanong. Judge Avila asserted and exercised authority to hold the preliminary investigation, received complainant’s evidence, found probable cause (March 29 order), issued a warrant of arrest (March 31), fixed bail at P3,000 and referred the case to the city fiscal for information filing. Escribano challenged that exercise of power, contending that under the Cotabato City charter and R.A. 4363 the city fiscal alone (or municipal courts in certain places) has exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigations in written defamation cases.

Legal Issue Presented

Whether the Court of First Instance of Cotabato (the proper CFI under Article 360’s venue rules) is authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation of a written defamation (libel by radio) complaint filed directly with it, or whether that statutory authority is exclusively lodged in the provincial/city fiscal or municipal courts as enumerated in the amendment to Article 360 (R.A. 4363).

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner (Escribano): Relied on R.A. 4363’s language and on city charter provisions to argue exclusivity of the city fiscal’s authority to conduct preliminary investigations in written defamation cases; invoked precedents (Sayo, Montelibano, Guerrero) holding in some city-charter contexts that the city fiscal had exclusive authority. Argued that Article 360’s enumeration excludes other actors from conducting investigations in libel cases.
Respondents (Pendatun and Judge Avila): Invoked Section 13, Rule 112, and constitutional authority to support the CFI judge’s power to conduct preliminary examination and investigation where the complaint is filed directly with the CFI. Argued that R.A. 4363 was intended to deprive ordinary municipal courts of the power to investigate libel suits filed in remote places but did not intend to divest the CFI of such power.

Statutory Construction and Purpose of R.A. 4363

The Court emphasized the mischief R.A. 4363 sought to remedy: harassment of accused persons by filing libel complaints in remote municipal courts (out-of-town suits). R.A. 4363 clarified venue for actions in written defamation and specified the public officers and courts that may conduct preliminary investigations to minimize out-of-town municipal prosecutions. The Court concluded that the amendment intended to strip ordinary municipal courts (those in remote municipalities) of their investigatory power in written defamation cases but not to deprive the proper Court of First Instance (i.e., the CFI of the province or city where the libel was printed/first published or where the offended party resided or held office) of its established power to conduct preliminary investigations.

Interpretation of the Enumerative Language and the Maxim inclusio unius

The Court rejected a strict application of the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius to Article 360’s list of officers and tribunals because the legislative purpose and context showed that omission of the CFI was not intended to exclude it. The Court observed that the omission was likely inadvertent and that the statute’s object—preventing out-of-town harassment—did not require excluding the CFI’s preexisting power. The maxim was characterized as an auxiliary rule of interpretation that must yield to manifest legislative purpose and to avoid injustice.

Constitutional and Rule-Based Authority for CFI Judges to Conduct Preliminary Investigations

The Court drew upon the constitutional prohibition on issuance of warrants except upon probable cause “to be determined by the judge after examination under oath” (the 1973 Constitution provision cited in the decision), and recognized that implicit in that provision is the judge’s power to hold a preliminary examination/investigation and to issue warrants. The Court also relied on Rule 112, Section 13 of the Rules of Court, which expressly authorizes a judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary examination and investigation when a complaint is filed directly with the CFI, or to refer the complaint to the municipal judge. The Court treated these authorities as supporting the proposition that CFIs retain their power to conduct preliminary investigations in appropriate cases.

Precedents Considered and Their Scope

The Court discussed prior decisions that had held the city fiscal exclusive in certain chartered cities (Sayo v. Chief of Police; Montelibano v. Ferrer; Guerrero v. Ferrer). It explained those holdings in context: some city charters (e.g., Manila, Bacolod under older charters) lacked provisions granting municipal/city courts investigatory power; thus prior rulings were limited and did not, in the Court’s view, establish a universal rule depriving CFIs of their constitutional and rule-based powers. The Court relied also on Collector of Customs v. Villaluz (71 SCRA 356) as recognizing the constitutional foundation for a judge’s authority to determine probable cause and issue warrants after examination under oath.

Holding

The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the Court of First Instance of Cotabato had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the written defamation complaint filed directly with it. R.A. 4363 did not intend to or effectuate a divestiture of the inherent and rule-based power of the Court of First Instance to conduct such preliminary investigations when the action is properly filed in that court under the statute’s venue rules. The statutory enumeration in Article 360 was not interpreted to be exclusive of the CFI.

Rationale

The principal object of R.A. 4363 was to prevent the filing of libel suits in remote municipal courts to harass accused persons; it accomplished this by limiting venue and by specifying fiscals and municipal courts that might conduct preliminary investigations in written defamation cases.
This legislative objective did not require or indicate withdrawal of the CFI’s power to conduct investigations in cases properly cognizable by it under the venue provisions.
The constitutional provision on warrants and probable cause, together with Rule 112, Section 13, supports the judge’s authority to conduct examination and investigation and to issue warrants based on probable cause determined after examination under oath.
Charter provisions vesting investigatory powers in a city fiscal are not inherently exclusive; where city charters expressly allow municipal/city courts investigatory power (e.g., Cotabato City’s charter), the fiscal’s authority is not exclusive and the courts retain their investigatory competence.

Concurring Opinion (Justice Tee

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-30375)

Court and Citation

Decision reported at 174 Phil. 490, En Banc, G.R. No. L-30375, dated September 12, 1978.
Majority opinion authored by Justice Aquino; concurrence by Justice Teehankee; dissent by Justice Fernando. Other justices’ votes noted in the decision.

Procedural Posture

Petitioner Jose Escribano filed a petition for special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition in the Supreme Court on April 1, 1969 against respondent Judge David P. Avila and complainant Salipada K. Pendatun seeking annulment of Judge Avila’s orders conducting a preliminary investigation in a libel complaint.
The complaint for libel was filed directly with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cotabato on September 25, 1968, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Avila, supported by the affidavit of Acting Governor Simeon Datumanong.
Judge Avila issued orders on March 5, 20, 27 and March 29, 1969 ruling he had power to conduct preliminary investigation and on March 29, 1969 found probable cause, ordered arrest, fixed bail at P3,000, and referred the case to the city fiscal for filing of information; a warrant of arrest was issued on March 31, 1969.
The city fiscal filed an information for libel sometime before April 16, 1969.
On August 10, 1970, the Supreme Court issued a resolution restraining Judge Avila from proceeding with Escribano’s arraignment.
The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the petition with costs against petitioner.

Facts

On August 26, 1968, a speech broadcast by a radio station at Cotabato City allegedly contained a statement by Mayor Jose Escribano that “Mr. Pendatun is the worst animal that ever live [lived] in this province.”
On September 25, 1968 Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, governor-elect of Cotabato, filed a direct complaint for libel (Criminal Case No. 5283) with the CFI of Cotabato, sworn before Judge Avila and supported by Acting Governor Simeon Datumanong’s affidavit.
Escribano contested Judge Avila’s authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the libel charge.
Judge Avila proceeded to receive complainant’s evidence and later found probable cause to believe libel by radio had been committed and that Escribano probably committed it.

Issue Presented

Whether the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation of a complaint for written defamation (libel by radio), or whether that power is vested exclusively in the city fiscal of Cotabato City (or provincial/city fiscal or municipal court as specified by statute and city charter).

Statutory and Charter Provisions Invoked

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 4363 (June 19, 1965), particularly the provision:
- “Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article.”
Rule 112, Section 13, Rules of Court:
- Provides that upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance without prior fiscal preliminary investigation, the judge referred may either refer the complaint to the municipal judge for preliminary examination and investigation or himself conduct both preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously and, if he finds reasonable ground, issue warrant and thereafter refer to the fiscal for filing information.
Charter of Cotabato City (Republic Act No. 2364 as amended by RA No. 3332), Section 23:
- City attorney powers include investigating all charges of crimes and preparing informations and prosecuting crimes triable in the Court of First Instance and municipal court, discharging duties enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals.
Charter provision cited (Section 78 of Cotabato City charter and Section 41 of R.A. 409, Revised Charter of Manila) that municipal or city courts “may also conduct preliminary investigations for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishments.”

Petitioner’s Contentions (Escribano)

The city fiscal of Cotabato (city attorney under city charter) is the only official empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in libel cases committed within chartered cities; hence Judge Avila lacked authority.
Invokes city charter provisions (R.A. 2364, as amended) giving the city attorney authority to investigate charges and prosecute in the CFI and municipal courts, and to prepare informations.
Relies on Article 360 as amended by R.A. 4363 which specifies that preliminary investigation of written defamations shall be conducted by provincial or city fiscals or municipal courts, arguing exclusion of CFI judges.
Cites jurisprudence holding exclusive city fiscal authority in chartered cities (Sayo v. Chief of Police, Montelibano v. Ferrer, Guerrero v. Ferrer).

Respondents’ Contentions (Judge Avila and Pendatun)

Rely on Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which authorizes the judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary examination and investigation when complaint is filed directly with the CFI.
Argue that the amendatory provisions in R.A. 4363 were intended to divest ordinary municipal courts of power to conduct preliminary investigations in libel cases to prevent out-of-town harassment, not to deprive proper CFIs of their power.
Maintain that the CFI has constitutional and statutory authority to conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants when venue rules under Article 360 are satisfied.

Court’s Analysis and Reasoning

Purpose of R.A. 4363: The Court reads the amendment as intended to prevent harassment via out-of-town libel suits and to limit venue of actions for written defamation to specified courts (CFI where article is printed/first published or where offended party resides or holds office). The amendment also sought to deprive ordinary municipal courts (remote municipal courts) of preliminary investigation power to