Title
Erena vs. Querrer-Kauffman
Case
G.R. No. 165853
Decision Date
Jun 22, 2006
A forged real estate mortgage was executed by an impostor using stolen documents; the court ruled it null, rejecting the mortgagee's claim of good faith.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 5025)

Factual Background

Respondent owned the subject lot and house and kept the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T‑48521 and tax declarations in a safety deposit box in the house. She left the Philippines in February 1997 and entrusted the house key to her live‑in partner Eduardo Victor, who later gave the key to his sister Mira Bernal. Sometime later, Bernal admitted that Jennifer Ramirez took the contents of the safety deposit box. Respondent discovered the disappearance of her owner’s duplicate title and tax declarations in late October 1997 and learned upon returning to the Philippines that a real estate mortgage on the property had been registered in favor of petitioner and dated August 1, 1997. The mortgage purportedly bore respondent’s signature and showed Jennifer Ramirez as attorney‑in‑fact.

Procedural Posture

Respondent filed suit on March 12, 1998 for nullification of the Real Estate Mortgage and damages, praying among other reliefs for the turnover of the owner’s duplicate title, cancellation of the mortgage, and monetary damages. Petitioner pleaded entitlement as a mortgagee in good faith and filed a cross‑claim against Bernal and Ramirez for repayment of the P250,000 loan. Bernal and Ramirez were declared in default in the civil case; they also pointed to a City Prosecutor resolution (November 13, 1998) absolving them in related criminal matters. The RTC (April 4, 2000) dismissed respondent’s complaint, declaring the questioned mortgage valid on the ground that petitioner was a mortgagee in good faith who relied on apparent title and on the impostor who presented the owner’s duplicate. The Court of Appeals reversed (June 10, 2004), holding the mortgage void as executed by impostors and the mortgagee‑in‑good‑faith doctrine inapplicable. Petitioner sought review in the Supreme Court, advancing primarily factual‑based challenges and invoking her alleged good‑faith reliance.

Principal Issues Presented

Petitioner framed the salient questions as: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding respondent to be the owner of the mortgaged property despite alleged lack of substantial evidence; (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the August 1, 1997 mortgage to be forged without substantial proof; and (3) whether the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith should apply to petitioner despite evidence that the deed was forged.

Trial and Appellate Findings on Evidence

The trial and appellate courts accepted respondent’s proof of ownership: a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 21, 1997 and issuance of TCT No. T‑48521 in her name (June 25/26, 1997). The courts also found convincing proof that respondent’s signatures on the Special Power of Attorney and the Real Estate Mortgage were forged: immigration entries showing respondent abroad at the relevant time, juxtaposed signature samples showing dissimilarity, and the implausibility of both principal and purported attorney‑in‑fact signing the mortgage. Testimony established that Bernal admitted that Jennifer Ramirez took the title and other valuables and that an impostor had posed as the registered owner to consummate the mortgage. Petitioner’s evidence showed she inspected documents and the property and relied on documents presented at the time of the mortgage, including a duplicate title that, according to the RTC’s factual finding, she possessed when served with the complaint; nonetheless, the CA and the Supreme Court found the totality of evidence supported respondent’s ownership and the mortgage’s forgery.

Governing Legal Principles Cited

  • Article 2085(2) of the Civil Code: the mortgagor must be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged.
  • Article 1409(2) of the Civil Code: contracts that are absolutely simulated or fictitious are void ab initio.
  • P.D. 1529 Sec. 53 (last paragraph): registrations procured by the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title or a forged deed are null and void; the owner may pursue remedies against parties to the fraud, without prejudice to rights of an innocent holder for value of the certificate issued by virtue of a voluntary instrument that was not forged.
  • Doctrine of mortgagee in good faith (indefeasibility): generally protects persons who rely on the face of a Torrens title and who purchase or mortgage property in good faith where the instrument produced for registration is not forged; however, that doctrine does not protect a mortgagee who relies on a forged instrument or an impostor when the title remains in the registered owner’s name.

Court of Appeals’ Reasoning (as summarized in the record)

The CA concluded that a real estate mortgage is void if the mortgagor is not the absolute owner. It held that the mortgage in question was procured through fraud by impostors who stole the owner’s duplicate title and forged respondent’s signature, and that the mortgage therefore was void. The CA relied on jurisprudence establishing that the mortgagee‑in‑good‑faith doctrine only protects those who rely on the face of a certificate of title where a voluntary instrument used to effect registration is not forged; when an instrument is forged, registration does not transfer rights to the assignee or mortgagee. The CA found the evidence — immigration entries, signature comparison, Bernal’s admission implicating Jennifer Ramirez, and the incongruity of signatures — sufficient to declare the mortgage forged and the registration null.

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA. It emphasized the limited role of the Court under Rule 45 (it does not re‑examine factual findings except in exceptional circumstances) and found no exceptional ground to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and CA that respondent was the true owner and that respondent’s signature on the mortgage was forged. The Court relied on P.D. 1529 Sec. 53 to hold that a registration procured by a forged deed is null and void. It reiterated that while the mortgagee‑in‑good‑faith doctrine protects persons who rely on the face of a Torrens title, that protection presupposes that the instrument presented for registration is not forged and

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