A.M. No. MTJ-16-1880 - Elgar vs. Santos, Jr.

Case Summary (A.M. No. MTJ-16-1880)

Factual Background and Events in Special Proceedings No. 1870

Elgar alleged that her deceased husband, Wenceslao F. Elgar, executed on August 18, 1999 a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa in her favor covering two parcels of agricultural land in San Jose, Nabua, Camarines Sur. On January 7, 2010, Elgar filed a petition for allowance of the deed before the MCTC, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1870. Acting Presiding Judge Bernhard B. Beltran had earlier declared the petition sufficient and had assumed jurisdiction, treating the case as one for probate.

Before the initial hearing, Judge Santos assumed his post. On August 19, 2010, Wenceslao V. Elgar, Jr. (the deceased’s son by his first marriage) appeared as oppositor. Judge Santos issued orders resetting the proceedings, directing the parties to submit position papers, and urging amicable settlement with proposed terms and conditions. Elgar asserted that Judge Santos exhibited a continuous advocacy to settle the case, including through notices/writings and through papers directed to litigants and lawyers, as well as persistent text messaging to counsel to pursue settlement.

Elgar further recounted multiple instances of alleged overreach and improper pressure. Judge Santos allegedly advised the oppositor to bring co-heirs residing in the United States of America for inclusion in the estate. He purportedly also advanced a view that the proceeding should not be confined solely to the validity of the deed, warning against “bloody and prolonged litigation,” and pushing the parties to comply with prescribed pre-trial brief outlines. The preliminary conference and pre-trial proceedings were repeatedly reset. Elgar averred that some conferences did not proceed due to the oppositor’s absence or counsel’s absence, but she claimed that Judge Santos still dealt with her in chambers, proposed settlement options when the parties had not offered them, and later issued an order identifying properties for “swapping” and requirements for a written agreement as if the parties had already agreed.

Elgar also described further impropriety surrounding mediation and conferences. A Motion for Recusal was filed by the oppositor, and a Manifestation followed accusing Judge Santos of impropriety after an accidental meeting in Naga City where, according to Elgar, Judge Santos insisted on settlement. Judge Santos denied recusal. During the later preliminary conference, Elgar claimed she refused to participate, insisted she would not sign any document, and alleged that Judge Santos banged his arm on the table while badgering her until she cried, before resetting the conference.

Ultimately, after almost two years of pre-trial and preliminary conference activity, Judge Santos set presentation of evidence for the petitioner, then later reversed course and ordered a regular pre-trial hearing. Elgar opposed the manner in which the pre-trial was dictated, sought inhibition, and raised objections to the pre-trial approach. She later moved for withdrawal of the petition, and Judge Santos granted it on December 11, 2012. Elgar then protested the issuance of an Extended Order dated December 19, 2012, which she alleged castigated her counsel and cast aspersions on her character without any pending incident.

Respondent’s Position and Justifications

Judge Santos denied that he committed gross ignorance of the law or violated judicial ethics. He insisted that his persistent efforts at amicable settlement were directed at both parties and were within judicial duties to encourage equitable compromise. He invoked A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, asserting that courts should endeavor to make parties agree to an equitable compromise at any stage before judgment.

Judge Santos defended his various acts that Elgar characterized as grossly improper. He justified advising the oppositor to bring co-heirs abroad on the premise that the dispute concerned compulsory heirs and the rightful shares in the estate. He further defended not restricting the inquiry solely to the deed’s validity and explained that some submitted information concerned parcels allegedly relevant to the estate because one donated lot was allegedly already under the oppositor’s name.

He admitted texting counsel but characterized it as ordinary negotiation pressure in amicable settlement. He also asserted that meetings were not necessarily ex parte and that some were done separately with each party or with both present, framing these as mediation techniques allowed under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC. As to the “property swapping” order, Judge Santos claimed that the oppositor had made an oral proposal and that complainant’s silence amounted to acquiescence or estoppel.

Judge Santos likewise denied misconduct during conferences and denied that he banged his arm on the table. He attributed delays mainly to the posture of parties and counsel, citing non-appearances, non-submissions, unreadiness, and changes in handling counsel. He maintained that his decision to conduct pre-trial was legally grounded under Rule 18 as made applicable to special proceedings by Rule 72. He also claimed that complainant was estopped from questioning pre-trial after submitting a pre-trial brief and noted that complainant did not assail the resulting pre-trial order.

Regarding the Extended Order, Judge Santos argued that it was based on pride-related dynamics that allegedly caused prejudice to the petitioner’s cause, and he portrayed it as fraternal advice consistent with the record of events.

OCA Findings and Recommendations

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in a Report dated September 17, 2015, recommended that Judge Santos be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to simple misconduct, but it distinguished certain acts as not administratively actionable. The OCA did not hold him liable for (1) allowing the oppositor to bring co-heirs residing abroad; (2) not limiting determination to the deed’s validity; (3) requiring information on parcels not alleged in the petition; and (4) ordering a regular pre-trial in a special proceeding case, because those matters were judicial in nature and required correction through proper judicial remedies.

However, the OCA found liability for (1) stubborn persistence in forcing amicable settlement and (2) undue delay in terminating the preliminary conference. It reasoned that, although the intent to reconcile may not be malicious, the pattern of insistence derailed speedy disposition. It observed that from filing of the petition on January 7, 2010 until its withdrawal on December 11, 2012, the matter did not advance beyond the pre-trial stage. It also found that Judge Santos could not deny that both parties repeatedly made clear they did not want amicable settlement.

On the judicial ethics violations, the OCA concluded that Judge Santos violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 for issuing an Extended Order that scolded and lectured counsel after withdrawal of the petition and for sending text messages and conducting ex parte meetings/conferences. As for the charge of gross ignorance of the law, the OCA held that Judge Santos issued a prefabricated pre-trial order despite the pre-trial hearing not yet having been terminated and the oppositor having failed to file his pre-trial brief. For penalty, the OCA deemed a fine sufficient, recommending P30,000.00, with a reminder to be more circumspect in settlement efforts.

The Court’s Disposition: Partial Adoption and Doctrinal Adjustments

The Supreme Court partly adopted the OCA findings and recommendations, but it modified the legal treatment of certain charges.

First, the Court agreed with the OCA that Judge Santos should not be held administratively liable for conducting pre-trial in a special proceeding case, because Section 2, Rule 72 provides that in the absence of special provisions, rules for ordinary actions apply as far as practicable in special proceedings. The Court also agreed with the OCA that advising the complainant to bring her co-heirs abroad, not limiting the case solely to the deed’s validity, and requiring information on lots not clearly within the petition were judicial matters involving appreciation of a probate case. The Court emphasized that mere judicial error, without fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice, does not automatically warrant administrative sanction. It cited Salvador v. Judge Limsiaco, Jr., as quoted in Magdadaro v. Judge Saniel, Jr., to reiterate that judges are not administratively liable for every interpretive or appreciation mistake.

Nevertheless, the Court held that other acts could not be treated as mere judicial error. It ruled that Judge Santos committed serious ethical and procedural transgressions, which warranted administrative penalties.

Failure to Refer the Case to Court-Annexed Mediation Under A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA

A pivotal basis for liability was Judge Santos’s failure to refer the case to mediation under A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA. The Court stressed that the institutionalization of court-annexed mediation was adopted to decongest dockets and enhance access to justice, and that mediatable cases where amicable settlement is possible must be referred to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC). The Court held that the petition for allowance of a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa falls under the Rules on the Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons and is thus mediatable.

Since Judge Santos’s acts showed he discerned settlement possibilities, the Court found it improper that he did not refer the case to the PMC. It further held that Judge Santos could not plausibly feign ignorance of the mediation framework, noting that the Philippine Judicial Academy regularly conducted seminars on the implementation of judicial dispute resolution and that, as early as 2008, cases from MCTC Nabua-Bato had already been referred to the PMC. The Court therefore treated the om

Case Syllabus (A.M. No. MTJ-16-1880)

This administrative matter arose from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by Susan R. Elgar against Judge Soliman M. Santos, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Nabua-Bato, Camarines Sur, involving Special Proceedings No. 1870 on the petition for allowance of a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
The complainant charged the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
The Court proceeded with a review that partly adopted the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and modified the recommended liabilities through its own penalty framework.

Parties and Procedural Posture

The complainant was Susan R. Elgar, who moved against Judge Soliman M. Santos, Jr. in his judicial capacity in the MCTC.
The administrative case was decided En Banc, with Inting, J. as the ponente.
The OCA issued its Report on September 17, 2015, recommending liability for selected acts and a fine.
The Court’s disposition was anchored on a partial adoption of the OCA findings, while it affirmed some aspects and rejected others, notably those involving judicial discretion and judicial errors correctible in proper remedies.

Key Factual Allegations

The complainant alleged that her deceased husband executed a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa on August 18, 1999, and that she filed a petition for allowance on January 7, 2010, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1870.
The complainant alleged that Acting Presiding Judge Bernhard B. Beltran initially found the petition sufficient and assumed jurisdiction, but that Judge Santos assumed as regular presiding judge before the initial hearing.
The complainant alleged that Wenceslao V. Elgar, Jr., the oppositor and the deceased’s son by his first marriage, appeared and opposed on August 19, 2010.
The complainant alleged that Judge Santos persistently urged and pushed for amicable settlement, as reflected in posted notices, issuance of settlement-advocating papers, and text messages to counsel.
The complainant alleged multiple pre-trial and mediation-related resettings and conduct, including: repeated scheduling and postponement of conferences; meetings in chambers; and an accidental insistence on settlement during an occurrence in Naga City on August 4, 2011.
The complainant alleged that on one occasion Judge Santos banged his arm on the table and continued urging settlement despite her refusal to participate and refusal to sign anything.
The complainant alleged that after she withdrew her petition on December 11, 2012, the respondent issued an Extended Order on December 19, 2012 which allegedly castigated her counsel and attacked her character without an existing pending incident.
The complainant alleged that the respondent’s series of acts reflected adversely on the judiciary and demonstrated impropriety and disregard of legal and procedural standards.

Respondent’s Defenses and Explanations

The respondent denied gross ignorance of the law, arguing that his persistence to reach settlement was directed toward both parties.
The respondent invoked Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 03-1-09-SC, contending that the court must endeavor to make parties agree to an equitable compromise or settlement at any stage before judgment.
The respondent justified alleged overreach by invoking the nature of the matter as concerning compulsory heirs and rightful shares in the estate rather than merely the mechanical validity of the deed.
The respondent explained that he directed the oppositor to bring co-heirs residing in the USA because they were necessary for determining shares and properly involving rightful heirs.
The respondent argued that he required clarifications on additional lots because one of the donated properties was already in the name of the oppositor and the claims implicated estate elements beyond the deed’s immediate description.
The respondent admitted sending text messages to counsel but defended them as permissible mediation techniques not unethical in themselves.
The respondent denied ex parte impropriety in meetings, alleging that conferences were sometimes conducted with one party and sometimes with both parties present.
The respondent defended his April 26, 2011 order on the swapping proposal as arising from the oppositor’s oral proposal and as consistent with anticipated written formalization through an extrajudicial settlement framework.
The respondent denied coercion during the August 4, 2011 accidental meeting and characterized the episode as a chance to convey a consistent message favoring settlement.
The respondent argued that delay in terminating preliminary conference was not entirely attributable to him because postponements and non-appearances, non-submissions, and unreadiness of parties and counsel contributed to the timeline.
The respondent defended his decision to conduct a pre-trial by citing Section 2, Rule 72 (special proceedings) as incorporating, as far as practicable, rules for ordinary actions, and he maintained that pre-trial was consistent with Section 2, Rule 18.
The respondent asserted that the complainant was estopped from challenging pre-trial since she submitted a pre-trial brief and later proceeded with post-order motions only after adverse developments.
The respondent defended denial of inhibition based on his prior rulings on motions for recusal and inhibition, and he denied bias absent extrinsic evidence of malice or corrupt purpose.
The respondent explained the Extended Order as an attempt to address pride and prejudice in counsel’s conduct after denial of inhibition, and he framed it as sincere fraternal advice rather than improper browbeating.

OCA’s Findings and Recommendations

The OCA recommended that the respondent be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to simple misconduct.
The OCA did not hold the respondent liable for acts that the OCA characterized as judicial in nature, including: allowing co-heirs residing abroad to be brought to court; not limiting determinations to the deed’s validity; requiring information about seven parcels not named in the petition; and ordering a regular pre-trial in a special proceeding.
The OCA held the respondent liable for: stubborn persistence in making parties agree to amicably settle; and undue delay in terminating the preliminary conference.
The OCA found that although judges may promote conciliation, the unrelenting effort derailed the speedy disposition of the case.
The OCA emphasized the timeline from the complaint filing in January 2013 and the case progress from January 7, 2010 to December 11, 2012—with the case never going beyond the pre-trial stage before the withdrawal.
The OCA treated the respondent’s issuance of an Extended Order as a violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 because it scolded and lectured counsel and was issued after the granting of withdrawal, allegedly without continuing occasion.
The OCA also considered the respondent’s texts and ex parte meetings and conferences as conduct violating judicial conduct s