G.R. No. 246942 - People vs. Josephine Angsico, Virgilio vs. Dacalos, Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr., and Noel A. Lobrido, Accused; Josephine Casenas-Hottle, et al.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 246942)

Petitioner

Leo Echegaray

Respondents

Secretary of Justice et al.

Key Dates

October 12, 1998: Decision upholding constitutionality of RA 8177 except for certain implementing rules.
November 6, 1998: Decision became final and executory.
December 28, 1998: Very Urgent Motion for TRO filed by petitioner.
January 4, 1999: En banc issued Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) suspending execution.
January 19, 1999: En banc resolution on respondents’ motion for reconsideration, lifting the TRO.

Applicable Law

1987 Philippine Constitution (judicial power, separation of powers, right to information).
Republic Act No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law).
Republic Act No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law).
Supreme Court Rules, particularly Rule 135 Sec. 6 (auxiliary writs) and Rule 120 (criminal judgments).
Constitutional provisions on reprieves and pardons (Art. VII, Sec. 19), right to information (Art. III, Sec. 7; Art. II, Sec. 28), and procedural safeguards.

Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion

Respondents argued the TRO usurped executive authority over execution of a final judgment, would encourage endless litigation, and was rendered unnecessary by presidential and congressional assurances against repeal or modification of the death-penalty law.

Petitioner’s Opposition

Echegaray maintained that issuing a stay of execution lies squarely within judicial power, does not trench on executive or legislative prerogatives, and that the possibility of legislative repeal or amendment remains sufficiently plausible to warrant the TRO.

Jurisdiction to Control Execution of Final Decisions

The Court reaffirmed its inherent and constitutional authority to enforce, supervise, and—in exceptional circumstances—temporarily suspend its own judgments even after finality. Finality bars only alteration or amendment of a decision, not the exercise of jurisdiction over its execution. Rule 135 Sec. 6 endorses use of all writs and processes necessary to effectuate judicial jurisdiction.

Separation of Powers and Co-ordinate Functions

The Court rejected the notion that only the President may stay a death sentence. Judicial intervention to suspend execution coexists with executive writs of reprieve and legislative power to amend penal statutes. All three branches may act to protect the convict’s right to life without usurping each other’s constitutional roles.

Circumstances Surrounding the TRO

Faced with credible allegations—sworn and widely publicized—that the newly constituted Congress might revisit or repeal the death penalty law, and with only hours before the scheduled execution, the Court took a cautious approach. The TRO was limited in duration (until June 15, 1999) to allow legislative certainty to emerge.

Subsequent Developments and Lifting of the TRO

House Resolution No. 25, overwhelmingly adopted, expressed no intent to review RA 7659; the President publicly pledged to veto any repeal. These supervening events satisfied the condition upon which the TRO had been granted, prompting the Court to lift the stay and

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 246942)

Facts and Context

Petitioner Leo Echegaray was sentenced to death on automatic review (G.R. No. 117472).
He assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules in G.R. No. 132601.
On October 12, 1998, the Supreme Court rendered a decision:
• RA 8177 is not unconstitutional;
• Sections 17 and 19 of the implementing rules are invalid;
• Enforcement of RA 8177 stayed until those sections were amended.
The decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998.
Secretary of Justice filed compliance and published the amended rules on October 21 and October 28, 1998.

Procedural History

December 7 and 8, 1998: Petitioner’s counsel and Secretary of Justice sought disclosure of the execution date.
December 15, 1998: Supreme Court ordered the trial court to reveal the execution date.
December 28, 1998: Petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO, citing legislative moves to review or repeal the death penalty law.
January 4, 1999: Supreme Court issued a TRO temporarily restraining execution until June 15, 1999 or earlier if legislative inaction became certain.
January 4, 1999: Public respondents filed Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion.
January 19, 1999: En banc resolution granting motions to lift the TRO and ordering a new execution date.

Public Respondents’ Arguments

Final and executory decision falls within executive domain for execution; TRO intrudes on executive power.
TRO sets a precedent for perpetual litigation, as Congress might always revise laws.
Congress already extensively debated death penalty before RA 7659; new debates are speculative.
Application of maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito: courts must not look forward to future legislative action.
Supervening events make repeal or amendment impossible:
• President Estrada’s vow to veto repeal;
• House Resolution No. 629 (113 members) opposing review;
• Senator Roco’s resolution lacks majority support.

Petitioner’s Counterarguments

Issuance of a stay is within the Court’s judicial power and duty.
The stay was a reasonable exercise of authority in light of pending legislative activity.
The Court retained jurisdiction to address incidental matters arising from the petition.
Public respondents are estopped from contesting the Court’s jurisdiction after seeking its aid.
Uncertainty remains whether Congress will repeal or modify the death penalty within six months.

Issues Presented

Does the Supreme Court retain jurisdiction to restrain execution after a final, executory judgment?
Does issuing a TRO in