Title
Ducusin vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. L-58286
Decision Date
May 16, 1983
Lessor terminated month-to-month lease citing son’s need for premises; ejectment suit upheld by Supreme Court, ruling resolutory condition valid, need proven, and lease not covered by rent control.
lease contract
termination
apartment
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-58286)

Factual Background

On February 20, 1975, petitioner Agapito Ducusin leased to the spouses Virgilio S. Baliola and Lilia S. Baliola a one-door apartment unit under Exhibit “A”, with a monthly rental of P220.00. The contract bound the lessees to pay rent on time and provided that the term ran on a month-to-month basis, beginning February 19, 1975, until terminated by the lessor upon specified grounds. The lease further warranted that the leased premises would be used exclusively as residence and expressly forbade subleasing, assignment, transfer, or any encumbrance of the right of lease. The contract also allocated utilities and repair responsibilities, with major repairs appearing to be excluded from the lessees’ burden.

For almost two years, the Baliola spouses occupied and paid rentals. On January 18, 1977, petitioners sent a written “Notice to Terminate Lease Contract” to the respondents, terminating the lease and giving them until March 15, 1977 to vacate. The stated reason was that the lessor’s two children were getting married and would need the apartment for their own use and residence. A second letter dated February 14, 1977 sought information on whether the respondents had taken action in response to the termination notice. The respondents did not respond to that notice. Instead, they wrote to the Secretary of National Defense reporting that the lessor intended to evict them from the premises.

Consequently, on April 14, 1977, petitioners filed an ejectment action in the City Court of Manila, Branch XVI. The complaint alleged that the apartment complex was constructed for the use and residence of petitioners’ children and that unit 3319-A had been allotted to Agapito Ducusin, Jr., who had decided to live independently upon his marriage in May 1977. The complaint also alleged violations of the lease terms: subleasing, use of the premises for commercial or manufacturing purposes, and neglect to undertake repairs as agreed.

Trial Court Proceedings

The respondents denied the allegations and argued that the ejectment suit was intended to evict them through a scheme to circumvent laws that allegedly prohibited raising apartment rentals. The City Court of Manila, Branch XVI ruled for the lessor. It held that the lessees’ lease contract had already terminated with the lessor’s notice of termination premised on the ground that he needed the premises for his children.

The City Court’s dispositive portion ordered the respondents and all persons claiming possession under them to vacate and surrender possession to petitioners. It further ordered payment of P220.00 monthly as compensation for use of the premises starting December 1978 until final vacation and surrender, reimbursement of P263.29 for expenses for the booster pump, and P700.00 as attorney’s fees plus costs.

Appeal and Issues Raised

The lessees appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVI, assigning as errors: (a) the failure to find that the lease fell within the ambit of P.D. No. 20; (b) the finding that the lessor’s need was lawful and valid and sufficiently proved; (c) the propriety of damages for reimbursement of booster pump expenses and attorney’s fees; and (d) the denial of the lessees’ counterclaim.

The CFI affirmed. It adopted findings that the lessor’s allegation of need for immediate family members constituted a cause to eject; it treated the marriage of Agapito Ducusin, Jr. as proved through testimony and supporting evidence; and it treated as admitted the existence of a verbal agreement to share booster pump expenses.

Unsatisfied, the lessees then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals framed the controversy as involving (1) whether an owner could unilaterally terminate the lease under its terms; and (2) whether the resolutory condition relating to the family need had been established by a preponderance of evidence.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals sustained the lease clause’s validity. It examined the lease provision that termination could be effected by the lessor on the ground that his children needed the premises for their own use or residence or on any ground allowed by law. It considered the contract’s agreed “causes” of extinguishment, including termination when the lessor elected to end the lease on the ground that his children needed the premises. Applying principles from the Civil Code—including Art. 1308 and Art. 1182—the Court of Appeals reasoned that the resolutory condition was not dependent solely on the lessor’s will because it depended on the will of the lessor’s children. In its view, when the children required the premises for their own use, the lease would be deemed terminated.

However, on the evidentiary question, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts. It concluded that the respondents did not prove by a preponderance of evidence the alleged need of the immediate members of the lessor’s family. It pointed to procedural and evidentiary gaps: no proof of the marriage of Agapito Ducusin, Jr. was presented from the filing of the case until much later; the evidence of marriage consisted largely of photographs and a marriage certificate introduced only after a motion to reopen for rebuttal evidence; and it characterized certain materials as self-serving and hearsay, invoking Rule 130, Sec. 30 on testimony generally confined to personal knowledge and hearsay exclusion. It also noted that Agapito Ducusin, Jr. did not appear in the trial court and that the father’s account of the younger son’s whereabouts and marriage intentions was treated with skepticism. The Court of Appeals further added that even if the marriage were established, the lessor allegedly failed to show that the one-door apartment was the only place available for Agapito Ducusin, Jr. It therefore modified the trial court’s ejectment judgment by dismissing the complaint for ejectment while still ordering reimbursement for booster pump expenses and future sharing until termination of the lease contract.

Parties’ Contentions Before the Supreme Court

In seeking reversal, petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in its evidentiary and legal determinations. They asserted, among others, that the contract expired by the passage of the lease’s period and by the giving of notice to vacate, regardless of the respondents’ position on the truth of the claimed need. They also maintained that the evidence supporting the third cause of action was sufficient to show the need of the premises for personal use and occupation. Finally, they argued that the existence of the lease provision negated the claim that “house rental laws” had been violated.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its appraisal of the evidence on the resolutory condition and in its restrictive application of evidentiary rules.

First, the Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ premise that the weight of the evidence turned on hearsay exclusion. The Supreme Court found that the testimony of petitioner Agapito Ducusin, Sr. should have received weight because he testified that his son Agapito Ducusin, Jr. had married Adela Villacorta on November 25, 1978 in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, at St. Anthony Church. The Supreme Court noted that he stated he personally knew the fact of marriage because he was present at the wedding ceremony. It further observed that the wedding photographs marked Exhibits “H,” “I,” “J,” and “J-1” were taken after the ceremony and that he identified himself in a photograph marked Exhibit “J.”

Second, the Supreme Court addressed the evidentiary nature of the materials. It held that the testimony of Arturo Ducusin, a brother of Agapito Ducusin, Jr., could be considered as an act or declaration about pedigree, which it treated as covering relationship, family genealogy, marriage, dates and places where those facts occurred, and relatives’ names. It also sustained the legal admissibility of the presentation and consideration of the marriage certificate and the evidence noted by the trial courts.

The Supreme Court thus ruled that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in excluding and discounting the evidence described above, and it concluded that the intention to use the leased premises as the residence of Ducusin, Jr. had been proven by clear, strong, and substantial evidence on the record. In its view, the combination of petitioners’ testimonial proof of marriage and the circumstances of intent—together with documentary evidence showing the younger son’s plan to settle in the Philippines—competently established the intent to reside in the premises and use them for residence and for the household life with his wife.

Third, the Supreme Court agreed with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in treating the lease as though it were within the general protective coverage of P.D. No. 20. It held that the Court of Appeals’ view that the lease’s arrangement did not qualify for the exception was not in line with controlling doctrine. The Supreme Court pointed out that the lease was month-to-month and yet also involved a definite period in the sense recognized by jurisprudence. It relied on Rantael vs. Court of Appeals and Teresa Llave, L-47519, April 30, 1980, 97 SCRA 453, treating it as “squarely on all fours” with the present case. The Supreme Court adopted the approach that judicial ejectment lies as an exception where the lease is for a definite period or where the fixed or definite period has expired, even if ordinary landlord-tenant rules might otherwise restrict ejectment.

Fourth, the Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ factual conclusion that the lessor failed to show the premises were the only available place for Agapito Ducusin, Jr. It found in the record that the lessor owned an eight-door apartment building, that three doors had become untenantable due to wear and tear, and that the remaining five doors wer

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