Title
Du vs. Jayoma
Case
G.R. No. 175042
Decision Date
Apr 23, 2012
Petitioner's unauthorized cockpit operation post-1992 led to suspension; SC upheld CA, denying damages as no legal right existed.
public bidding
cockpit operation
legal requirements
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 175042)

Enactment of Municipal Regulation and the Initial Authority to Operate

On July 7, 1988, the SB enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1988, requiring a public bidding for the operation of a cockpit in Mabini every four years. For the period January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992, the winning bidder was Engr. Edgardo Carabuena. When Carabuena failed to comply with legal requirements to operate a cockpit, the SB adopted Resolution No. 127, series of 1988 on December 1, 1988, authorizing petitioner to continue his cockpit operation until the winning bidder complied with the legal requirements.

Suspension and the Mayor’s Enforcement Order

On July 9, 1997, the SB discovered that petitioner was operating his cockpit in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1988. It then passed Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, suspending petitioner’s cockpit operation effective upon approval. On July 11, 1997, Mayor Jayoma, acting on Municipal Resolution No. 065, ordered petitioner, through a letter, to desist from holding any cockfighting activity effective immediately.

The Petition for Prohibition and Request for Provisional Relief

Petitioner, feeling aggrieved, filed with Branch 51 of the RTC of Bohol a Petition for Prohibition, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 4, against Mayor Jayoma and nine SB members. He sought a preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from suspending his cockpit operation. Petitioner asserted that he had a business permit to operate until December 31, 1997 and that Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997 was unlawfully issued because it deprived him of due process.

Respondents’ Answer: Authority of the SB and Executive Enforcement Power

In their Answer, respondents argued that under the LGC of 1991, the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of a cockpit belonged to the SB. They further contended that the mayor’s order suspending petitioner’s cockpit operation was an exercise of executive authority to regulate the establishment of cockpits pursuant to SB ordinances and resolutions. Respondents also argued that Municipal Resolution No. 065 did not require approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because it was not an ordinance but an expression of sentiments of the SB of Mabini.

Temporary Restraining Order and the Later Inclusion of Damages

The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order on October 22, 1997, enjoining respondents from suspending petitioner’s cockpit operation pending further court orders. Petitioner later amended the petition to include a claim for damages, and the RTC admitted the damages claim in an Order dated January 21, 1998.

RTC Decision Awarding Moral, Unearned, Exemplary, and Attorney’s Fees

On October 5, 2004, the RTC ruled for petitioner. It found that petitioner proved his case by a preponderance of evidence and ordered respondents, jointly and severally, to pay: P20,000.00 as moral damages; P60,000.00 as unearned income, computed from petitioner’s claim that he lost P4,000.00 for each of 15 Sundays when his cockpit was closed due to respondents’ suspension; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus costs.

CA Reversal: No Vested Right and No Cause of Action for Damages

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA held that petitioner did not acquire a vested right to operate a cockpit because he was granted only a temporary privilege by the SB. Since petitioner had no right in esse, the CA concluded that he was not entitled to damages. It set aside the RTC’s award of damages and dismissed petitioner’s petition. The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated October 4, 2006.

Core Issue Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the core issue of whether the CA erred in ruling that petitioner was not entitled to damages.

Petitioner’s Position: Alleged Ultra Vires Resolution and Due Process Deprivation

Petitioner argued that Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997 was ultra vires, and he alleged that it was maliciously, hastily, and unlawfully enforced by the mayor only two days after its passage without review or approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bohol. He maintained that respondents suspended his cockpit operation without due process and that the action was politically motivated. On that basis, he sought actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Respondents’ Position: No Vested Right and Suspension Pursuant to Law

Respondents echoed the CA ruling and maintained that petitioner was not entitled to damages because he did not acquire a vested right to operate a cockpit. They asserted that the suspension was in line with law and existing ordinances and resolutions adopted by the SB and implemented by the mayor.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling: Absence of a Legal Right Defeats the Cause of Action

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Applying the elements of a cause of action, the Court held that a cause of action requires, among others, a right in favor of the plaintiff and an act or omission by the defendant violating that right and causing injury or damage for which the plaintiff may sue. The Court then found that petitioner had no legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality. It explained that Resolution No. 127, series of 1988 allowed petitioner to continue operating only because the winning bidder for January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992 had not complied with the legal requirements. The Court interpreted the resolution as limiting petitioner’s authority to either December 31, 1992 or to the moment the winning bidder complied with the legal requirements, whichever came first. Thus, the Court treated petitioner’s continued operation until July 1997 as attributable to the SB’s failure to monitor cockpit status.

The Court further held that even if petitioner obtained a business permit from the mayor for January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997, such permit did not constitute a license to operate a cockpit. It relied on Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC, which empowered the SB to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits and to regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks. The Court noted that no public bidding was conducted for cockpit operation from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, and therefore petitioner could not claim lawful authorization for the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997.

Validity of Municipal Resolution No. 065 and the Presumption of Regularity

The Supreme Court concluded that the SB members had reason to suspend petitioner’s operation by enacting Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997. It also held that as chief executive, Mayor Jayoma had the duty to enforce the suspension pursuant to that resolution. The Court emphasized that petitioner presented no evidence showing that, upon review by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bohol, the resolution was declared invalid, nor any proof that it was issued beyond the SB’s or the mayor’s powers. The Court invoked the jurisprudential principle that ordinances, or in that case resolutions, are presumed valid absent evidence to the contrary.

License as a Mere Privilege Subject to Revocation for Public Interest

The Court also reiterated the doctrine that a license to operate and exploit a cockpit is not property within the

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.

About Privacy Terms