Title
Drilon vs. Lim
Case
G.R. No. 112497
Decision Date
Aug 4, 1994
Supreme Court upheld Section 187 of the Local Government Code as constitutional, affirming the Secretary of Justice's supervisory role over local tax ordinances, while ruling Manila complied with procedural requirements for its revenue code.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 112497)

Petitioner’s Action and Administrative Determination

Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, Secretary Drilon, on appeal by four oil companies and a taxpayer, reviewed Ordinance No. 7794 and declared the Manila Revenue Code null and void. The Secretary’s annulment rested on findings of (a) non-compliance with the procedural requirements prescribed for enactment of tax ordinances and (b) inclusion of provisions that were ultra vires or contrary to law and public policy.

Lower Court Ruling and Its Constitutional Finding

The Regional Trial Court (Manila) in a petition for certiorari revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. The trial court also declared Section 187 unconstitutional insofar as it vested the Secretary of Justice with power to review and annul local tax ordinances, holding that such power constituted “control” over local governments in violation of the constitutional policy of local autonomy and the specific allocation of supervisory power to the President.

Central Legal Questions

The case presents two principal issues: (1) whether Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional under the framework of local autonomy and the separation of supervisory versus control functions; and (2) whether the procedural requirements for the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code were complied with.

Applicable Constitution and Relevant Provisions

The decision was rendered in 1994; therefore the 1987 Constitution is the constitutional basis relied upon. The case discusses Article X (local government) — specifically Section 4 (the President’s power of general supervision over local governments) and Section 5 (local taxing powers subject to guidelines and limitations) — and the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality as reflected in the pertinent constitutional provision cited by the Court. Section 187 of the Local Government Code (text reproduced in the record) prescribes mandatory public hearings and provides for appeals to the Secretary of Justice on questions of constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances, with prescribed time frames and without suspending effectivity of the ordinance.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The Supreme Court held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain constitutional questions concerning Section 187, noting BP 129’s grant of jurisdiction to regional trial courts in appropriate civil matters and the accused’s right to question the constitutionality of laws in criminal actions. The Court emphasized the settled standard: courts should exercise caution before declaring a law unconstitutional, honoring the presumption of constitutionality that can be overcome only by the clearest showing of an infraction of the Constitution, and recognizing that final determination is best made by a collegiate body.

The Distinction Between Control and Supervision

The Court reiterated the established distinction: “control” implies the superior’s power to alter, modify or set aside subordinate acts and to substitute the superior’s judgment for that of the subordinate; “supervision” means ensuring that lower officers perform functions in accordance with law, without prescribing procedures or substituting judgment. The trial court’s characterization of Section 187 as an act of control was examined against this distinction.

Application of the Distinction to Section 187

The Court found that Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances and, if warranted, to revoke them on those grounds. That authority, as used by Secretary Drilon in this instance, was confined to determining legality and constitutionality — whether prescribed procedures and substantive legal limits had been followed — and did not grant the Secretary latitude to annul ordinances based on policy, wisdom, or reasonableness. Because the Secretary did not substitute his own policy judgments for those of the local government but only assessed legal compliance, his act was characterized as supervision rather than control.

Comparison with a Prior Statutory Provision (Local Autonomy Act)

The Court contrasted Section 187 with an earlier provision of the Local Autonomy Act that gave the Secretary of Finance authority to suspend the effectivity of an ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax was unjust, excessive, oppressive or contrary to national economic policy. That earlier provision conferred discretionary judgmental power that arguably amounted to control. Section 187, by contrast, does not authorize the Secretary of Justice to make such discretionary assessments; it confines review to legality and constitutionality. The Court noted the distinction and found Section 187 less intrusive.

Procedural-Compliance Findings Concerning the Manila Revenue Code

Secretary Drilon had found several procedural lapses (absence of written notices of public hearings required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules, lack of publication in three successive issues required by Art. 276(a), absence of minutes, failure to post the approved ordinance as required by Sec. 511(a), and lack of Pilipino/Tagalog translation under Sec. 59(b)). The trial court disagreed and the Supreme Court ordered elevation of exhibits submitted by the City of Manila. After examining those exhibits, the Court concluded that required notices of p

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