Title
Re: Draft Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service's Rules on Preliminary Investigations and Inquest Proceedings
Case
A.M. No. 24-02-09-SC
Decision Date
May 28, 2024
The Supreme Court recognized the DOJ's authority to promulgate new rules for preliminary investigations, allowing for the repeal of inconsistent provisions in Rule 112 of the current Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Case Summary (A.M. No. 24-02-09-SC)

Proponent and Institutional Positions

Proponent: Department of Justice — submitted a draft DOJ Circular and final version of the DOJ‑NPS Rules concerning the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings by the National Prosecution Service. Court role: the Sub‑Committee solicited and forwarded the banc’s comments to the DOJ, and the Court, sitting en banc, addressed recognition of the DOJ’s authority and the effect on Rule 112.

Key Dates and Correspondence

  • October 27, 2023: Chief Justice transmitted banc comments to Usec. Vasquez (DOJ).
  • January 22, 2024: Usec. Vasquez notified the Court of DOJ matters adopted from the Court’s comments and furnished the DOJ‑NPS Rules final version.
  • February 7, 2024: Chief Justice urged the banc to recognize the DOJ’s authority to promulgate the DOJ‑NPS Rules.
  • May 28, 2024: The Court issued the en banc Resolution recognizing the DOJ’s authority and directing the repeal of provisions of Rule 112 inconsistent with the DOJ‑NPS Rules.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

Because the decision date is in 2024, the Court’s action is grounded in the 1987 Constitution. The Resolution references statutes and rules that have historically governed preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings, including the 1940, 1964, 1985, and 2000 rules; Republic Act No. 296 as amended by RA No. 3828 (Judiciary Act of 1948); Batas Pambansa Blg. 29 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) and Blg. 129 (1981); Republic Act No. 732; Republic Act No. 5180 (as amended); and Republic Act No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010). The Court also relied on controlling jurisprudence construing the nature of preliminary investigation and the allocation of authority between the Executive and Judicial branches.

Historical Definition and Purpose of Preliminary Investigation

The Resolution traces the evolution of the definition and jurisprudential understanding of preliminary investigation from the 1940 Rules of Court through the 1985 and 2000 Rules. Historically, preliminary investigation has been defined as an inquiry to determine whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well‑founded belief that a crime cognizable by a trial court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty, warranting holding for trial. The Court reiterated that the quantum of evidence required is enough to engender a well‑founded belief (probable cause), not the higher thresholds applied in earlier decades.

Statutory and Rule‑based Allocation of Authority Over Time

The Resolution outlines how authority to conduct preliminary investigations was originally shared among various judicial officers (justices of the peace, municipal judges, provincial fiscals, etc.) under early Rules of Court and statutory enactments. Over time, legislation and rule revisions expanded prosecutorial authority (e.g., provincial and city fiscals, state prosecutors, National Prosecution Service obligations under RA 10071). The 2000 Rules initially listed both prosecutors and certain judges among officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation; a 2005 amendment removed judges of certain trial courts from that list, reflecting a trend toward prosecutorial primacy.

When Preliminary Investigation Is Required

Under the 2000 Rules (as amended), preliminary investigation is required for offenses punishable by imprisonment of at least four years, two months, and one day, irrespective of fines. The Resolution notes that this threshold was retained following the 2005 amendments.

Jurisprudential Shift: Preliminary Investigation as an Executive Function

The Resolution summarizes the Court’s jurisprudence establishing that preliminary investigation is an executive, not a judicial, function. Key cited authorities include Salta v. Court of Appeals (1986), People v. Navarro (1997), and Chan y Lim v. Secretary of Justice (2008). The Court explained that preliminary investigation is intended to protect both the accused (from unnecessary trials) and the State (from useless prosecutions), and that the determination of probable cause is fundamentally prosecutorial. Consequently, the Court has adopted a policy of non‑interference in the prosecutor’s conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

Recognition of the DOJ’s Authority to Promulgate Rules

Relying on the executive nature of preliminary investigation and the DOJ’s statutory mandate (notably under RA 10071) to direct and control prosecution and preliminary investigation, the Court expressly recognized the DOJ’s authority to promulgate the 2024 DOJ‑NPS Rules on Preliminary Investigations and Inquest Proceedings. The Court emphasized deference to the DOJ’s internal rules so long as their application is not tainted by grave abuse of discretion.

Effect on Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

To avoid conflict between the DOJ‑NPS Rules and the Court’s Rule 112, the Court resolved to repeal, once the DOJ promulgates the 2024 DOJ‑NPS Rules, the provisions of Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure that are inconsistent with the DOJ‑NPS Rules. The Resolution clarifies that: (1) the promulgation of the DOJ‑NPS Rules does not automatically repeal Rule 112; (2) only the Supreme Court may repeal its own procedural rules; and (3) the Court, exercising that authority, deemed repeal of inconsistent portions warranted to prevent impediments to DOJ implementation.

Limits on Repeal and Preservation of Judicial Rule‑making Authority

The Resolution explicitly preserves the Court’s exclusive constitutional power to promulgate rules of procedure. Citing Estipona v. Hon. Lobrigo (2017), the Court acknowledged that it alone can amend or repeal rules of pleading, practice, and procedure. The Court’s action to repeal inconsistent portions of Rule 112 is therefore an exercise of its exclusive rule‑making authority, undertaken to harmonize Court procedure w

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