Title
Dorado vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 216671
Decision Date
Oct 3, 2016
A 16-year-old minor, Jerwin Dorado, was initially convicted of frustrated murder for shooting Ronald Bonion. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling Dorado exempt from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 due to lack of discernment. The crime was reclassified as frustrated homicide, and Dorado was referred to an intervention program but ordered to pay civil indemnity and moral damages.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 215305)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

Facts occurred on March 15, 2004. Arraignment occurred November 9, 2004. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Taguig City, Branch 163, rendered judgment on July 5, 2010. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed on August 8, 2014 and denied reconsideration on January 29, 2015. The Supreme Court decision reviewed is dated October 3, 2016.

Charges and Informations

Two informations were filed: Criminal Case No. 127784 charged Dorado and others with frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2 of the RPC, alleging qualifying circumstance(s) including treachery and evident premeditation, nighttime, and use of an improvised shotgun (sumpak). Criminal Case No. 127785 charged the same group with violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 for acts of cruelty (stone‑throwing) against Raniel Parino.

Prosecution Evidence

Prosecution witnesses (including Ronald, his brother Robert, Raniel, and Dr. Ronaldo Artes) testified that on the evening in question Dorado’s group threw stones and bottles at Ronald’s group; Dorado allegedly carried and fired a sumpak, hitting Ronald between the eyes. Ronald sustained severe ocular and cranial injuries, lost his left eye and retained only light perception in the right eye, required surgeries and one month’s hospitalization. Dr. Artes testified that timely medical intervention prevented death.

Defense Evidence

The defense presented alibi and denial testimony: Dorado and several family members and acquaintances testified he was at home watching television between approximately 8:00 and 11:00 p.m.; barangay tanods who arrived allegedly blamed him but no sumpak was taken from his house; witnesses for co‑accused denied being present at the crime scene; Ofelia testified she saw five persons and identified an assailant who was not Dorado and stated she could recognize the shooter.

RTC Ruling and Rationale

The RTC convicted Dorado of frustrated murder, crediting prosecution witnesses on identification and concluding the act satisfied the frustrated stage because Ronald survived due to medical intervention. The RTC found evident premeditation (ongoing feud, Dorado allegedly holding a sumpak beforehand, waiting for Ronald to reappear, and then shooting). The RTC appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority but did not suspend sentence because Dorado was over 21 at pronouncement. Co‑accused were acquitted on reasonable doubt; the R.A. 7610 charge failed due to lack of proof of complainant’s minority.

CA Ruling and Rationale

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC, finding intent to kill and that the shooting would have caused death but for medical aid. The CA upheld evident premeditation (observing that Dorado waited for Ronald to come out) and rejected the alibi because Dorado’s residence was one block from the talipapa, making presence at the scene physically possible.

Issue Presented on Review

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming Dorado’s conviction for the charged crime.

Parties’ Arguments Before the Supreme Court

Petitioner argued that alibi and denial were credible (Ofelia’s testimony excluded Dorado as the shooter and no sumpak was recovered from his home), and thus identification was unreliable. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintained that identification was positive, that intent to kill was present, and that timely medical intervention prevented death; the OSG also acknowledged (in its CA brief) that shooting might not have been attended by evident premeditation and recommended a reduction in penalty.

Supreme Court’s Disposition — Overarching Outcome

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the conviction on the ground that Dorado was exempt from criminal liability by reason of minority under R.A. No. 9344, since the prosecution failed to prove that the then‑16‑year‑old acted with discernment. The Court ordered referral of Dorado to the local social welfare and development officer for appropriate intervention and imposed civil liabilities (P30,000 civil indemnity and P30,000 moral damages, with 6% interest per annum from finality) consistent with People v. Jugueta. Copies of the decision were to be furnished to both houses of Congress.

Legal Basis for Applying R.A. No. 9344 Retroactively

The Supreme Court applied R.A. No. 9344 retroactively to Dorado’s case pursuant to the penal law principle that statutes favorable to the accused are to be applied retroactively (favorabilia sunt amplianda). Although the law was enacted in 2006 and the incident occurred in 2004, the benefit of the lighter treatment for minors was afforded because the accused was a child in conflict with the law (CICL) at the time of the offense.

R.A. No. 9344: Substance and Procedural Protections for CICL

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (as discussed by the Court) provides: (1) children 15 years or under at the time of the offense are exempt from criminal liability and instead subjected to intervention programs; (2) children above 15 and below 18 are likewise exempt unless they acted with discernment, in which case appropriate proceedings may be pursued. The Act emphasizes diversion, intervention, suspension of sentence upon conviction, and liberal construction in favor of the CICL.

Discernment Requirement and Burden of Proof

The Court emphasized that for minors aged above 15 but below 18 the prosecution bears the burden to establish, as a separate element, that the child acted with discernment (mental capacity to know right from wrong) at the time of the offense. Discernment is not synonymous with intent and cannot be presumed. The Court cited legislative history, JJWC Resolution No. 03‑2006 (guidelines for transitory implementation), and jurisprudence (e.g., Doquena, Guevarra v. Almodovar, Jose v. People) to show that discernment must be proven by competent evidence drawn from the child’s appearance, conduct and other surrounding circumstances before, during and after the act.

Application of the Discernment Standard to Dorado

The Supreme Court found no record evidence that the prosecution specifically established Dorado’s discernment. The RTC’s judgment acknowledged minority as a mitigating circumstance but did not make the required discernment determination. Given the absence of proof and the presumption in favor of the child under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court concluded Dorado must be deemed to have acted without discernment and therefore be exempted from criminal liability.

Evident Premeditation: Legal Elements and Court’s Analysis

Evident premeditation requires proof of: (1) when the accused resolved to commit the crime, (2) an act manifesting persistence in that resolution, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between resolution and execution to permit reflection. The Court held the prosecution

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