G.R. No. 109376 - Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

Case Summary (G.R. No. 109376)

Procedural History and Applicable Law

The complaint originally named Ferdinand E. Marcos, Rodolfo M. Cuenca, and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr. as respondents. Marcos was dropped from the complaint in 1987 due to lack of jurisdiction after he left the country. Domingo was subpoenaed but not served because he was no longer connected with PNB at the location specified. Administrative Order No. 1 (1988) authorized the Special Prosecutor’s Office to continue preliminary investigations of pending cases. Domingo was eventually impleaded on February 6, 1992, and filed his counter-affidavit on March 9, 1992. The Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended charges against him on July 9, 1992. The information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on July 30, 1992, docketed as Criminal Case No. 17847.

The relevant legal provisions include Section 3(e) and Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. Section 3(e) penalizes a public officer who causes undue injury or gives unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Section 4(a) prohibits private individuals from exploiting close personal relations with public officials to obtain advantages in government transactions. The prescriptive period was considered under R.A. No. 3019 as originally ten years, later extended to fifteen by BP Blg. 195 (1982). Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation and interruption of prescription in special cases.

Issue on Prescription

Domingo argued that the offense was already extinguished by prescription, claiming the prescriptive period started in July 1980 when the alleged crime occurred and was tolled only in 1992 upon his impleading. He contended the filing of the original complaint in 1987 had no effect in interrupting prescription because the Office of the Special Prosecutor was divested of authority to conduct preliminary investigations in February 1987 without the Ombudsman’s authorization.

The Court rejected this contention, noting the prescriptive period must be computed from the discovery of the offense if the crime was not known at the time of commission. Since the alleged transactions involved a conspiracy between public officials and private individuals to commit fraud, the government could not have discovered the violations until after the 1986 People Power Revolution and the filing of the complaint in 1987. Prescription was interrupted when legal proceedings were instituted against Domingo, either in 1987 or 1992, rendering any argument of prescription premature. Thus, the motion to quash based on prescription was properly denied.

Sufficiency of Facts in the Information

Domingo also moved to quash the information for failure to allege facts constituting an offense. The Court reiterated that a motion to quash on this ground must be resolved based on the allegations in the information, assuming their truth. The information must allege ultimate facts to establish the essential elements of the crime, leaving detailed proof to the trial.

The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are: (1) accused is a public officer or a private person in conspiracy with one; (2) the accused committed the prohibited acts in relation to his official functions; (3) the accused caused undue injury to any party; (4) the undue injury arose from giving unwarranted benefits or preference; and (5) the accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross negligence.

The information alleged that Domingo, while PNB President, facilitated PNB’s Board Resolution No. 144 that approved a US$40 million Letter of Credit for CDCP, waiving collateral requirements despite CDCP’s deficiencies, resulting in PNB’s having to assume CDCP’s defaulted obligations amounting to US$29 million. This caused undue injury and granted unwarranted benefits to CDCP due to pressuring by former President Marcos and the conspiracy with Cuenca.

The Court found these allegations sufficient to state an offense, warranting denial of the motion to quash.

Right to Speedy Trial and Due Process

Domingo claimed that the excessive delay in preliminary investigation and filing of the information violated his right to a speedy trial. The Court recognized that the right to speedy disposition is relative and flexible, requiring consideration of length and reasons for delay, the accused’s assertion of the right, and prejudice suffered.

The delay in this case was partly due to legal uncertainties (the Tanodbayan’s authority was questioned in related cases) and organizational changes involving retirement of prosecutors and reorganization of the Special Prosecutor’s Office. The first subpoena to Domingo was returned unserved, justifying further delay to afford him an opportunity to submit his counter-affidavit. The filing of the information followed promptly after his counter-affidavit.

Thus, the Court concluded no violation of the right to a speedy trial or due process occurred, and the delay was not prejudicial but beneficial to Domingo’s defense.

Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus in Criminal Prosecutions

Consistent with existing doctrine, the Court emphasized that extraordinary writs such as certiorari or prohibition will not generally lie to restrain criminal prosecutions unless there is grave abuse of discretion or oppression.

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 109376)

Procedural History and Parties Involved

Petitioner Panfilo O. Domingo, former President of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus seeking to nullify the Sandiganbayan Second Division’s 15 March 1993 resolution denying his motion to quash the information against him.
The information charged Domingo with violating Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(a) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended).
The initial complaint was filed on 26 May 1987 by PNB with the Tanodbayan against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Rodolfo M. Cuenca (CDCP President), and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr. Domingo was initially not charged but was later subpoenaed due to his involvement.
The subpoena to Domingo was unserved as he was no longer with PNB at the address indicated.
Administrative Order No. 1 (June 8, 1988) authorized continuation of preliminary investigations by the Office of the Special Prosecutor after certain authority disputes.
Domingo was impleaded in the case following a finding of probable cause on 6 February 1992.
Domingo submitted his counter-affidavit on 9 March 1992.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended prosecution against Domingo and Cuenca on 9 July 1992.
Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 30 July 1992, docketed as Criminal Case No. 17847.
Domingo filed a motion to quash based on prescription and failure of the alleged facts to constitute an offense, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan on 15 March 1993.
Domingo refused to plead during arraignment, prompting the court to enter a plea of “not guilty” on his behalf.
Domingo elevated the case through a petition alleging grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan.

Facts Underpinning the Case

In July 1980, Domingo, as PNB President, allegedly, in conspiracy with Marcos and Cuenca, caused undue injury to PNB and granted unwarranted benefits to CDCP.
CDCP secured a U.S. $40 Million Standby Letter of Credit from PNB without adequate collateral despite prior defaults, causing PNB a US$29 Million loss.
Domingo allegedly succumbed to pressure from President Marcos, facilitating the passage of PNB Board Resolutions No. 144 and 180 which approved the letter of credit and amended its use to include other international projects.
The offense charged pertains to corrupt practices involving manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence under R.A. No. 3019, Sections 3(e) and 4(a).

Issues Presented

Whether the criminal action against Domingo was already extinguished by prescription.
Whether the facts charged in the information constitute an offense under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Whether Domingo’s right to a speedy trial was violated due to alleged inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation and filing of the information.
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash.

Prescription and Its Application

R.A. No. 3019 provides a prescriptive period of ten years, which was later amended to fifteen years by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195.
Prescription under special laws begins at the commission of the offense or from its discovery if unknown at the time.
Prescription is interrupted when formal proceedings against the accused commence and resumes if dismissed without final judgment.
In this case, the offense’s discovery was after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, given the conspiracy and clandestine natur