Case Summary (G.R. No. 104818)
Key Dates and Procedural Posture
Marriage alleged between petitioner and private respondent: November 29, 1976. Prior marriage of petitioner: April 25, 1969. Private respondent filed petition May 29, 1991. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss on August 20, 1991 and denied reconsideration on September 11, 1991. Petitioner filed certiorari/mandamus to the Court of Appeals; CA dismissed the petition February 7, 1992 and denied reconsideration March 20, 1992. The Supreme Court rendered the decision under review in 1993; the 1987 Constitution and the Family Code (1987) therefore govern the decision.
Facts Alleged in the Petition
Private respondent alleged marriage to petitioner in 1976 while petitioner had an earlier valid marriage (1969) with Emerlina dela Paz; she only learned of the prior marriage in 1983 when Emerlina sued for bigamy. Since 1979 she worked in Saudi Arabia and provided economic support; she allegedly used personal earnings to purchase real and personal properties totaling about P350,000, which petitioner possessed and administered. She alleged petitioner cohabited with another woman in 1989 and disposed of some of her properties without consent. Relief sought: temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner from administering those properties, declaration that the marriage is null and void, and declaration that she is sole owner with appointment of her attorney-in-fact to administer her properties.
Motion to Dismiss and Trial Court Ruling
Petitioner moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, arguing that a void marriage is void ab initio and requires no judicial decree and that a nullity petition is superfluous, and further contending private respondent had no property in his possession. Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria denied the motion, reasoning that although a second marriage contracted during the subsistence of a prior marriage is illegal and void, jurisprudence (Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS) requires a judicial declaration of nullity; and issues about property possession are factual matters to be decided at trial.
Court of Appeals Decision and Reasoning
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s certiorari/mandamus petition, holding that the issues in Yap and Consuegra were not dispositive here given factual differences and noting the petition sought both nullity and concomitant separation/distribution of properties. The CA emphasized avoidance of multiplicity of suits, held that a declaration of nullity may be invoked together with incidents of marriage such as property separation, and relied on Family Code Articles (notably Arts. 48, 50 and 52) to support that the court hearing nullity has jurisdiction to adjudicate incidental property matters. The CA also observed that alleged error in refusing dismissal was principally a matter of law that should normally be raised by answer and appeal.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
(1) Whether a judicial declaration of nullity is necessary for a marriage that is void ab initio; and if yes, whether such declaration is required only for purposes of remarriage. (2) Whether Special Proceedings No. 1989-J (declaration of nullity and separation of property) is a proper remedy to recover properties allegedly belonging exclusively to private respondent.
Governing Law and Constitutional Context
Because the decision was rendered in 1993, the 1987 Constitution is the constitutional basis applied. The Family Code (1987) provisions are controlling, specifically Articles addressing absolute nullity and its consequences (Art. 39/40 and related provisions), as well as provisions on the effects of a declaration of nullity (Arts. 43, 44, 48, 50, 52). The Court also relied upon constitutional policy recognizing marriage as an inviolable social institution to explain why judicial declaration is required in specified circumstances.
Supreme Court’s Analysis on Necessity of Judicial Declaration
The Court acknowledged that a marriage contracted while a prior subsisting marriage exists is bigamous and void ab initio, and that petitioner himself did not dispute the nullity. The Court traced prior jurisprudential conflict (People v. Aragon; People v. Mendoza — which earlier held no judicial decree necessary, and later cases such as Gomez v. Lipana, Vda. de Consuegra, Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy which required judicial declaration). The Family Code then settled the conflict, explicitly requiring judicial action: Article 39/40 provide that absolute nullity of a prior marriage may be invoked, and Article 40 requires that for purposes of remarriage such absolute nullity be invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The Court examined the drafting history of Article 40, focusing on placement and scope of the word “solely,” and concluded that Article 40 does not limit invocation of absolute nullity only to cases of remarriage; rather, it prescribes that when the nullity is invoked for purposes of remarriage the only acceptable basis is a final judgment declaring the prior marriage void, but that in other contexts evidence of nullity may be presented without a prior final judgment.
Interpretation and Rationale — Distinction Between Remarriage and Other Purposes
The Court reasoned that the formal requirement of a prior final judgment is driven by policy considerations protecting the institution of marriage and third parties: when a person seeks to remarry, certainty is needed to avoid bigamy and its social consequences; therefore, a final judicial declaration is the sole acceptable basis for establishing that a previous marriage is null for purposes of remarriage. For other legal consequences (e.g., liquidation, partition, distribution of properties, custody, support, legitimes), the Family Code allows the absolute nullity of a prior marriage to be invoked and proved in the proceeding at hand by testimonial or documentary evidence, not necessarily limited to on the basis of an earlier final judgment. The drafting history and committee discussions were used to support this textual construction.
Application to Property Separation and Incidental Relief
The Court found that separation, liquidation and distribution of properties are among the effects provided by the Family Code to flow from a judicial declaration of nullity (Arts. 43, 50). Thus, a petition that seeks declaration of absolute nullity together with partition/liquidation/separation of properties is procedurally appropriate. The Family Code explicitly contemplates that the judgment of nullity shall provide for liquidation, partition and distribution of properties and other incidents unless previously adjudicated. Therefore, an ordinary civil action for recovery of property is not required as the separation of properties is an incident of the nullity action and the trial court has jurisdiction to adjudicate possession and ownership in that context. The Court rejected petitioner’s suggestion that private respondent should have filed only an ordinary civil action.
Disposition and Rationale for Denying the Petition
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and denied the petition for certiorari. It held that the lower courts did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J because judicial determination of nulli
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 104818)
Procedural Posture
- Petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Roberto Domingo seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals' dismissal of his special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
- Subject matter originated as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J filed by private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig seeking (1) declaration of nullity of marriage and (2) separation of property.
- Petitioner moved to dismiss the RTC petition for lack of cause of action on the ground that the second marriage was void ab initio and thus a judicial declaration of nullity was unnecessary and superfluous; RTC denied the motion and denied reconsideration.
- Instead of filing an answer in the RTC, petitioner filed a special civil action (certiorari and mandamus) with the Court of Appeals; the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on February 7, 1992 and denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration; this Supreme Court petition followed.
Facts as Alleged in the Petition (SP No. 1989-J)
- Parties were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Building; marriage evidenced by Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 and Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite.
- Private respondent alleged she did not know petitioner had a prior marriage to Emerlina dela Paz solemnized April 25, 1969, which was valid and still subsisting; she learned of the prior marriage around 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy.
- Private respondent worked in Saudi Arabia from January 23, 1979 to present and returned to the Philippines for one-month annual leave only; since 1983 petitioner has been unemployed and dependent on her support.
- Private respondent alleges she purchased real and personal properties with her personal earnings totaling approximately P350,000.00; these properties are in petitioner’s possession and administration.
- Sometime in June 1989 private respondent discovered petitioner was cohabiting with another woman and disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent.
- After confrontation, private respondent appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as attorney-in-fact to manage her properties; petitioner allegedly refused to turn over possession and administration to the attorney-in-fact and lacked authority to administer such properties on account of the alleged nullity of the marriage.
- Prayer of the petition included issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner from exercising acts of administration and ownership, declaration that the marriage is null and void, and declaration that private respondent is the sole and exclusive owner of the properties with placement of said properties under the attorney-in-fact’s management.
Motion to Dismiss in the RTC and RTC Ruling
- Petitioner’s ground for dismissal: the marriage was void ab initio due to prior subsisting marriage, so a petition for declaration of nullity was unnecessary and superfluous; private respondent allegedly had no property in his possession.
- RTC Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria denied the motion to dismiss (Order dated August 20, 1991), reasoning:
- Recognized prior jurisprudence (Yap v. Court of Appeals) that a second marriage contracted while a first was subsisting is illegal and void.
- Distinguished that whether a judicial declaration of nullity is required was addressed in later jurisprudence; cited Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS which held that even if a second marriage is presumed void ab initio, there is need for a judicial declaration of nullity.
- Observed the Consuegra ruling represented a later departure from People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza.
- Treated petitioner’s contention that private respondent had no property in his possession as an issue for trial on the merits.
RTC Motion for Reconsideration and Subsequent Order
- Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration stressing alleged erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS and absence of justiciable controversy.
- On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner 15 days to file his answer. Petitioner instead filed a special civil action with the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals Ruling (February 7, 1992)
- Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s certiorari and mandamus petition.
- Reasoning and holdings:
- Found Yap v. CA and Consuegra v. GSIS not controlling because facts differ; previous cases dealt with succession rights of second wife while SP No. 1989-J sought separation of property corollary to declaration of nullity.
- Held that separation and distribution of properties acquired during the union can be determined only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between parties.
- Emphasized that to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity may be invoked in the same proceeding together with partition and distribution of properties.
- Cited Family Code Articles 48, 50 and 52 to support that declaration of absolute nullity may be raised together with other incidents of marriage such as separation of properties.
- Characterized the RTC as having jurisdiction; treated refusal to grant motion to dismiss as an error of law for which remedy was to answer, proceed to trial, and raise issue on appeal if adverse.
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
- Two fundamental issues presented:
- Whether a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary; and if so, whether such judicial declaration is required only for the purpose of remarriage.
- Whether SP No. 1989-J is a proper remedy for private respondent to recover real and personal properties allegedly belonging exclusively to her.
Parties’ Principal Contentions
Petitioner’s contentions:
- Relies on People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza asserting that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void bigamous marriage and that a petition for nullity is superfluous.
- Interprets Article 40 of the Family Code to mean a petition for absolute nullity may be required only for purposes of remarriage; since private respondent did not allege intention to remarry, SP No. 1989-J should be dismissed.
- Argues private respondent could have filed an ordinary civil action for recovery of properties rather than a special proceeding; suggests nothing to separate because properties alleged to have been acquired with private respondent’s money.
Private respondent’s contentions:
- Insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity not for remarriage but as a basis for separation and distribution of properties acquired during coverture; requests an incidental determination of property consequences in the same special proceeding.