Title
Djumantan vs. Domingo
Case
G.R. No. 99358
Decision Date
Jan 30, 1995
Filipino worker Bernard Banez married Djumantan under Islamic law, misrepresented her status to immigration, leading to deportation proceedings. SC ruled deportation power prescribed after 5 years, granting Djumantan permanent residency.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 99358)

Petitioner

Petitioner is an Indonesian citizen who entered the Philippines on January 13, 1979 as a temporary visitor and later had her immigration status changed to that of a permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940. She was married to a Filipino, Banez, according to Islamic rites in 1974.

Respondents

Respondents are the immigration authorities (Board of Commissioners of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, CID) who ordered revocation of petitioner’s Section 13(a) visa and initiated deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400), culminating in a Decision dated September 27, 1990 and a Resolution denying reconsideration dated January 29, 1991.

Key Dates

  • Marriage (Islamic rites): May 17, 1974 (between Banez and petitioner).
  • Entry into the Philippines: January 13, 1979 (petitioner and two children admitted as temporary visitors).
  • Change of status to permanent resident (Section 13[a] visa): March 25, 1982.
  • Initial complaint to CID by Leonardo C. Banez: November 19, 1980 (follow-up after EDSA).
  • CID Decision ordering revocation/deportation: September 27, 1990.
  • CID Resolution denying reconsideration: January 29, 1991.
  • Temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court: June 4, 1991 (later made permanent).
  • Manifestation withdrawing objection by Banez family: September 20, 1994.
  • Supreme Court decision disposing of the petition: January 30, 1995.

Applicable Law

  • Immigration Act of 1940: Sections relevant to admission (Section 9), change of status to permanent resident (Section 13[a]), and grounds and limitations for deportation (Section 37[a] and 37[b]). Amendments referenced include Rep. Act No. 503 and R.A. No. 144.
  • Precedent authorities cited in the decision: Shiu Shin Man v. Galang; Joaquin v. Galang; United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy; Lam Shee v. Bengzon; Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa. The decision was rendered under the constitutional framework effective in 1995 (1987 Constitution).

Facts

Petitioner arrived as a temporary visitor with her two young children and was admitted on the basis of an Affidavit of Guaranty and Support executed by Banez, who characterized them as his “guests.” Petitioner and her children lived with Banez. In 1981, Banez’s first wife discovered the marriage and filed a concubinage complaint (dismissed for lack of merit). Petitioner’s immigration status was later converted to permanent residency in 1982 and an alien certificate of registration was issued. Leonardo C. Banez thereafter lodged a complaint with the CID alleging irregularity in petitioner’s entry and change of status. Petitioner was detained, released on bond, sought voluntary departure but later moved to dismiss the deportation proceedings asserting valid marriage to a Filipino.

Procedural History

The CID concluded in its September 27, 1990 Decision that petitioner’s marriage to Banez was irregular and revoked her Section 13(a) visa, effectively ordering deportation. The CID denied reconsideration on January 29, 1991. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order (June 4, 1991) and later made it permanent. The Supreme Court reviewed whether the CID’s deportation power had prescribed under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether petitioner’s admission and subsequent change of status to permanent resident were lawful given alleged misrepresentations at entry.
  2. Whether the CID’s authority to deport petitioner was barred by the five-year prescription in Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
  3. Whether the CID’s revocation of petitioner’s Section 13(a) visa constituted an actionable deportation order subject to the five-year limitation.

Analysis — Admission and Change of Status

The Court found substantial misrepresentation in the admission and the acquisition of permanent residency: petitioner did not disclose her marriage to Banez on the immigration applications, and her initial admission was facilitated by false and misleading statements and the Affidavit of Guaranty. The Court reiterated established principles: admission and continued residence of aliens are permissive privileges subject to immigration laws; marriage to a Filipino does not ipso facto confer admission or permanent residency; and misrepresentation affecting admission can ground deportation under Section 37(a), clause 1. The Court nonetheless declined to decide the intrinsic validity of the marriage because the deportation/prescription issue was dispositive.

Analysis — Prescription under Section 37(b)

Section 37(b) provides that deportation under clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of Section 37(a) is barred unless arrest in deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises. The Court applied this provision and relevant precedents (including Lam Shee v. Bengzon and Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa) to hold that Congress validly imposed a statute of limitations on certain grounds for deportation. Leonardo C. Banez first notified the CID of the alleged illegal entry on November 19, 1980. The CID’s deportation order was issued on September 27, 1990—well beyond five years from the date the cause for deportation first arose or was brought to the authorities’ attention—so the five-year limitation applied and barred the deportation.

Analysis — Revocation of Visa vs. Deportation

Respondents contended that their action merely revoked the Section 13(a) visa and was not a deportation subject to the five-year bar. The Court rejected that distinction, holding that revocation of a permanently granted visa, followed by the ordering of arrest and removal, is functionally equivalent to deportation. The Court clarified that the “arrest” referenced in Section 37(b) pertains to arrest for carrying out an order for deportation. Since revocation carried with it the effect of ordering petitioner’s arrest and removal as an overstaying alien, the five-year prescriptio

    ...continue reading

    Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
    Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.