Case Summary (G.R. No. 203335)
Majority Resolution Denying Reconsideration
The Supreme Court, voting en banc, denied both petitioners’ and respondents’ motions for reconsideration of its February 18, 2014 decision. It reaffirmed its prior rulings on the constitutionality and invalidity of certain provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act, finding no new arguments sufficient to warrant reversal.
Legislative Process and Committee Insertions
The Court refused to probe claims of unauthorized bicameral committee insertions, holding that each House must internally resolve alleged non-compliance with its own rules so long as constitutional passage requirements were met.
Section 6 – Aggravated Penalties for ICT-Facilitated Crimes
Section 6 raises by one degree the penalty for any Revised Penal Code or special-law crime “committed by, through and with the use of ICT.” The majority upheld its constitutionality under Congress’s exclusive power to define and fix penalties. It distinguished cybercrimes as inherently more harmful—owing to ICT’s speed, reach and anonymity—and therefore legitimately subject to stiffer sanctions.
Section 4(c)(4) – Online Libel
The Court reaffirmed that libel (Article 355, RPC) is unprotected speech and that the constitutional guarantee of free expression does not extend to defamatory statements. Consequently, online libel remains punishable, and increased penalties under Section 6 do not violate freedom of speech.
Section 4(c)(3) – Unsolicited Commercial Communications
The majority implicitly recognized the government’s interest in regulating spam and denied motions aiming to strike down Section 4(c)(3). It noted that the provision does not ban unsolicited e-mail but requires honest sender identification, non-misleading content and a reliable opt-out mechanism to protect users’ enjoyment of e-mail services without unduly restricting commercial speech.
Other Provisions Previously Addressed
In its February decision, the Court had already struck down provisions permitting warrantless real-time data interception (Sec. 12), takedown orders without due process (Sec. 19), certain aspects of cyberpornography and multiple prosecutions under Section 7. The resolution left those rulings intact.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Sereno
Chief Justice Sereno vigorously reasserted her view that Section 6’s mandatory one-degree penalty increase for cyberlibel unduly chills free speech. She argued that the in terrorem effects—longer prison terms, harsher accessory penalties, loss of probation, extended prescription periods and inability to offset aggravation—collectively overburden online expression. She would declare Section 6 and Section 4(c)(4) unconstitutional, while upholding Section 4(c)(3).
Concurring Opinion of Justice Carpio
Justice Carpio joined the majority in full, including the finding that Section 6 is constitutional. He reiterated his separate
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Facts and Parties
- Multiple petitions (G.R. Nos. 203335, 203299, 203306, 203359, 203378, 203391, 203407, 203440, 203453, 203454, 203469, 203501, 203509, 203515, 203518) challenging provisions of Republic Act No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012)
- Petitioners range from private individuals, bloggers, media groups, civil‐society organizations, lawmakers, to professional associations
- Respondents include the President, Executive Secretary, Secretaries of Justice and Interior and Local Government, Budget and Management, heads of ICT Office, PNP, NBI, DOJ-Cybercrime Office, Cybercrime Coordinating Center, Congress
Procedural Posture
- En banc Decision of February 18, 2014 declared certain provisions of RA 10175 invalid or unconstitutional, upheld others
- Petitioners and respondents each filed motions for partial or full reconsideration
- En banc Resolution of April 22, 2014 resolves those motions
Issues Presented
- Validity of Section 6 (one-degree higher penalty for crimes committed with ICT)
- Validity of Section 4(c)(4) (penalizes online libel)
- Validity of Section 4(c)(3) (unsolicited commercial communications, “spam”)
- Validity of other provisions: Sections 7 (repeated prosecution), 12 (warrantless real-time data interception), 19 (takedown order)
Rationale of the Majority
- Bicameral committee insertions are intra-legislative matters; not for judicial inquiry so long as constitutional processes observed
- Section 6:
- Within Congress’s power to classify and fix penalties
- Not arbitrary: higher penalty justified by ICT’s speed, reach, anonymity, greater harm potential
- Aggravating circumstance analogous to others (use of vehicle, group commission, superior strength)
- Online libel (Section 4(c)(4)):
- Not new crime but libel under RPC, transposed to cyberspace
- Libel is unprotected speech; higher penalty does not chill protected expression
- Constitutional safeguards (actual malice standard, privilege, prohibition of prior restraint) remain applicable
- Spam regulation (Section 4(c)(3)):
- Permissible regulation of potentially harmful conduct
- Not a total ban: allows unsolicited messages subject to opt-out, truthful source identification, absence of misleading data
- Other provisions:
- Sections 7 and 19, Section 12 previously struck down where unconstitutional
- Remaining challenged sections upheld as within legislative authority and sufficiently definite
Resolution
- All motions for reconsideration denied for lack of merit
- February 18, 2014 Decision affirmed in toto except as already modified
- Sections upheld as constitutional; only those previously struck down remain invalid
Separate Opinions
- Justice Abad (concurring & dissenting):
- Agrees with denial of reconsideration generally
- Emphasizes deference to legislative penalty-fixing power
- Agrees with constitutionality of Section 6
- Chief Justice Sereno (concurring & dissenting in part):
- Maintains dissent as to Section 6 on online libel (creates chilling effect)
- Would uphold Section 4(c)(3) as valid spam regulation
- Calls for further scrutiny of Section 6’s impact on free s