Title
Diongzon vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 114823
Decision Date
Dec 23, 1999
Sales supervisor issued dishonored checks for unauthorized deliveries, admitted liability, convicted under B.P. Blg. 22; subsidiary imprisonment imposed for insolvency.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 114823)

Relevant Dates and Procedural Posture

Criminal information filed: December 15, 1981. Trial court (Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City) convicted petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the dispositive portion to exclude subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The Supreme Court reviewed the CA decision and rendered the judgment now summarized.

Factual Summary

Petitioner, as sales supervisor, had authority to withdraw goods from Filipro’s warehouse, deliver to dealers/customers, receive payments, and remit collections to Filipro’s depository bank. Filipro’s accounting found questionable delivery orders bearing unusually large quantities signed by petitioner. Anacleto Palisoc investigated and discovered certain dealers (Queensland, Queendies, Cokins) denied receiving the goods. Petitioner then presented three Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) checks, purportedly in payment for those invoices: check nos. 540295881-E (P36,874.00, postdated Sept. 15, 1981), 540295880-E (P130,597.75, postdated Sept. 16, 1981) and 540295899-E (P130,647.75, postdated Oct. 3, 1981). The checks were deposited with Filipro’s depository bank (Security Bank) and, upon presentment to ABC (drawee), were dishonored: the first two for apparent signature discrepancy with bank specimen, and the third for insufficiency of funds.

Evidence at Trial and Petitioner’s Statements

Prosecution witnesses were Palisoc, the ABC cashier, and the NBI document examiner. Petitioner testified in his own defense. He initially denied issuing the first two checks (alleging signature differences), argued that checks were not issued “on account” or “for value” as required by B.P. Blg. 22, and later admitted issuing the third check, claiming it was issued to replace the second check which he insisted he did not issue. Petitioner also asserted that he practiced “credit riding” — allowing certain dealers to use other dealers’ credit lines to facilitate deliveries — and claimed the checks were part of arrangements to hold checks while awaiting payment from actual recipients.

Trial Court and Court of Appeals Findings

The trial court discounted petitioner’s conflicting assertions and found him guilty under B.P. Blg. 22. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, rejecting the defenses presented at trial and the newly-asserted novation theory. The CA modified the penalty portion by removing subsidiary imprisonment for insolvency, reasoning that B.P. Blg. 22, being a special law, did not expressly provide for subsidiary imprisonment.

Issues Raised on Review

Petitioner principally advanced novation as a defense before the Supreme Court (having raised other defenses earlier in trial and on appeal). He argued the issuance of the third check and a partial payment together with a written undertaking constituted novation of the original obligation, thereby extinguishing any criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22. He also continued to contend (as earlier) that two checks were not his due to signature differences and that the checks were not issued “on account” or “for value.”

Novation: Legal Principles and Application to the Case

The Supreme Court reiterated the settled civil-law requisites for novation: (1) an existing valid obligation; (2) agreement of all parties to the new contract; (3) extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) validity of the new obligation. Novation cannot be presumed and must be clearly intended by the parties. Importantly, the Court reiterated that novation, when it occurs prior to filing of criminal information, may prevent the rise of criminal liability, but novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability once such liability has already accrued and been filed in court. Applying these principles, the Court found that the requisite proof of extinguishment of the old obligation (the critical third requisite) was lacking: petitioner did not comply with the supposed undertaking, the alleged new agreement never took effect, and the written undertaking was not formally presented in evidence notwithstanding an admission of its existence during trial. Even if there were an attempted agreement, petitioner’s failure to perform rendered it an empty promise insufficient to effect novation. The Court cited analogous jurisprudence (e.g., Llamado) where an accepted offer to pay that proved an empty promise could not avail the accused.

Elements of B.P. Blg. 22 and Presumption of Knowledge

The gravamen of a B.P. Blg. 22 offense is the issuance of a worthless check. Here, petitioner admitted issuing the check which, upon presentment, was not sufficiently funded. Under the law and settled doctrine, the drawer is presumed to have knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account when he issues the check; petitioner’s failure to pay within five banking days after notice of dishonor did not rebut that presumption. The change in the mode of payment (i.e., promises or undertakings to pay later) does not alter the substantive obligation nor negate the criminal element where the check was dishonored upon presentment.

Subsidiary Imprisonment Issue and Final Dispositio

    ...continue reading

    Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
    Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.