Title
Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 205728
Decision Date
Jul 5, 2016
The Diocese of Bacolod challenged COMELEC’s order to remove a tarpaulin advocating against the RH Law, claiming it violated freedom of expression. The Supreme Court ruled the tarpaulin was protected speech, not election propaganda, and COMELEC’s size limit was unconstitutional.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 205728)

Key Dates

  • COMELEC notice: February 22, 2013.
  • COMELEC letter/order: February 27, 2013.
  • Supreme Court Decision (granting petition and making TRO permanent): January 21, 2015 (referenced).
  • Resolution denying respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration: July 5, 2016.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

  • Constitution: 1987 Philippine Constitution (decision date post-1990). Relevant provisions invoked include Article IX-C (COMELEC powers), Article III, Section 4 (free speech), Article II, Section 26 (policy to ensure honesty and efficiency in public service), and Article XIII, Section 1 (education policy) as cited by respondents.
  • Statutes and rules: Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Elections Act) Section 3.3; COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 implementing RA 9006 (Section 6(c) specifically limiting poster size to 2' x 3'); Omnibus Election Code Section 82 and prior election laws (Election Code of 1971, PD No. 1296, RA No. 6388, RA No. 6646) referenced by respondents.
  • COMELEC procedural rules: Rule 34 (preliminary investigation for election offenses) and COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 (Rules of Procedure in Investigation and Prosecution of Election Offense Cases).

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

Respondents (COMELEC and election officer) filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the Supreme Court to reverse its January 21, 2015 Decision that granted petitioners’ petition, made a temporary restraining order permanent, and declared the COMELEC acts unconstitutional. The Court’s July 5, 2016 resolution denied that Motion for Reconsideration with finality.

Respondents’ Main Arguments in the Motion

  1. The COMELEC notices and letters were not final en banc quasi‑judicial acts and therefore not subject to Supreme Court review; the proper remedy is administrative review within COMELEC (Article IX‑C, Section 2(3)) or remedies under COMELEC rules including Rule 34. Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
  2. The tarpaulins are election propaganda as defined by COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and RA 9006: they contained names of candidates and party-list groups and used marks (check/X) that plainly urged voters to vote for/against candidates. Posting on the cathedral façade was designed to draw attention. The tarpaulins thus fall squarely under COMELEC regulation.
  3. Size limitations (historically 2' x 3' in earlier laws) apply equally to all persons and entities; the Fair Elections Act and Omnibus Election Code authorize content‑neutral regulation of election propaganda to promote political equality and minimize election spending. The size limit is a valid content‑neutral regulation and should be upheld under intermediate scrutiny. Respondents cited National Press Club v. COMELEC to support COMELEC’s supervisory regulatory powers over speech during election periods.

Court’s Rejection of Prematurity / Exhaustion Arguments

The Supreme Court (majority) denied the Motion and reiterated its earlier reasoning that Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for challenging COMELEC acts; a direct petition under Rule 65 is available where grave abuse of discretion is shown and where immediate judicial relief is necessary to prevent a chilling effect on constitutional rights. The Court found the asserted “chilling effect” on political speech and the urgent circumstances (the RH Law controversy and imminent elections) rendered exhaustion of administrative remedies unreasonable. The Court noted prior cases relied upon by respondents were factually distinct (election protests or disqualification suits by losing candidates) and inapposite here where petitioners were private parties asserting free expression.

Court’s Characterization of the Tarpaulin and Free Expression Analysis

The Court held that the tarpaulin primarily constituted social advocacy—a political expression addressing a public issue (the RH Law)—rather than election propaganda whose primary purpose is to promote or oppose election of candidates. The Court emphasized the special protection afforded political speech, including speech by private citizens on public issues, and that censorship or subsequent punishment that entails evaluation of viewpoint/content merits strict scrutiny. The Court found that labeling the tarpaulin as election propaganda would risk chilling political speech and that the secondary or incidental effect of influencing elections did not convert the expression into regulable campaign material in this instance.

Court’s View on Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral Regulation and Poster Size

The majority concluded the size limitation, as applied here, amounted to a content‑based regulation because “the form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed” and size materially affected the expression. Accordingly, the regulation failed constitutional scrutiny under the standard applicable to content‑based restrictions (compelling state interest and narrow tailoring), and the COMELEC’s order removing the tarpaulins was declared unconstitutional as applied.

Chilling‑Effect Rationale and Rule 65 Justification

The Court relied on the doctrine that when an administrative act or threat thereof is capable of repetition and likely to create a chilling effect on constitutional rights, direct judicial intervention (Rule 65) is permissible to prevent such harm. The Court emphasized that the contested COMELEC actions were capable of repetition and could deter other citizens from speaking on election‑related public issues, thus justifying immediate judicial review without exhaustion of administrative channels.

Disposition by the Supreme Court

The Motion for Reconsideration was denied with finality. The January 21, 2015 Decision granting the petition, making the temporary restraining order permanent, and declaring the COMELEC acts unconstitutional was left intact.

Dissent (Justice Brion) — Prematurity and COMELEC Jurisdiction

Justice Brion dissented. He argued the petition was premature because COMELEC en banc had not rendered a final decision; consequently, judicial review should not have been entertained before COMELEC had the opportunity to exercise its constitutional and statutory powers to investigate, preliminarily determine, and, if warranted, prosecute election offenses. He stressed the importance of COMELEC’s exclusive and constitutional jurisdiction under Article IX‑C, Section 2(1) and (7) to administer and enforce election laws and to regulate time, place, and manner of election propaganda. Brion asserted that the Court improperly reviewed administrative acts of COMELEC units without a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion or completion of COMELEC processes.

Dissent — Tarpaulin as Election Propaganda

Justice Brion contended the tarpaulin plainly fit the statutory and regulatory definition of election propaganda: it was displayed during the campaign period, listed names of legislators who were candidates in the 2013 elections, used “Team Buhay” (with check marks) and “Team

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