Title
Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II
Case
G.R. No. 144153
Decision Date
Jan 16, 2002
Petitioner, lacking CES eligibility, was removed as TRB Executive Director II after suspension and reassignment; SC upheld dismissal, citing no vested right or security of tenure.
petition for quo warranto
dismissal
vested right
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 144153)

Factual Background

MA. CHONA M. DIMAYUGA received a permanent appointment as Executive Director II of the Toll Regulatory Board on October 26, 1992. She served as the Board’s highest-ranking working official with supervisory control over its Finance and Administrative, Technical, and Engineering Divisions and participated in oversight and negotiations of several build-operate-and-transfer projects. The position was classified under the Career Executive Service on June 4, 1993. While the Civil Service Commission later issued Memorandum Circular No. 21 on May 31, 1994, Section 4 of that circular addressed the status of incumbents when positions are declared part of the CES for the first time. During petitioner’s incumbency she became the subject of administrative and criminal complaints. Respondent Gregorio R. Vigilar issued a ninety-day suspension on November 28, 1997. A second ninety-day suspension followed on March 26, 1998 by Executive Secretary Alexander Aguirre. Petitioner returned to duty on June 25, 1998 but the next day the Department issued Department Order No. 85, series of 1998 detailing her to the Office of the Secretary and a Memorandum directed her to the Department’s Legal Service. Petitioner took a leave until September 30, 1998 rather than accept what she considered a demotion. While on leave she received a communication dated September 22, 1998 informing her that then President Estrada had appointed MARIANO E. BENEDICTO II to the position she had held.

Procedural History

Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto in the Court of Appeals on September 6, 1999 challenging her displacement and asserting her permanent appointment vested rights. The Court of Appeals, Seventeenth Division, dismissed the petition by decision dated July 25, 2000. Petitioner then sought relief by filing a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144153, which the Court resolved by decision dated January 16, 2002.

Issues Presented

Petitioner principally asserted that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that she had no vested right to the Executive Director II position. She further contended that her refusal to vacate the post did not impinge upon the President’s power of appointment and removal, that she possessed security of tenure, and that the Court of Appeals wrongly dismissed her quo warranto action and denied damages, including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees. The legal foundation of petitioner’s claims rested on Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 21 and on the CES Board’s letter of December 15, 1998 recognizing the permanence of incumbents’ status.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner argued that her 1992 permanent appointment gave her a vested right to continue in the position even after its inclusion in the Career Executive Service, relying on Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 21 and the CES Board’s December 15, 1998 reply. She claimed that the suspensions and subsequent detailing and replacement were coercive measures to remove her from office and sought reinstatement and damages. Respondents and the Court of Appeals countered that petitioner lacked the requisite CES eligibility and that permanence in a CES position requires possession of the prescribed eligibility; thus her appointment, although labeled permanent, did not confer security of tenure. Respondents relied on established jurisprudence that a person without the required eligibility holds the position only temporarily and may be reassigned or removed consistent with the appointing authority’s powers.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 2000. The Court concluded that petitioner’s claims lacked merit and ordered costs against petitioner. The dispositive judgment upheld the lower court’s characterization of petitioner’s appointment and the consequent absence of protected security of tenure in the circumstances presented.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court examined the interplay between Memorandum Circular No. 21 and the classification of petitioner’s position as part of the Career Executive Service on June 4, 1993. It held that Section 4 of the circular applies to incumbents of positions declared CES positions for the first time pursuant to that specific resolution and therefore did not control where the position had been included in the CES prior to the circular’s issuance. More fundamentally, the Court reaffirmed the long-standing rule that a permanent appointment attains permanency only when the appointee meets all requirements for the post, including the appropriate eligibility. The Court applied the doctrine that security of tenure in the CES depends on rank or eligibility and not on the particular position; thus a person who lacks the requisite CES eligibility cannot claim the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure for that CES position. The Court found unpersuasive the CES Board’s letter of Decemb

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