A.M. No. MTJ-96-1105 - Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Llanes, Jr.

Case Summary (A.M. No. MTJ-96-1105)

Factual Background

DBP filed a complaint for unlawful detainer on April 14, 1992 against Julio Agcaoili, docketed as Civil Case No. 2551 before MTCC, Branch I, Laoag City. When a preliminary conference was scheduled and defendant failed to appear, the court reset the case. Subsequently, the judge handling the case was detailed away, and Judge Manuelito A. Cid became the acting presiding judge. On October 14, 1993, acting presiding judge Cid rendered judgment for DBP, ordering defendant to vacate.

DBP sought execution shortly thereafter. A writ was eventually issued on January 21, 1994, but DBP alleged that, notwithstanding multiple motions, the writ was not enforced for more than six months. The Office of the Court Administrator related that DBP’s earlier attempt to hold other court personnel accountable proceeded from an initial administrative complaint against Leticia M. Aguto, Clerk of Court, and Antonio Espejo, Deputy Sheriff, for the unreasonable delay in enforcement. That complaint was dismissed by an investigating judge after respondent judge’s admission, through a first indorsement dated October 17, 1994, that he had ordered the enforcement held in abeyance to conduct an inventory of cases pending in his court as of January 22, 1994, without any explanation of why inventory-taking suspended regular judicial operations.

Procedural History and the Questioned Orders

After respondent judge was required to comment and did so on March 8, 1996, DBP filed a reply on May 3, 1996, and respondent, through counsel, filed a rejoinder on August 26, 1996. The administrative records then traced key procedural events in Civil Case No. 2551.

The record showed that defendant’s supposed notice of appeal—dated November 4, 1993—arrived at the MTCC only on November 25, 1993 after the envelope was returned due to an erroneous address. The notice was re-registered on November 18, 1993 and received on November 25, 1993 with the corrected address. In the same mail envelope, defendant’s counsel also filed a Motion to Amend Decision dated November 3, 1993, which also reached the court on November 25, 1993 and was denied on December 1, 1993 on the ground that it was in substance a motion for reconsideration, prohibited under Section 19(c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

Despite documentary indications, acting presiding judge Cid later issued orders: one on December 1, 1993 treating the notice of appeal as filed within the reglementary period, and another on December 21, 1993 declaring that the reglementary period had lapsed, citing failure to perfect the appeal due to lack of docket fee and appeal bond, and denying the notice of appeal while declaring the judgment final and executory. Thereafter, DBP filed a motion for execution, and a writ of execution was issued on January 21, 1994. The record further reflected that upon respondent judge’s return to his permanent station on January 24, 1994, defendant’s counsel transmitted a telegram claiming that an appeal had been timely filed and that receipts and bonds were enclosed.

On March 10, 1994, respondent judge issued an order directing the clerk of court to verify, within ten days, the truthfulness of defendant’s telegram allegations regarding alleged timely filing through the mail and the accompanying docket fee and appeal bond. After investigation, the docketing fees were found to have been paid on November 10, 1993. On April 18, 1994, respondent set hearings on pending incidents. Several subsequent orders were issued to manage hearings, receive position papers, and allow submissions from counsel. A position paper raising issues such as alleged mis-trial, due process violations, indispensable parties, and legal irregularities was filed on September 2, 1994, and a subsequent order reset hearings when plaintiff did not comply with a directive to comment.

The record further showed that, because a hearing scheduled for October 27, 1994 did not proceed and negotiations between defendant and DBP led to a proposed repurchase, respondent issued an order on March 15, 1995 resetting the matter for hearing on March 31, 1995. On May 18, 1995, after discussing the established facts and the issues, respondent issued an order declaring a mis-trial, setting aside prior proceedings, and directing that the case be tried anew. The order justified the action on the court’s **inherent power under Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court to amend and control processes and orders to conform to law and justice, and it also reasoned that indispensable parties—Modesty Ranada, Antonio H. Agcaoili, and Lucila Goyma—must be included.

The Parties’ Contentions

DBP maintained that Judge Llanes should be held administratively liable for ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty, and acts prejudicial to the interest of the Government, focusing particularly on the order dated May 18, 1995. DBP’s theory, as reflected in the administrative findings summarized in the decision, was that the supposed appeal and related motions were procedurally ineffective, and that respondent’s actions effectively allowed dilatory procedural maneuvers to prevent immediate execution of DBP’s judgment.

Judge Llanes defended his conduct by asserting that his questioned order was issued in good faith and in accordance with law and the undisputed record. He argued that he honestly believed that the proceedings held by acting presiding judge Cid were marked by serious irregularities and violations of law that rendered the October 14, 1993 judgment, the December 21, 1993 order, and the January 21, 1994 writ of execution null and void. He also contended that he needed to decide new issues raised by defendant’s counsel, and that he attended to incidents without unnecessary delay. He further argued that if DBP believed execution of the writ was ministerial, DBP should have sought mandamus against him and, alternatively, should have pursued appellate remedies such as certiorari, prohibition, or injunction to question the order.

The Court’s Assessment and Reasoning

The Court rejected respondent’s defenses and adopted the Office of the Court Administrator’s evaluation. The Court found the procedural posture of the supposed appeal to be decisive. It held that the records showed the notice of appeal was filed with the MTCC only on November 25, 1993, supported by the certified true copy stamped with that date. Given that defendant received the decision on October 22, 1993, the filing thirty-four days later was, in the Court’s view, out of time. The Court treated respondent’s explanation—that the notice was sent to the wrong court and thus should suspend or toll the reglementary period—as strained, particularly because the Regional Trial Court branch named in the erroneous address did not exist in Laoag City. The Court concluded that when the notice was returned and ultimately received by the MTCC, the period to appeal had already long expired. It also questioned why respondent still set the case for hearing purportedly to resolve whether an appeal had been timely filed, notwithstanding documentary proof and the fact that execution had already issued after such verification.

The Court further noted that, even assuming the remote possibility that the notice had been timely filed, defendant still failed to file the required supersedeas bond, which would have prevented the judgment from becoming immediately executory. On that basis, the Court reasoned that appellate review would not have vested the appellate court with authority to reverse or substantially modify the trial court’s judgment. The Court thus regarded DBP’s complaint as having a sound foundation: respondent’s actions effectively permitted procedural maneuvers to delay execution.

The Court also found respondent’s handling of the incident related to the alleged mailing of a motion for reconsideration and the status of docket fees and appeal bond to be legally untenable. It emphasized that a motion for reconsideration was a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The Court considered it impossible that respondent was unaw

Case Syllabus (A.M. No. MTJ-96-1105)

Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) filed a sworn administrative complaint with the Court on May 31, 1995 against Judge Federico A. Llanes, Jr..
The complaint charged gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty, and acts prejudicial to the interest of the Government arising from the respondent judge’s official actuations in Civil Case No. 2551, assigned to Branch I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) Laoag, City.
The Court considered the matter as an administrative case and resolved the issue based on the complaint, the respondent judge’s comment, DBP’s reply, and the rejoinder, together with the evaluation of the Office of the Court Administrator.

Parties and Procedural Posture

The complainant was Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
The respondent was Judge Federico A. Llanes, Jr., then presiding Branch I, MTCC Laoag City.
The Office of the Court Administrator reviewed the records and submitted a summary of the antecedents of the administrative charges.
The case was further shaped by an investigating proceeding that was dismissed by Judge Wenceslao Agnir in an earlier stage due to the respondent judge’s admitted participation in the delay.
The respondent judge submitted his comment on March 8, 1996, DBP filed its reply on May 3, 1996, and the respondent filed a rejoinder through counsel on August 26, 1996.
The Court ultimately found the respondent administratively liable and imposed a fine.

Key Factual Allegations

DBP filed an action for unlawful detainer on April 14, 1992 against Julio Agcaoili, docketed as Civil Case No. 2551 in MTCC, Branch I, Laoag City where the respondent was the permanently appointed presiding judge.
The parties scheduled a preliminary conference on September 10, 1992, but due to the defendant’s absence, the case was reset to October 7, 1992.
The respondent was later detailed by the Supreme Court to preside over MTC of Manila on October 2, 1992, and Judge Manuelito A. Cid became the acting presiding judge of the MTCC Laoag Branch.
On October 14, 1993, Acting Presiding Judge Cid rendered judgment in favor of DBP, ordering the defendant to vacate the premises.
DBP claimed the judgment became final and executory because no appeal was seasonably taken.
DBP sought execution, and a writ of execution was issued on January 21, 1994, but enforcement was not carried out despite DBP’s repeated motions.
The Office of the Court Administrator stated that DBP filed an administrative complaint earlier against Leticia M. Aguto (Clerk of Court) and Antonio Espejo (Deputy Sheriff) for unreasonable delay in enforcing the writ.
That earlier complaint was dismissed because the respondent judge admitted, in his First Indorsement dated October 17, 1994, that he directed Mrs. Aguto to hold enforcement in abeyance due to an inventory order of cases pending in his court as of January 22, 1994.
DBP later asserted that the respondent’s actions effectively permitted procedural maneuvers by the defendant to delay execution of DBP’s final judgment.

Critical Events in the Underlying Case

DBP filed a Manifestation/Motion on March 29, 1993 praying for resolution of the case.
Both parties filed a Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings on May 11, 1993, but the record as evaluated did not clearly show action by the acting presiding judge on that motion.
Acting Presiding Judge Cid denied defendant’s motion to amend decision dated November 3, 1993, treating it as in substance a prohibited motion for reconsideration under Section 19 [c], Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, by order dated December 1, 1993.
A notice of appeal dated November 4, 1993 was first registered by the clerk with an incorrect addressee and was returned to counsel, then re-registered on November 18, 1993, and received by MTCC-I on November 25, 1993.
DBP filed a Motion for Execution on January 19, 1994, and a writ was issued on January 21, 1994, but the Office of the Court Administrator noted the absence of a clear showing of a promulgated order granting execution with notice to the defendant or counsel.
After the respondent returned to his permanent station on January 24, 1994, DBP faced continued non-enforcement.
On February 21, 1994, the defendant submitted a telegram relaying that counsel allegedly filed an appeal on time and enclosed documents and receipts, and asked that other matters await resolution of that motion.
On March 10, 1994, the respondent issued an order directing the clerk of court to verify the truthfulness of the telegram’s allegations about a mailed motion for reconsideration and appeal bond and docket fee payment, with a report required within 10 days.
After verification, the respondent is