Title
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 129471
Decision Date
Apr 28, 2000
Cajes, possessing land since 1917, contested DBP's claim from fraudulent registration. SC upheld Cajes' ownership, ordering reconveyance due to acquisitive prescription and DBP's lack of due diligence.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 129471)

Factual Background

The land in dispute comprised 19.4 hectares in San Miguel, Bohol. Ulpiano Mumar held tax evidence of ownership as early as 1917 (Tax Declaration No. 3840). In 1950 Mumar sold the land to private respondent Carlos Cajes, who obtained Tax Declaration No. R-1475 in 1950 and later Tax Declarations R-799 (1961) and D-2247 (1974). Private respondent occupied, cultivated, and paid taxes on the land. In 1969 Jose Alvarez procured registration over a larger parcel that included the 19.4 hectares and obtained OCT No. 546 on June 16, 1969, although Alvarez never possessed or improved the parcel. In 1972 Alvarez sold the registered parcel to spouses Gaudencio and Rosario Beduya and TCT No. 10101 issued to them. The spouses Beduya mortgaged the property to petitioner in 1972 to secure a loan of P526,000.00 and executed a further mortgage in 1978 for P1,430,000.00. The Beduyas defaulted. At a foreclosure sale on January 31, 1985 petitioner was the highest bidder and consolidated ownership upon the expiration of the redemption period. Private respondent had also sought a loan from petitioner in 1978, offering his 19.4 hectares (Tax Declaration D-2247) as collateral; a petitioner representative inspected and appraised the land. Petitioner later cancelled private respondent’s loan and demanded payment when it learned the disputed portion appeared in TCT No. 10101. Private respondent paid and received a Cancellation of Mortgage dated March 18, 1981. In April 1986 petitioner discovered private respondent’s occupation, demanded that he vacate, and, upon his refusal, filed a complaint for recovery of possession in the RTC.

Trial Court Proceedings

The Regional Trial Court, after trial, rendered judgment on August 22, 1989. The court declared petitioner the lawful owner of the entire land covered by TCT No. 10101 and ordered defendants to vacate and to desist from interfering with plaintiff’s possession. The RTC rested its decision on the principle that the decree of registration was binding upon the land.

Court of Appeals Ruling

On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC. By its decision dated August 30, 1996 the appellate court dismissed the complaint, declared the disputed 19.4000 hectares as exclusively belonging to defendant-appellant Carlos Cajes, ordered its segregation from plaintiff-appellee’s title and ordered reconveyance to appellant. Reconsideration was denied April 23, 1997. Petitioner then filed the present petition for certiorari.

Issues Presented

Petitioner framed its principal contentions as follows: (1) the Court of Appeals’ decision was contrary to Sections 38 and 46 of Act No. 496 and controlling precedent such as Benin v. Tuason; (2) petitioner was an innocent mortgagee for value and later an innocent purchaser at the foreclosure sale; and (3) the Court of Appeals illogically applied estoppel against petitioner. Private respondent maintained that he had been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession since 1950, that his tax declarations supported ownership, that registration in favor of Alvarez and the Beduyas was erroneous as to the 19.4 hectares, and that reconveyance was the proper equitable remedy.

Supreme Court Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto. The Court declared that the 19.4 hectares included in TCT No. 10101 were owned by Carlos Cajes, ordered segregation of that portion from TCT No. 10101, and directed reconveyance to him.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court first distinguished Benin v. Tuason, explaining that the rule invoked by petitioner did not control the present facts. In Benin the registered owners had valid titles recognized over long periods and innocent purchasers for value had acquired subdivided parcels; the Court held that the decree of registration there cut off prescription and protected purchasers. The Supreme Court explained that those circumstances were absent here. The Court reiterated the settled rule that registration under the Torrens system confirms an already vested title; it does not create ownership where ownership already vested in another. The Court quoted Section 39 of Act No. 496 to show that a decree of registration extinguishes only unregistered encumbrances or easements that are not annotated on the certificate, but that the registration process does not operate as a mode of acquiring ownership by itself.

The Court found that private respondent had been in adverse, public, peaceful and continuous possession of the contested area since 1950, tacking his possession to Mumar’s possession from 1917. The possession and the successive tax declarations (R-1475, R-799, D-2247) constituted strong evidence of ownership. The Court held that more than thirty years of uninterrupted adverse possession had ripened into ownership by acquisitive prescription. The Court relied on precedent recognizing that tax declarations and payment of realty taxes are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner (citing Republic v. Court of Appeals and other authorities). Because private respondent was in actual possession, his action for reconveyance did not fall under the ten-year prescriptive bar applicable to reconveyance claims when the claimant is not in possession; possession suspends the prescriptive limitation on equitable reconveyance (citing Vda. de Cabrera and related decisions).

The Court further held that private respondent’s counterclaim constituted a direct action to challenge the validity of TCT No. 10101 in equity. The Court explained that a counterclaim stands as a complaint and may be tested by the same rules as an independent action; thus a determination on the Torrens title could be made in the present litigation rather than by a separate cancellation proceeding.

On petitioner’s contention that it was an innocent mortgagee and an innocent purchaser at the foreclosure sale, the Court analyzed Section 38 of Act No. 496, which protects innocent purchasers for value from collateral attacks on Torrens titles but preserves remedies where the decree was procured by fraud and where no innocent purchaser has acquired an interest. The Court accepted the general doctrine that an innocent mortgagee may rely on the face of a certificate of title in good faith, but it emphasized that a banking institution must exercise due diligence. The Court found that petitioner failed to exercise the prudence expected of a bank. Although banks need not make exhaustive historical title searches, they customarily investigate the premises and the identity of actual possessors before accepting land as collateral. The record showed that petitioner’s representativ

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