Case Summary (A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369, RTJ-14-2372)
Factual Background: The Parallel Civil and DOJ Proceedings
On October 29, 2010, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted after the HDMF filed a complaint-affidavit against Delfin S. Lee and other officers of Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation (Globe Asiatique) for syndicated estafa constituting economic sabotage. The alleged modus was the fraudulent take-out of housing loans for fake borrowers, where the supposed borrowers were reportedly paid to sign blank loan documents submitted to the HDMF for processing, causing the HDMF damages of about P6.5 Billion.
The DOJ then organized a panel of prosecutors to investigate the complaint, docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-10J-00319 (the first DOJ case). Subsequently, on November 15, 2010, Lee and Globe Asiatique filed a civil action for specific performance and damages against the HDMF before the Makati RTC. On December 10, 2010, the NBI Anti-Graft Division recommended that Lee, among others, be charged; the DOJ formed another panel for the preliminary investigation in a separate matter docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-10L-00363 (the second DOJ case).
On January 27, 2011, Lee filed a petition seeking to suspend the proceedings in the second DOJ case, claiming that the Makati civil case raised issues that constituted a prejudicial question. The DOJ panel issued an Omnibus Order dated February 21, 2011, denying suspension for lack of common issues and parties. The panel explained that the Makati civil case mainly involved Globe Asiatique’s right to replace its buyers under contractual agreements with HDMF, while the second DOJ case involved criminal liability for syndicated estafa. The panel also noted that the outcome of the civil case would not affect the criminal complaint, emphasizing that the civil action sought to compel HDMF to honor contractual provisions and accept replacement borrowers rather than resolve Lee’s criminal guilt or innocence.
Lee moved for partial reconsideration, which was denied. He was then directed to file a counter-affidavit. After filing his counter-affidavit, on July 28, 2011, Lee filed a petition for injunction with an application for TRO against the DOJ, raffled to Judge Mislang. Again, he sought suspension of the DOJ proceedings and also to prevent the filing of the information in the first DOJ case.
Events Before Judge Mislang and the Issuance of Injunctive Orders
On August 5, 2011, Lee’s counsel asked whether DOJ counsel would stipulate as to the existence of both the second DOJ case and the Makati civil case. DOJ counsel acceded, and the parties, with the permission of Judge Mislang, agreed to submit the petition for injunction for resolution on the basis of memoranda within fifteen (15) days, since no further factual matters were to be threshed out through trial.
After Lee submitted his memorandum on the day before August 12, 2011, he filed an unverified Urgent Motion for ex-parte resolution of his TRO application. Despite the parties’ earlier agreement and without waiting for DOJ’s memorandum, Judge Mislang issued orders dated August 16, 2011 and August 26, 2011, granting Lee’s request.
After these orders, HDMF and the DOJ filed separate administrative complaints against Judge Mislang, docketed as OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3736-RTJ (by HDMF) and OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3907-RTJ (by the DOJ). They alleged that Judge Mislang acted in patent disregard of rules on injunctive relief and prejudicial question, demonstrated gross ignorance of the law and/or procedure, and manifested partiality and gross misconduct.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Mislang be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be dismissed from service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits except leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
The Supreme Court’s Evaluation of Judge Mislang’s Actions
In evaluating the record, the Court treated the administrative cases together with emphasis on the injunctive orders Judge Mislang granted. It found no compelling reason to deviate from the OCA’s findings and recommendations. The Court explained that Lee’s petition for injunction incorporated the application for TRO in the second DOJ case. Yet the DOJ was not given notice of Lee’s urgent motion for ex-parte resolution. The Court also noted that, despite the parties’ agreement to submit memoranda before resolution, Judge Mislang granted the TRO without waiting for DOJ’s memorandum and without conducting any hearing on the TRO application or the motion for resolution.
The Court characterized these omissions as violations of the DOJ’s constitutional right to be heard and due process. It further stated that Judge Mislang’s disregard of the DOJ’s due process rights was repeated when he granted a TRO in the first DOJ case. Although the TRO application had been included in a verified petition, the DOJ was not properly served with a copy of the petition or the urgent motion for hearing, and it received no notice of hearing. Even then, Judge Mislang proceeded to hear the TRO application in the first DOJ case during a hearing on the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the second DOJ case.
Prejudicial Question, Jurisdiction, and the Prematurity of the Petition
The Court also found that Judge Mislang manifested serious lack of knowledge of basic legal principles concerning prejudicial question and jurisdiction in petitions for suspension of criminal action based on prejudicial questions, as set forth in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court adopted the reasoning of the Court of Appeals (Seventeenth Division) in Department of Justice v. The Hon. Rolando Mislang, etc. and Delfin Lee, CA-G.R. SP No. 121594, dated April 16, 2012, which held that no prejudicial question existed that could justify Judge Mislang’s issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals’ analysis, as quoted and adopted, explained that a prejudicial question is that which must precede the criminal action and must be resolved before final judgment can be rendered in a closely connected criminal case, and that the civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. It found that the NBI recommendation for DOJ investigation was filed ahead of the Makati civil case Lee filed. It further observed that, when Lee moved for a TRO to enjoin the DOJ in the first DOJ case, he did not file the required petition for suspension of criminal action based on prejudicial question before the DOJ panel, contrary to the requirement that such petitions be filed before the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation, or before the court where the information had already been filed.
Beyond prematurity and procedural requirements, the Court of Appeals also stated that injunction will not lie to enjoin criminal prosecution, since public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and protected for society, with injunctive relief being reserved for extreme cases. It found that Judge Mislang anchored the relief on prejudicial question, but that the facts and issues in the Makati civil case were not determinative of Lee’s guilt or innocence in the DOJ cases. It concluded that Judge Mislang committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the DOJ from filing an information and from proceeding with the preliminary investigation.
Doctrine on Gross Ignorance of the Law and Administrative Liability
Having found procedural and substantive legal errors, the Court assessed the conduct under administrative standards for gross ignorance of the law. It reiterated that gross ignorance refers to disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. It held that a judge may also be administratively liable if motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption in ignoring, contradicting, or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. The Court clarified that not every judicial error warrants administrative sanction; however, where the law is straightforward and the facts are evident, failure to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.
Applying these standards, the Court held that Judge Mislang issued two TROs, a writ of preliminary injunction, and a status quo order that failed to satisfy legal requisites. It found that Judge Mislang violated clearly established laws and procedures that every judge should know. It identified three points of failure: (a) prematurity of the petition, (b) inapplicability of the prejudicial question, and (c) lack of jurisdiction. It further held that Judge Mislang’s persistent disregard of elementary rules in favor of Lee reflected bad faith and partiality.
The Court, however, declined to hold Judge Mislang administratively liable for not requiring Lee to post a bond for the issuance of a TRO, noting that in Bautista v. Abdulwahid, the Court dismissed a charge involving an ex-parte TRO without requiring posting of a bond in view of the circumstances then considered by the Court.
Judge Mislang’s Pattern of Infractions and the Imposition of Dismissal
The Court also considered Judge Mislang’s prior administrative record. It noted that he had faced an “endless string” of administrative charges since April 2007. It referenced prior cases where he was found guilty of gross
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Case Syllabus (A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369, RTJ-14-2372)
- The case consolidated two administrative complaints against Judge Rolando G. Mislang arising from his issuance of injunction-related reliefs while criminal and preliminary investigation matters were pending before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
- The DOJ, represented by Secretary Leila M. De Lima, filed A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 against the respondent judge.
- The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), represented by Atty. Jose Roberto F. Po, filed A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372 against the same respondent judge.
- The complaints were grounded on allegations that the respondent judge acted in patent disregard of rules on injunctive relief and prejudicial question, exhibited gross ignorance of the law and/or procedure, and manifested partiality and gross misconduct in issuing the questioned orders.
- The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended dismissal with forfeiture of retirement benefits except leave credits, and prejudice to re-employment in any government branch or instrumentality, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
- The Supreme Court adopted the OCA’s findings and imposed the supreme penalty of dismissal in view of the respondent judge’s repeated infractions and bad faith.
- The dispositive portion ordered the respondent’s dismissal from service in both administrative matters for gross ignorance of the law, with corresponding forfeiture and disqualification from re-employment.
Parties and Procedural Posture
- The petitioner in A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 was the Department of Justice (DOJ), while the petitioner in A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372 was HDMF.
- The respondent was the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 167, presided over by Judge Rolando G. Mislang.
- The Supreme Court consolidated the administrative complaints and reviewed the OCA’s recommendations.
- The record showed that the DOJ and HDMF sought administrative accountability after the respondent judge issued orders granting injunctive and restraining reliefs without compliance with procedural safeguards.
Core Allegations in Complaints
- The administrative complaints alleged that the respondent judge disregarded governing rules on injunctive relief and the doctrine of prejudicial question.
- The complaints asserted that the respondent judge acted with gross ignorance of the law and/or procedure.
- The complaints further alleged partiality and gross misconduct in issuing the challenged orders.
- The OCA treated the acts as more than mere judicial error and found them constitutive of gross ignorance of the law warranting the penalty of dismissal.
Background Criminal Matters
- NBI recommended preliminary investigation because of HDMF’s Complaint Affidavit against Delfin S. Lee and other officers of Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation (Globe Asiatique).
- The alleged crime was syndicated estafa constituting economic sabotage under Presidential Decree No. 1689, in relation to Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
- The scheme described involved the fraudulent take-out of housing loans for fake borrowers.
- The affidavit asserted that the borrowers allegedly had no intention to apply for the loans and were instead paid to sign blank loan documents.
- The loan documents were then allegedly submitted to HDMF for processing.
- The complaint estimated damages at about P6.5 Billion.
DOJ Preliminary Investigation Tracks
- The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors to handle the complaint docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-10J-00319 (1st DOJ case).
- A separate matter was docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-10L-00363 (2nd DOJ case) after subsequent NBI recommendations that Lee, among others, be charged with the same offense.
- The DOJ panels issued orders addressing Lee’s attempts to suspend proceedings based on alleged prejudicial question issues.
- The DOJ panel issued an Omnibus Order dated February 21, 2011 denying suspension for lack of common issues and parties, and it explained why the Makati civil action would not affect the criminal inquiry.
Concurrent Makati Civil Case
- Lee and Globe Asiatique filed a Complaint for specific performance and damages against HDMF before the Makati RTC on November 15, 2010.
- The DOJ panel described the Makati civil case as focusing on Globe Asiatique’s right to replace buyers pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), Funding Commitment Agreement (FCA), and Collection Servicing Agreement (CSA).
- The DOJ panel reasoned that the civil case issues were not determinative of Lee’s criminal liability for syndicated estafa.
- The panel emphasized that the civil action did not primarily concern the sale of properties to specific persons named in the narration, but instead sought to compel HDMF to honor contractual provisions and accept replacement borrowers.
Lee’s First Suspension Attempt
- On January 27, 2011, Lee filed a Petition seeking the suspension of the 2nd DOJ case pending the outcome of the Makati civil case.
- Lee argued that issues in the civil case constituted a prejudicial question to the criminal matter.
- The DOJ panel denied the petition through its February 21, 2011 Omnibus Order because the cases lacked common issues and parties.
- The panel also concluded that the resolution of the civil case would not affect the resolution of the criminal complaint.
Lee’s Petition for Injunction
- After the denial of reconsideration and direction to file a counter-affidavit, Lee filed a Petition for Injunction with an application for TRO on July 28, 2011.
- The injunction petition was raffled to the sala of Judge Mislang.
- Lee again sought to suspend the preliminary investigation in the 2nd DOJ case, and he additionally sought to prevent the filing of the information in the 1st DOJ case.
- Lee’s counsel later requested a stipulation regarding the existence of the DOJ cases and the Makati civil case, and the DOJ counsel acceded.
Agreement to Submit for Resolution
- The parties, with the permission of Judge Mislang, agreed to submit the petition for injunction for resolution based on memoranda within fifteen (15) days.
- The agreement reflected that there were allegedly no remaining factual matters requiring a full-blown trial.
- After this arrangement, Lee proceeded with a procedural motion that became central to the administrative liability.
The Urgent Motion and Ex-parte Action
- On August 12, 2011, after Lee submitted his memorandum the day before, he filed an unverified Urgent Motion for ex-parte resolution of his TRO application.
- Judge Mislang issued orders dated August 16, 2011 and August 26, 2011 granting the petition for TRO.
- The Supreme Court found that Judge Mislang granted the TRO without waiting for the DOJ’s memorandum.
- The Supreme Court also found that the DOJ was not given notice of Lee’s Urgent Motion for ex-parte resolution of the TR